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Abstract 
 
 
 
Sir Keith Holyoake, New Zealand Prime Minister from 1960 to 1972, famously 
counselled first-term Members of Parliament to ‘breathe through their noses’, 
suggesting that it was in their best interests to keep their heads down and 
mouths shut. Perhaps this recommendation is instrumental in the low profile of 
first-term MPs in New Zealand and the subsequent dearth of information 
available about these individuals. 
 
Within political science, scholarly attention has tended to focus on the ‘power 
holders’ – senior leaders and those perceived to have the most influence. In 
New Zealand, this has resulted in a growing field of literature about prime 
ministers, party leaders, and the few parliamentarians who reach cabinet. This 
thesis steps back from power holders to shed light on new MPs. 
 
It is important to know who new MPs are. Within parliamentary systems MPs 
often serve long apprenticeships before being promoted to the senior positions 
of their party and government. Thus MPs who enter parliament today may hold 
significant influence in the future. However, very little is known about 
legislators when they enter parliament. Do all Members of Parliament wish to 
become ministers or prime ministers, or do they have more modest aspirations, 
such as being the best local MP they possibly can? By understanding the 
motivations of our neophyte politicians we can better understand the types of 
people who are likely to become significant political actors in the future. 
 
This study aims to understand how and why individuals become MPs and how 
they adapt to the role once they have been elected. 
 
This thesis uses information gained from two rounds of interviews conducted 
with first-term Members of Parliament during their first nine months in office. 
Thus this research presents an insight into how MPs view candidate selection 
and follows them through their first few months in the job as they reconcile 
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their pre-election expectations with the roles expected of MPs. The result is an 
account of how individuals become MPs and the roles they develop once 
elected. 
 iv
 
Acknowledgements 
 
 
Over the course of researching and writing this thesis, my thoughts have often 
turned to what I might write in the acknowledgements section. Initially, the 
thought was rather inviting. Acknowledgements, after all, are an opportunity to 
identify in print those who have inspired and supported you. 
 
As the time to write the acknowledgements approached, however, I became 
more and more reluctant to put pen to paper. This is not to suggest that I lacked 
people to thank – on the contrary, I had countless people to include. Rather, my 
reluctance was on account of the finality of writing the acknowledgements and 
putting an end of an incredibly enjoyable and rewarding experience. But, alas, 
all good things must come to an end – and those who have been involved as 
mentors, guides, supporters, and friends must be duly recognised and thanked. 
 
First, I thank my primary supervisor, Dr. Jon Johansson. Jon has the unusual 
distinction of fitting into each of the categories above: he is a mentor, guide, 
supporter, and friend. Some of my best ideas came from our lunchtime 
discussions in the Staff Club. I am particularly grateful for Jon’s assistance in 
developing the concepts of ‘proto-leadership’ and ‘parachute’ MPs. Jon was 
fortunate enough to spend several months in the United States as a Fulbright 
scholar while he was supervising my work. I remain grateful – and amazed – 
that despite the potential to ignore me in favour of the sights of Washington 
D.C., Jon was always accessible and insightful. I thank Jon most of all for his 
trust that I would create a worthy thesis. 
 
My secondary supervisor, Prof. Stephen Levine, is also deserving of enormous 
thanks. Stephen’s probing of my arguments has strengthened not only this 
thesis, but also my understanding of political science. Stephen has also been 
kind, patient, and always ready to chat. Anyone who knows Stephen will also 
know that his sense of humour is unique (in a good way, of course) and makes 
meetings a joy. I particularly appreciate Stephen’s extra attention while Jon was 
 v
abroad – it was encouraging to know that there was always a friendly ear in the 
building and, indeed, the hemisphere.  
 
The primary data for this thesis was derived from interviews with 28 New 
Zealand Members of Parliament. Confidentiality requirements mean that I 
cannot name them individually, but suffice to say that they form the backbone 
of this work. I was astonished at the willingness of MPs talk about all aspects of 
their lives – professional and personal. I came away from the interviews feeling 
positive about the future of our parliament. I thank each and every MP for their 
time, openness, and honesty. 
 
When my thesis was nearing completion, I put out a call for proof-readers and 
expected a deafening silence. Instead, a bevy of brave souls came forward, each 
of whom deserves recognition: Christine Barnes, Hugh Eldred-Grigg, Robyn 
Kenealy, Maire Smith, Hana Snook, and Jackson James Wood. I thank each and 
every one of you for not only sacrificing your time, but also for providing 
critiques and interpretations that have strengthened this thesis. 
 
Thanks are also due to the Parliamentary Library and its staff for entertaining 
my frequent requests for information. Each and every request was answered 
promptly and professionally. Moreover, extra nuggets of information were 
often included, almost as if I was being led on a fascinating treasure hunt. 
 
I was fortunate enough to be awarded a Victoria Master’s by Thesis Scholarship. 
This scholarship lifted the financial burden that studying often attracts. More 
importantly, however, it indicated to me that my work was valued by the 
university. Thanks to Victoria University and the Scholarships Office. 
 
A quirk of acknowledgement sections is that the author’s partner is commonly 
mentioned last. This is curious because partners usually bear the greatest 
burden of their loved one’s endeavour. My partner, Jessica Lemieux, can 
assuredly attest to this. Jess has been fundamental to my success, as she is to all 
 vi
aspects of my life. She has provided more love and compassion than I thought 
possible, and for this I thank her most of all. 
 vii
 
Table of Contents 
 
 
Table of Figures ............................................................................................................................... x 
 
Chapter 1 
Studying First-Term MPs in New Zealand ................................................................. 1 
2008 General Election ............................................................................................. 1 
Research Methodology ........................................................................................... 3 
Thesis Structure ...................................................................................................... 8 
 
Chapter 2 
Investigating Candidate Selection and 
Role Adaptation amongst Legislators ..................................................................... 10 
Leadership within a Political Context .................................................................. 10 
Candidate Nomination, Recruitment, and Selection .......................................... 13 
Candidate Selection in New Zealand ................................................................... 17 
Political Socialisation ........................................................................................................ 20 
Ambition ................................................................................................................................ 23 
Legislator Roles ..................................................................................................... 26 
Role Expectations amongst New MPs ........................................................................ 27 
Representation ...................................................................................................... 29 
Defining Political Representation ................................................................................ 29 
Constituency Members .................................................................................................... 32 
List Members ....................................................................................................................... 34 
Thematic Representation ................................................................................................ 36 
Parliamentary Roles .............................................................................................. 37 
The House .............................................................................................................................. 37 
Select Committees .............................................................................................................. 39 
Caucus ..................................................................................................................................... 40 
Policy ....................................................................................................................................... 41 
 
Chapter 3 
Candidate Selection ....................................................................................................... 44 
Supply and Demand .............................................................................................. 44 
Key Supply and Demand Factors ......................................................................... 47 
Ambition ................................................................................................................................ 47 
Political Socialisation ........................................................................................................ 51 
Occupation ............................................................................................................................ 56 
Women ................................................................................................................................... 59 
Ethnic Minorities ................................................................................................................ 62 
Party Loyalty ........................................................................................................................ 64 
Community and Volunteer Experience ...................................................................... 67 
Perceptions of the Candidate Selection Process ................................................. 68 
Candidate Selection and ‘Types’ of MPs and Party Size ...................................... 70 
Temperament ........................................................................................................ 73 
Candidate Selection and Community Leadership............................................... 78 
Conclusions ............................................................................................................ 79 
 viii 
 
Chapter 4 
Representation ................................................................................................................ 81 
Defining Representation ....................................................................................... 81 
Geographic Constituency Representation ........................................................... 87 
Electorates as Constituencies ........................................................................................ 87 
Regions as Constituencies ............................................................................................... 88 
Geographic Constituency Representation ................................................................ 89 
Ethnic Constituency Representation ................................................................... 98 
Ethnic Groups as Constituencies .................................................................................. 98 
Ethnic Constituency Representation .......................................................................... 99 
Party Representation .......................................................................................... 101 
General, Ill-Defined, and Absent Representation ............................................. 103 
Representation and Community Leadership .................................................... 112 
Conclusions .......................................................................................................... 113 
 
Chapter 5 
Parliamentary Roles ................................................................................................... 116 
Arriving at Parliament ........................................................................................ 116 
The House ............................................................................................................ 118 
Initial Experiences in the House ................................................................................ 118 
Maiden Speeches ............................................................................................................. 120 
The House ........................................................................................................................... 126 
Select Committees ............................................................................................... 132 
Parties .................................................................................................................. 139 
Caucus .................................................................................................................................. 139 
Caucus Committees ........................................................................................................ 145 
Policy .................................................................................................................................... 148 
Parliamentary Roles and Community Leadership ........................................... 152 
Conclusions .......................................................................................................... 154 
 
Chapter 6 
Conclusions .................................................................................................................... 156 
Candidate Selection ............................................................................................. 156 
Variations in Roles amongst ‘Types’ of MPs ..................................................... 158 
Electorate versus List MPs ........................................................................................... 159 
Large versus Small Party MPs .................................................................................... 163 
Representative Roles .......................................................................................... 166 
Parliamentary Roles ............................................................................................ 169 
Changes in Role Conceptions ............................................................................. 171 
Ministerial Ambitions .................................................................................................... 172 
Intended Number of Terms ......................................................................................... 174 
Post-Political Possibilities ............................................................................................ 176 
Leadership ........................................................................................................... 179 
 
Appendix I 
Participant Information Sheet ...................................................................................... 184 
 ix
Appendix II 
Consent to Participation in Research ......................................................................... 186 
Appendix III 
First Interview Schedule ............................................................................................... 187 
Appendix IV 
Second Interview Schedule ........................................................................................... 190 
Appendix V 
Parliamentary Services Induction Seminar Agenda ................................................ 193 
Appendix VI 
Office of the Clerk Induction Workshop Programme .............................................. 196 
Appendix VII 
Code of Conduct for Members of Parliament ............................................................ 199 
 
Bibliography .................................................................................................................. 200 
 
 x
Table of Figures 
 
 
Table 1.1  Distribution of MPs across Parties and First-Term MPs in each 
Party 
Table 1.2 Distribution of Participants across Parties 
Table 1.3  Key Demographic Information  
Table 1.4  MPs’ Occupational Backgrounds 
Figure 2.1 Model of Political Recruitment 
Table 2.1 Candidate Selection Methods in New Zealand’s Political Parties 
Figure 2.2 Model of Political Socialisation 
Table 3.1 Average Length of Party Membership amongst the 2008 Intake by 
Party 
Table 4.1  Uncommon Constituencies 
Table 5.1  Subjects included in Maiden Speeches of MPs first elected in 
November 2008 
Figure 5.1  Word Cloud of Most Common Words from Maiden Speech 
Table 5.2 Subjects included in Maiden Speeches of MPs elected in 
November 2008 by MP Type, Party Size, Gender, and Ethnicity 
Table 5.3  Perceptions of Collegiality in Select Committees 
Figure 5.2  Proportion of New MPs’ Bills in Members’ Bill Ballots 
Table 6.1  Electorate versus List Preferences 
Figure 6.1  Intended Number of Terms 
Table 6.2  Post-Political Possibilities 
 
 Chapter 1 
 
Studying First-Term MPs in New Zealand 
 
 
The study of first-term MPs has largely been overlooked in academic literature 
both in New Zealand and abroad. This is unsurprising, as the hierarchies 
apparent in Western legislatures ensure that power is usually concentrated in 
the hands of party leaders and senior legislators. 
 
The dearth of information about new legislators is a significant gap in the 
political science literature. Given the hierarchical structure of legislatures, it is 
essential to have a framework with which to measure new MPs in order to 
understand who they are and how they are likely to progress into higher 
legislative offices. 
 
This thesis addresses this issue by seeking to understand: 
• how candidate selection processes influence the types of people who are 
selected as candidates 
• who was elected for the first time in the 2008 general election, and  
• what roles first-term MPs adopt upon their entry to parliament.  
 
The thesis also asks the question of whether new legislators can be considered 
political leaders or any other type of leader and, if so, how they adapt to 
leadership roles.  
 
This introductory chapter briefly sets out the study’s context, outlines the 
research methodology, and presents the structure of the thesis. 
 
2008 General Election 
 
New Zealand held a general election on 8 November 2008. The result saw the 
Labour Party, which had led minority governments since 1999, ousted in favour 
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of a National-led government under the leadership of John Key. Following the 
election, the National Party entered into confidence and supply agreements 
with ACT, United Future, and the Maori Party. In April 2009, five months after 
the election, the Green Party signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the 
National Party, pledging to work together on a selected range of issues, such as 
energy efficiency.1 
 
The election returned 122 Members of Parliament,2 of whom 34 (28 percent) 
had never served in parliament before.3 Table 1.1 shows the 2008 election 
results and the number of new MPs in each party. 
 
Table 1.1 – Distribution of MPs across Parties and First-Term MPs in each 
Party  
Party Total Number of 
MPs 
Total Number of 
First-Term MPs 
Caucus 
Percentage of 
First-Term MPs 
National 58 15 26% 
Labour 43 13 30% 
Green 9 3 33% 
ACT 5 2 40% 
Maori 5 1 20% 
United 
Future 
1 0 0% 
Progressives 1 0 0% 
 122 34 21% 
                                                 
1 Information about these political parties can be found at www.labour.org.nz, 
www.national.org.nz, www.act.org.nz, www.unitedfuture.org.nz, www.maoriparty.org, and 
www.greens.org.nz. 
2 The standard size of the New Zealand Parliament is 120 members, but the Mixed Member 
Proportional electoral system occasionally creates an ‘overhang’ when a party wins a greater 
number of electorate seats than their proportion of the party vote allows. The Maori Party’s 
success in five Maori electorates coupled with its low party vote caused an overhang in 2008. 
3 One well-known member, the Honourable Sir Roger Douglas, was re-elected 18 years after 
retiring from parliament. Sir Roger was excluded from this study as he did not fit the criteria of a 
first-term MP. Additionally, while this study was being conducted four new MPs entered 
parliament because of the resignations of two other members. These new members were not 
included in the study because they were not first elected in the 2008 general election. 
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Research Methodology 
 
Two rounds of interviews were conducted with new MPs. Interviews focused 
on candidate selection processes, experiences as candidates in the 2008 
campaign, roles of Members of Parliament, and MPs’ expectations of their first 
term in parliament and beyond. The information gained from these interviews 
forms a substantial part of this thesis, providing a source of original primary 
material against which the existing literature on candidate selection, 
representation, and parliamentary roles can be assessed. 
 
The Members of the 49th Parliament were sworn in on 8 December 2008. The 
parliamentary offices of all 34 first-term MPs were contacted by telephone in 
January-February 2009 to request an initial interview. As a matter of courtesy, 
the whips of the National and Labour parties were contacted before 
approaching their MPs. Initial contact with each MP’s office was followed up by 
subsequent telephone calls or emails as necessary. 
 
Of the 34 MPs contacted, 28 (82 percent) participated in the first round of 
interviews. In the second round, one participant declined to be re-interviewed, 
resulting in a sample of 27 MPs (79 percent).  
 
The first round of interviews occurred between January and May 2009. 
Interviews were usually an hour in duration; some were shorter depending on 
the time available. Second interviews were conducted between June and August 
2009. The second interviews were carried out in approximately the same order 
as the first to ensure that adequate time had passed between each MP’s 
interviews. Second interviews were scheduled to last 30 minutes; some ran 
longer, others were truncated due to time constraints. 
 
Table 1.2 shows the distribution of participants across parties. 
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Table 1.2 – Distribution of Participants across Parties 
Party Number of First-
Round 
Participants 
Proportion 
of all First-
Term MPs 
(%) 
Number of 
Second-
Round 
Participants 
Proportion 
of all First-
Term MPs 
(%) 
National 11 32 10 29 
Labour 11 32 11 32 
Green 3 9 3 9 
ACT 2 6 2 6 
Maori 1 3 1 3 
 28 82% 27 79% 
 
Table 1.3, overleaf, compares key demographic information about the 
participating MPs against all MPs. 
 
Immediately, differences between the parliament as a whole and the 2008 
intake are apparent. The Class of 2008 were notably younger than their 
colleagues. The largest variation was in the 55-64 age grouping. The large 
cohort of MPs in this age group may suggest that politics is becoming 
increasingly professionalised and is considered a long-term occupation.  
 
The new MPs were less likely to be Pakeha or Pacifica and more likely to be 
Asian, suggesting that Asian New Zealanders – who have typically been 
underrepresented – are now taking their place in the legislature. They were 
slightly more likely to live north of Taupo, reflecting the ongoing northward 
migration of people – and power – in New Zealand.  
 
Those who stood for the first time in 2008 were likely to stand in an electorate 
and on the party list, indicating that parties generally reserve their list-only 
spaces for existing MPs – most likely senior MPs with significant portfolio 
responsibilities – with the notable exception of candidates from ethnic 
minorities. These demographic variations will be discussed in greater detail 
throughout this thesis. 
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Table 1.3 – Key Demographic Information  
  2008 
Intake 
(%)4 
All MPs 
(%) 
Variance 
(+/- %) 
Gender Male 68 66 (-2) 
Female 32 34 +2 
Age 25-34 22 6 +16 
35-44 37 22 +15 
45-54 30 32 (-2) 
55-64 11 35 (-24) 
65-74 0 5 (-5) 
Ethnicity Pakeha 68 76 (-8) 
Maori 15 15 0 
Pacific 6 14 (-8) 
Asian 12 5 +7 
Geographic 
Location 
North of Taupo 61 57 +4 
Lower North Island 21 23 (-2) 
South Island 18 21 (-3) 
Stood as Electorate 
candidate only 
0 0 0 
List candidate only 9 14 (-5) 
Both electorate and 
list candidate 
91 86 +5 
 
Table 1.4, overleaf, compares the occupational backgrounds of the 2008 intake 
with the parliament as a whole. 
 
Variations in occupational backgrounds are notable, with an increase in public 
servants, advocates/lobbyists, and diplomats entering parliament. At the same 
                                                 
4 The 2008 intake includes MPs who were not interviewed for this study. 
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time the number of farmers and – surprisingly – professionals decreased. These 
occupational themes will also be explored further in this thesis. 
 
Table 1.4 – MPs’ Occupational Backgrounds5 
Occupation 
2008 Intake 
(%) All MPs (%) 
Variance 
(+/-%) 
Manager/CEO 14 13 +1 
Lawyer 11 9 +2 
Professional6 11 16 (-5) 
Community 
Sector 
9 6 +3 
Public Service 9 3 +6 
Self-Employed 9 7 +2 
Advocate/ 
Lobbyist 
7 4 +3 
Consultant 7 5 +2 
Education 7 11 (-4) 
Political 7 9 (-2) 
Diplomat 5 3 +2 
Union 5 6 (-1) 
Farmer 0 6 (-6) 
Service 0 2 (-2) 
Total 100 100  
 
The specific questions asked of each MP varied between interviews, but the 
themes remained constant. In the first round of interviews the themes were 
classified as general reactions to being an MP, personal situation before 
election, decision to run, candidacy, campaign and election, role definition, 
initial parliamentary experiences, relationships with other MPs, and future 
perspectives. The second interview themes were general reactions to being an 
MP, roles, constituents, list/electorate and small/large party role differences, 
                                                 
5 Occupational information was retrieved from MP profiles on www.parliament.govt.nz.  
6 This category includes occupations such as accountants, economists and journalists. 
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psychology (such as motivations, feelings of efficacy), party, parliament, media, 
intra- and inter-party relationships, and future perspectives. The interview 
schedules used to guide each interview are included as Appendix III and 
Appendix IV. 
 
It is extremely important to note the limitations of this thesis’s data. All 
responses are self-reported by MPs themselves. Thus there is a serious risk that 
responses may be skewed towards MPs reporting that their actions fit within 
their normative assumptions about how MPs ought to behave rather than how 
they actually act.  
 
There is also a risk that some individuals may lack the self-awareness to 
accurately report how they perceive a situation or act in certain circumstances. 
This observation is not intended to cast doubt on the intellectual capacity of 
MPs; rather when faced with a question about a subject to which they have 
devoted little thought individuals may respond flippantly, or in a manner that 
does not reflect their actual behaviour or, indeed, their philosophy. 
 
Moreover, as only individuals who were successful in being elected were 
interviewed, responses regarding candidate selection may favour the position 
of successful candidates at the expense of those who either did not achieve their 
party’s nomination or who unsuccessfully contested the election. These data 
limitations cannot be stressed strongly enough. 
 
However, self-reported data, when treated with caution, can be extremely 
useful. Firstly, if MPs claim to behave in a manner consistent with normative 
assumptions about legislator roles, this provides a valuable pool of information 
about exactly what those assumptions are and allows exploration of why such 
assumptions exist. Secondly, self-reported data that is skewed towards a 
flattering image of MPs allows parallels to be drawn between perceived 
behaviour and actual behaviour. For instance, if an MP claims to behave with 
civility in the House but actually interjects and heckles opponents loudly and 
frequently, it is possible to examine why such a disparity exists. 
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Thus one should read this thesis with these data limitations in mind. The aim of 
this work is not to provide a definitive account of how individuals become MPs 
and the roles they adopt once elected. Rather, it seeks to build a better 
understanding of the types of people who enter parliament, the experiences 
that new MPs typically face, and the roles that are available for MPs to choose 
from. This thesis claims only to be a snapshot of new MPs elected in the 2008 
general election. 
 
Thesis Structure 
 
This thesis is broken into six chapters, including this first introductory chapter.  
The second chapter identifies arguments surrounding political leadership, 
candidate selection, political representation, and parliamentary roles in New 
Zealand and abroad. This chapter serves as a review of the existing literature, 
although it delves beyond this into a preliminary identification and analysis of 
the topics relevant to this thesis, specifically the dynamics and effects of 
candidate selection processes, methods of providing representation, and the 
variety of parliamentary roles MPs are expected to fulfil. 
 
The third chapter discusses candidate selection in New Zealand with respect to 
differences between parties, the types of people selected, and MPs’ perspectives 
on the selection process. Information collected from interviews with MPs will 
be analysed against the international literature about the composition of 
legislatures to determine how ‘typical’ New Zealand MPs are. Comparisons will 
be made between the processes used by New Zealand political parties to select 
candidates and the effects of party differences will be analysed.  
 
The fourth chapter discusses differing conceptions of representation in the New 
Zealand parliament, including geographic, ethnic, and party representation. 
Moreover, the differences in representative focus between electorate and list 
MPs and large and small party MPs will be addressed. Chapter four also 
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explores the ways that new MPs go about representing their constituents and 
their self-perceptions of legitimacy. 
 
The fifth chapter turns to the mechanics of parliament itself, examining the 
parliamentary roles of new MPs. House, select committee, party, and policy 
responsibilities are explored. The maiden speeches of new MPs are also studied 
as a means of understanding attitudes towards parliament.  
 
The final chapter concludes by discussing the value of candidate selection 
mechanisms, variations in roles amongst ‘types’ of MPs, how representation 
occurs amongst new MPs, and changes in role conceptions. This chapter brings 
together findings from throughout this thesis to offer a better understanding of 
expectations of and about new MPs. 
 
Leadership is a theme throughout this thesis. Each chapter discusses the types 
of leadership that new MPs demonstrate through their roles as legislators. This 
aims to provide a better understanding of roles that are peripheral to political 
leadership, such as community leadership. Moreover, this focus highlights the 
fact that while new MPs may not be political leaders when they enter 
parliament, they form an exclusive pool of future political leaders. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Investigating Candidate Selection and  
Role Adaptation amongst Legislators 
 
 
The literature concerning candidate selection and role adaptation in the New 
Zealand legislature is limited. Fortunately, however, some overseas scholarship 
exists. This chapter sets out the arguments of the existing literature surrounding 
candidate selection and role adaptation in Western legislatures. In addition to 
performing the functions of a literature review, this chapter also identifies and 
offers a preliminary exploration of the key themes and topics addressed by this 
thesis, including leadership; candidate nomination, recruitment and selection; 
the decision to stand for parliament; legislator roles; representation; and 
parliamentary roles. 
 
Leadership within a Political Context 
 
All MPs provide some form of leadership. This thesis addresses how backbench 
MPs exercise leadership by focusing on those who are generally the lowest-
ranked members in the hierarchical parliamentary environment: new MPs. In 
assessing the leadership functions of MPs who are typically the most obscure 
and constrained individuals in the entire parliament it is possible to better 
understand the leadership functions of all MPs. 
 
As a concept, political leadership is exclusive. Jon Johansson defines political 
leadership as: 
 
a dynamic interaction that occurs between an elected leadership 
(whether individual or group based) and its citizenry. It is 
mediated to varying degrees by situational constraints and 
opportunities. A leader or leaders combining power and purpose 
to achieve shared objectives with the citizenry characterises the 
leadership interaction.1 
                                                 
1 Jon Johansson, Two Titans: Muldoon, Lange and Leadership (Wellington: Dunmore Press, 2005), 
p. 19. 
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New MPs demonstrate some of the qualities required of political leaders: they 
are elected, they interact with the citizenry, and they are affected by situational 
constraints and opportunities. Arguably, new MPs have shared objectives with 
the citizenry and may act with purpose to see their goals achieved. 
 
However, new MPs generally lack power and thus they face the greatest 
situational constraints of all legislators. The vast majority of new MPs are 
relatively unknown, certainly outside of their communities. Moreover, 
parliamentary and party hierarchies mean that new MPs generally have few 
significant responsibilities. Even new MPs with the greatest leadership potential 
are severely restricted in their ability to act; thus their ability to be political 
leaders is limited. 
 
There are, however, occasionally exceptions to this rule. For instance, Steven 
Joyce, who was elected as a National list MP in 2008, was relatively well-known 
by virtue of his previous roles within the National Party. Joyce was made a 
minister immediately upon being elected – an unusual occurrence – and thus 
acquired significant formal power. The other recent notable exception is 
Margaret Wilson’s immediate elevation into the Clark cabinet upon her election 
in 1999. Joyce and Wilson’s cases are examples of the exception proving the 
rule. The majority of new MPs must progress through party and parliamentary 
hierarchies before achieving such roles – the fact that Joyce and Wilson 
overcame these institutional barriers make their cases unusual. 
 
Despite this, all MPs have the potential to be leaders of some description. The 
size of the New Zealand parliament means that the pool of possible leaders is 
relatively small. Thus if MPs demonstrate competence in backbench roles their 
chances of promotion are relatively high. Therefore, new MPs can be described 
as ‘proto-leaders’: individuals whose institutional location means that they form 
the future pool of political leaders. 
 
 12
MPs’ privileged positions within their communities also mean that they are 
uniquely placed to offer leadership to a range of citizens. Thus new MPs are not 
political leaders; rather they are community leaders. Community leaders are 
individuals who support or advocate for communities. The concept of 
community is inclusive and may describe geographic areas, ethnicities, genders, 
and so on. Communities may even describe individuals who subscribe to 
particular ideologies or wish particular policies to be implemented. Moreover, 
while it is normatively important for political leaders to be elected, this is not 
the case for community leaders. Community leadership may be exercised by any 
individual who is perceived by the community as legitimate. Thus community 
leaders may be MPs, but they may also be teachers, religious leaders, activists, 
and so on. 
 
It should be stressed that MPs’ individual agency is important in determining 
the extent to which they are leaders. While the potential to exercise leadership 
assuredly exists by virtue of their office, MPs who lack leadership skills will not 
develop leadership roles beyond their ex-officio positions. On the other hand, 
MPs who possess leadership skills may employ them to engage with broader 
groups within society and in turn develop the skills required of political 
leadership. Thus it is up to each MP to determine the type of leadership they 
aspire to and, if desired, to employ strategies to move from being ‘proto’ or 
community leaders to becoming political leaders. 
 
The extent to which new MPs see themselves as leaders has not been tested in 
New Zealand. Stephen Levine and Nigel S. Roberts argue that MPs’ ‘own 
convictions about their own competence and capacities’ affect MPs’ self-images 
and their approach to leadership.2 Thus MPs must see themselves as leaders in 
order to be leaders. However, given how tightly-controlled the upper leadership 
positions are within parliamentary systems self-identifying as a leader may be 
interpreted as staking a claim to the party leadership or an expression of 
                                                 
2 Stephen Levine and Nigel S. Roberts, ‘Unwanted Heroes? Three Labour Leaders and Seven 
Campaigns’, in Margaret Clark (ed.), Three Labour Leaders: Nordmeyer, Kirk, Rowling 
(Palmerston North: Dunmore Press, 2001), p. 224. 
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overwhelming ambition and thus be frowned upon. Such a claim may even be 
career-limiting as party leaders seek to protect their positions.  
 
The assumption that all MPs have common goals is widespread, especially in 
small parliaments where the chances of achieving executive office are relatively 
high.3 This thesis argues the contrary; not all MPs wish to be prime ministers or 
members of the cabinet. Legislators’ diverse motivations and ambitions mean 
that desired positions will vary. Moreover, where a number of MPs share a goal, 
the method of achieving that goal will vary amongst them.4 This is consistent 
with the argument that new MPs exercise community leadership – community 
leadership, not political leadership, is the reason they became MPs. This thesis 
will test the hypothesis that goals amongst first-term MPs will vary and not be 
exclusively centred on achieving executive office.  
 
Candidate Nomination, Recruitment, and Selection  
 
The selection of candidates is perhaps the most important function of political 
parties. As Pippa Norris argues, ‘in the long run who gets into the legislature, 
perhaps rising during a twenty- or thirty-year career into the highest offices of 
state, may have more important repercussions for the future of the country than 
any other electoral choice.’5  
 
Who gets selected as political candidates is largely dependent on the legal, 
electoral, and party systems that determine selection practices. The rules of 
selection processes shape the supply of aspirants and the criteria by which 
selectors choose candidates. Norris describes the political recruitment process 
using the model shown in Figure 2.1. 
 
                                                 
3 Keith Jackson, ‘Candidate Selection and the 1978 General Election’, in Howard R. Penniman 
(ed.), New Zealand and the Polls: The General Election in 1978 (Washington DC: American 
Enterprise Institute for Public Research, 1980), p. 117. 
4 Elizabeth McLeay and Jack Vowles, ‘Redefining Constituency Representation: The Roles of New 
Zealand MPs Under MMP’, Regional and Federal Studies, Vol. 17, No. 1, March 2007, p. 92. 
5 Pippa Norris, ‘Introduction: Theories of Recruitment’, in Pippa Norris (ed.), Passages to Power: 
Legislative Recruitment in Advanced Democracies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1997), p. 3. 
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Selecting candidates can be understood as a question of supply and demand. 
Supply concerns the people who put themselves forward for nomination. 
Potential candidates must have the motivation and political capital to enter the 
selection process.6 As not everybody wishes to be a legislator, self-filtering 
occurs in determining the supply of potential candidates. There tend to be 
biases towards particular occupations, age groups, family situations, education 
levels, genders, and races.7 This has consequences for how representative the 
legislature is of the general population. 
 
Figure 2.1 – Model of Political Recruitment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Supply-side effects can, however, be moderated by demand. Parties determine 
the criteria used to select candidates in line with legal requirements. By 
applying criteria that seek to recruit particular types of candidates, supply-side 
biases can be minimised. Adjusting criteria to facilitate entry for 
underrepresented groups may result in a more diverse range of candidates. This 
occurs in Germany and Norway where some parties have self-imposed gender 
quotas in their candidate selection criteria.8 
 
However, viewing candidate selection as a supply and demand model overlooks 
two key points. Firstly, supply-side arguments assume that all aspiring 
                                                 
6 Pippa Norris, ‘Introduction: Theories of Recruitment’, p. 2. 
7 Pippa Norris and Joni Lovenduski, Political Recruitment: Gender, Race and Class in the British 
Parliament (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 144. 
8 Miki Caul, ‘Political Parties and the Adoption of Candidate Gender Quotas: A Cross-National 
Analysis’, The Journal of Politics, Vol. 63, No. 4, November 2001, p. 1216. 
Supply of 
Aspirants 
Legal System 
Outcome Recruitment Processes 
(Rules & Procedures) 
Electoral System 
Demands of 
Gatekeepers 
Party System 
Source: Pippa Norris, ‘Introduction: Theories of Recruitment’, p. 2. 
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candidates are rational actors seeking to achieve legislative office. However, not 
all potential candidates want to become legislators. Individuals may stand to 
raise their party’s profile or to advance specific policy goals, especially in small 
parties.9 Moreover, in larger parties individuals may offer themselves in 
unwinnable positions as a means of indicating that they wish to make a more 
serious run in the future. Where election is believed to be unlikely, candidates 
generally do not fit the ‘typical’ profile of candidates selected by their parties in 
safer positions.10 Supply arguments do not acknowledge the diversity of reasons 
why individuals put themselves forward for selection. 
 
Supply arguments also do not fully acknowledge the importance of political 
parties. Given the necessity of being sponsored by a party to be elected, parties 
themselves help to determine supply. Political parties play a role in grooming 
potential candidates. According to M.R. Price, potential candidates must 
‘emerge’ from within their parties. Emergence is concerned with ‘the 
identification or “discovery” of recruits who appear to others to be potential 
leaders’.11 Party leaders seek potential future legislators to progress within the 
party and members seek to distinguish leaders from non-leaders amongst their 
ranks.  
 
Within New Zealand political parties the length of membership before standing 
for parliament is comparatively short. The 1993 New Zealand Election Study 
showed an average length of party membership of less than four years.12 In the 
same period membership in Australian parties was 12.3 years.13 However, there 
are variances between parties. Larger parties generally demand longer party 
service – a trait that is even more common in parties on the political left. 
                                                 
9 Pippa Norris and Joni Lovenduski, Political Recruitment: Gender, Race and Class in the British 
Parliament, p. 24. 
10 Martin Holland, ‘Electoral Status and Candidate Selection: Data and Findings from the 1979 
British Direct Election to the European Parliament’, Political Science, Vol. 38, No. 2, December 
1986, p. 170. 
11 M.R. Price, The Political Vocation: A Study of the Recruitment and Selection of Parliamentary 
Candidates in the New Zealand National Party (University of Auckland: Unpublished MA Thesis, 
March 1972), p. 10. 
12 Helena Catt, ‘New Zealand’, in Pippa Norris (ed.), Passages to Power: Legislative Recruitment in 
Advanced Democracies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 151. 
13 Ian McAllister, ‘Australia’, in Pippa Norris (ed.), Passages to Power: Legislative Recruitment in 
Advanced Democracies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 20. 
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Additionally, candidates who enter parliament as electorate MPs are likely to 
have longer records of party membership.14 Candidates who are well-known 
within their parties – either through long service or active participation – have 
stronger networks on which to build their candidacy and a greater knowledge of 
their party’s internal workings.15 Candidates with a demonstrated commitment 
to their party are particularly desirable. 
 
Although it is possible to be selected without a long history of party service, one 
must still ‘emerge’ as a potential candidate. Some candidates are ‘self-starters’ – 
those who approach MPs or party officials to indicate their interest in 
standing.16 Others are ‘recruited’ – individuals that parties, pressure groups, or 
friends identify as potential legislators and convince to stand.17 Party 
presidents, general secretaries, regional party leaders, or notable figures within 
each electorate may play a particularly important role in recruiting potential 
candidates. Barber argues that when recruiting potential candidates, parties 
often highlight the favourable aspects of being a legislator while minimising the 
negative sides.18 Thus legislators who are ‘recruited’ may have a lower 
knowledge of the role than those who are ‘self-starters’. Regardless of 
differences in emergence, before nomination and selection individuals must 
become known to political parties as potential future legislators. 
 
Demand arguments are problematic in identifying who is likely to be selected as 
political candidates. Although demand can be moderated so that candidates 
from diverse backgrounds are selected, the extent to which this occurs varies. 
Thus the preferences and prejudices of selectors result in particular types of 
candidates being selected. Discrimination may be direct, based on the attitudes 
of the selectors, or indirect, based on selectors’ perceptions of the electorate’s 
                                                 
14 Raymond Miller, Party Politics in New Zealand (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 
122. 
15 Helena Catt, ‘New Zealand’, p. 150; Pippa Norris and Joni Lovenduski, Political Recruitment: 
Gender, Race and Class in the British Parliament, p. 162; Raymond Miller, Party Politics in New 
Zealand, p. 90; M.R. Price, The Political Vocation, p. 165. 
16 M.R. Price, The Political Vocation, p. 168. 
17 Michael Rush, Politics and Society: An Introduction to Political Sociology (Hertfordshire: 
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992), pp. 130-131. 
18 James David Barber, The Lawmakers, p. 241. 
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attitudes.19 Although discrimination may sometimes be positive (for example, 
running a candidate from a minority group in a constituency with a significant 
population from that community), it is more often negative (for example, 
selecting fewer minority candidates in favour of majority candidates). 
 
The extent of selector discrimination is often determined by the openness of the 
selection process. Open systems devolve selection powers to the public, party 
members, or delegates, while closed systems are characterised by high levels of 
central party control.20 Open and closed systems create different types of 
prejudices. Open systems that utilise public primary elections may expose the 
prejudices of the electorate, while open systems that allow local party members 
or delegates to control candidate selection may amplify the prejudices of a small 
group of individuals. Closed systems may entrench the prejudices of a small 
group, but high levels of central control may result in a more representative 
pool of candidates overall. Mixed systems that allow shared local and central 
control over selection attempt to balance the prejudices of each side. 
 
Many parties attempt to moderate themselves in selecting candidates, although 
what constitutes a desirable range of candidates varies. As David Boyd notes, 
the concept of a representative pool of candidates means different things to 
different parties – ‘to some, a representative list is one that reflects their party 
supporters; to others it is a mixture that takes account geography, gender, race, 
age and class.’21 Thus some parties may structure candidate lists to appeal to 
supporters while others appeal to broader demographic or geographic groups. 
 
Candidate Selection in New Zealand 
 
In New Zealand, legal and electoral rules are flexible enough to allow most 
individuals to stand for parliament. The Electoral Act 1993 requires only that 
                                                 
19 Pippa Norris and Joni Lovenduski, Political Recruitment, p. 124. 
20 Austin Ranney, ‘Candidate Selection and Party Cohesion in Britain and the United States’, in 
William J. Crotty (ed.), Approaches to the Study of Political Organization (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 
1968), p. 145. 
21 David Boyd, Party Candidate Selection Procedures and Objectives Under MMP (University of 
Auckland: Unpublished MA Thesis, July 1996), p. 3. 
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candidates be New Zealand citizens and be registered to vote in an electoral 
district.22 Political parties must be registered and follow democratic selection 
procedures, although the latter has never been enforced by the Electoral 
Commission.23 Arguably, New Zealand’s Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) 
electoral system makes election to parliament easier due to the existence of list 
members who are not elected in a geographic constituency. However, party 
dominance significantly reduces the potential supply of aspirants. New Zealand 
does not have a tradition of electing independent MPs. Therefore, to have a 
reasonable chance of being elected, one must stand for a political party. 
 
Each political party varies in how they select candidates, although most New 
Zealand parties use relatively closed processes. The methods employed by New 
Zealand’s parties are outlined in Table 2.1, overleaf. 
 
Decision to Stand 
 
The legislative career is not suited to everyone. As Levine and Roberts neatly 
sum up, ‘it is sometimes said that in America anyone can grow up to be 
president, but what is not often added is that not everyone wishes to do so.’24 
Being a legislator is taxing on individuals. The role comes with a high public 
profile, long hours, and high risks. MPs are often treated with disdain by the 
media and the public. On the other hand, entering the legislature has many 
benefits, including the possibility of exercising real power and ‘making a 
                                                 
22 Electoral Act 1993, Section 47, www.legislation.govt.nz, accessed 12 June 2009. The only 
memorable occasion in which these conditions were not met was following the 2002 election 
where Kelly Chal, a United Future candidate, was not allowed to be sworn in as a Member of 
Parliament because she was resident, not a citizen, of New Zealand. Chal was replaced by the 
next eligible candidate on the United Future party list. 
23 Electoral Act 1993, Section 71; Raymond Miller, Party Politics in New Zealand, p. 110. The 
only recent case where this aspect of law was formally tested occurred following the 2008 
general election when an unsuccessful nominee for the National Party candidacy in the 
Selwyn electorate took a complaint about the party’s selection procedures to the High Court. 
The High Court ruled that the National Party’s application of democratic procedures were 
within the requirements set out by the Electoral Act 1993. See PAYNE v ADAMS (Unreported, 
7 May 2009, High Court Christchurch, Randerson, Allan and French JJ). 
24 Stephen Levine and Nigel S. Roberts, ‘From Lobby Fodder to Leadership: New Zealand 
Parliamentarians and Select Committees’, Political Science, Vol. 56, No. 2, December 2004, p. 43. 
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difference’. In understanding who become MPs it is important to understand 
what appeals to them about the job and why they put themselves forward.  
 
Table 2.1 – Candidate Selection Methods in New Zealand’s Political Parties 
 Electorate List 
National Locally-selected delegates vote 
on centrally-approved 
candidates 
Central list-ranking committee. 
Some regional influence 
Labour Locally-selected delegates and 
centrally-appointed party 
delegates vote on centrally-
approved candidates 
Central list-ranking committee. 
Some regional influence 
Green Locally-selected delegates vote 
on centrally-approved 
candidates 
All members vote to create 
indicative list from centrally-
approved candidates. Final 
ranking determined centrally 
Maori Party members and electors on 
Maori roll in each electorate vote 
at local hui. Final confirmation 
made centrally 
Local Electorate Councils send 
prioritised rankings to the 
National Council. Final ranking 
determined centrally 
ACT Local members vote on 
centrally-approved candidates 
Party members vote to create 
indicative list from centrally-
approved candidates. Final 
ranking determined centrally 
United 
Future 
Panel of local, regional, and 
central delegates seek local 
member feedback before 
endorsing candidate. Final 
confirmation made centrally 
All members submit prioritised 
rankings to the Board of 
Management. Final ranking 
determined centrally 
Progressive Locally-selected delegates and 
centrally-appointed party 
delegates vote on centrally-
approved candidates 
Central list-ranking committee. 
Some regional influence. 
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Political Socialisation 
 
All MPs have at least one thing in common: an interest in politics. However, 
when, where, and how that interest develops differs. According to Michael Rush, 
political socialisation is ‘the means by which individuals acquire political 
knowledge or information, political values or basic beliefs, and political 
attitudes or opinions on specific matters’.25 Rush’s model of political 
socialisation is shown in Figure 2.2, overleaf. 
 
Political socialisation begins early in life and is shaped by the groups that 
individuals belong to such as families, peer groups, and other civil society 
groups. These groups provide sources for imitation, instruction, and motivation. 
Initial socialisation typically occurs in childhood and is reinforced or adapted by 
experiences, behaviour, and personality throughout adolescence and adulthood. 
Thus socialisation is a perpetual cycle – one never finishes being socialised. 
 
Understanding when political socialisation occurs allows for an understanding 
of how intrinsic a particular set of political beliefs are to an individual. For 
instance, being politically socialised as a child should result in the political 
beliefs of that child being a core part of their identity, if their political beliefs 
have stood the test of time against numerous rounds of reinforcement and re-
socialisation. On the other hand, one might expect those who are politically 
socialised as adults to be more flexible in their political beliefs. Thus identifying 
the point of political socialisation exposes an individual’s likely approach to 
politics. 
 
Motivations to stand for public office differ greatly between individuals. Those 
who enter politics while young are likely to be motivated by a specific political 
personality or campaign; young legislators may select political personalities as  
 
 
                                                 
25 Michael Rush, Politics and Society, p. 96. 
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their ego-ideals in the same way others may select movie or rock stars.32 
Moreover, charismatic leadership may provide a catalyst for young people to 
become politically active.33 Young people are less driven by specific policies 
or issues; while their political identity is firm they tend to drift into political 
activity.34 
 
Older people, on the other hand, are likely to be motivated by specific 
concerns or issues. The decision to enter politics is rational and based on the 
desire to solve specific problems.35 There is often a feeling of dissatisfaction 
with politicians and the political environment and the decision to stand is 
based partially on a sense of duty to solve these issues.36 The decision is 
made easier by many older aspirants having grown-up children and thus 
possibly being particularly open to considering a new career path.37 Older 
legislators are likely to take a pragmatic approach to political issues.38 
 
Age is also significant when examining motivations that may be triggered by 
events or attitudes that are of special significance to particular generations. 
As Prewitt and Nowlin argue, ‘a consideration of the time at which the 
current leadership class were children and adolescents informs us of the 
kind of schooling they had, the nature of the dramatic political events they 
experienced, and what their earliest acquired, and most persistently held, 
views of the political world might be.’39 Generational attitudes are often 
shaped by crises. During times of uncertainty, individuals begin to feel the 
relevance of their political views. Thus understanding the crises of 
                                                 
32 Kenneth Prewitt, Heinz Eulau, and Betty H. Zisk, ‘Political Socialization and Political Roles’, 
The Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 4, Winter 1966-1967, p. 576. 
33 M.R. Price, The Political Vocation, p. 9. 
34 James Walter, The Acculturation to Political Work: New Members of the Federal Backbench 
(Canberra: Australasian Political Studies Association, 1979), p. 17. 
35 James Walter, The Acculturation to Political Work, p. 17.  
36 Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, Leroy Ferguson, and John C. Wahlke, ‘The Political 
Socialization of American State Legislators’, Midwest Journal of Political Science, Vol. 3, No. 2, 
May 1959, pp. 202-203. 
37 James Walter, The Acculturation to Political Work, p. 12. 
38 Kenneth Prewitt, Heinz Eulau, and Betty H. Zisk, ‘Political Socialization and Political Roles’, 
p. 576. 
39 Kenneth Prewitt and William Nowlin, ‘Political Ambitions and the Behavior of Incumbent 
Politicians’, The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 2, June 1969, p. 305. 
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politicians’ lives – especially those during youth – helps us to understand 
motivations. 
 
The exposure an individual has to politics throughout their life plays an 
important role in how they feel about the political vocation. The extent to 
which politics features in a child’s life is a good indicator of how they will feel 
about politics in their adult life. Prewitt argues that children of politicians, 
union leaders, campaign workers, lobbyists, civic leaders, or professors are 
more likely to become legislators.40 Price found a strong correlation between 
having family members who are politically active and standing for 
parliament.41 Family members need not be activists – simply being 
interested in politics increases the likelihood of children becoming politically 
active.42 This suggests that those most psychologically prepared for a 
political career are those exposed to politics throughout their lives. 
 
Ambition 
 
Studying individuals’ ambitions allows us to see what serves as their call to 
action. Stanley A. Renshon defines ambition as the ‘capacity, desire and 
ability to invest oneself for the accomplishment of one’s immediate and life 
purposes.’43 Renshon argues that ambition sees the ‘consolidation of a set of 
skills that can be successfully engaged in the pursuit and accomplishment of 
one’s goals and the realization of one’s values.’44 Without ambition, goals 
cannot be formed nor achieved. Politically, ambition refers to the drive that 
makes political aspirants want to stand for public office.45 While largely a 
psychological trait, ambition is also shaped by institutional constraints.46 
                                                 
40 Kenneth Prewitt, ‘Political Socialization and Leadership Selection’, pp. 106-107. 
41 M.R. Price, The Political Vocation, p. 144. 
42 James Walter, The Acculturation to Political Work, p. 9. 
43 Stanley A. Renshon, The Psychological Assessment of Presidential Candidates (New York & 
London: New York University Press, 1998), p. 186. 
44 Stanley A. Renshon, The Psychological Assessment of Presidential Candidates, p. 186. 
45 Pippa Norris, ‘Introduction: Theories of Recruitment’, p. 13. 
46 Pippa Norris and Joni Lovenduski, Political Recruitment: Gender, Race and Class in the 
British Parliament, p. 21. 
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Ambition cannot go unabated in situations where the structure of 
opportunities is unfavourable.  
 
Ambition describes the way legislators go about achieving their political 
goals. Essential to the role of a legislator is responding to a constituency. 
Ambitious legislators may respond to the constituency that controls the 
office to which they aspire.47 Thus some legislators may respond primarily to 
voters and local party organisations, while others may appeal to party 
leaders, who act as gatekeepers to their desired offices. Prewitt and Nowlin 
argue that anticipatory socialisation occurs when legislators ‘begin to 
prepare themselves for their future positions long before they actually fill 
those positions.’48 Individuals anticipate the reactions of those who control 
access to their desired position and act accordingly.49 
 
In order to achieve one’s goals, significant energy must be invested in their 
pursuit.50 This is especially true of legislators. Given that political careers are 
highly competitive and the structure of opportunities often unfavourable, 
being elected and achieving one’s political goals requires extremely high 
levels of energy. The hours worked by legislators are long and successes are 
often incremental – therefore stamina is required. Thus individuals who 
enter the political vocation may generally have higher levels of ambition and 
energy than the broader population. 
 
The decision to stand for parliament is likely to be heavily influenced by the 
fortunes of each potential candidate’s political party. If the chances of 
success are low, even especially ambitious individuals may choose to delay 
                                                 
47 Joseph Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics: Political Careers in the United States (Chicago: 
Rand McNally & Co., 1966), p. 5. 
48 Kenneth Prewitt and William Nowlin, ‘Political Ambitions and the Behavior of Incumbent 
Politicians’, p. 299. 
49 Kenneth Prewitt, ‘Political Ambitions, Volunteerism, and Electoral Accountability’, The 
American Political Science Review, Vol. 64, No. 1, March 1970, p. 7. 
50 Stanley A. Renshon, The Psychological Assessment of Presidential Candidates, p. 186. 
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their run.51 Moreover, the opportunities available to potential legislators can 
be further reduced by factors well outside of their control, such as economic 
crises or political scandal.52 Ambition itself develops in response to 
opportunities. Where opportunities do not exist, action is unlikely. 
 
Ambitions to stand for parliament may not necessarily be related to politics. 
Because it is a high-status occupation, those with strategic ambition may 
enter parliament to achieve more desirable goals upon their parliamentary 
exit, such as a successful business or diplomatic career. These legislators are 
attracted to offices that have served as ‘stepping-stones’ for others who 
occupy sought-after offices. Thus behaviour in office is shaped by anticipated 
future consequences.53 Furthermore, attraction to the legislative role may 
not even be related to future career options; some older aspirants may be 
attracted by the parliamentary pension and enjoying high social status in 
retirement.54 
 
Political candidates are likely to place high value on obtaining power.55 This 
is unsurprising given the status of the legislative role. However, it is not clear 
whether those who stand for office are already attracted to power or 
whether the drive for office creates an attraction to power.56 It is likely that 
both are true: those who stand are attracted to power and the attraction 
grows stronger as they get closer to powerful positions. As the institutional 
environment of parliament is centred on the exercise of power, it is only 
natural that legislators should feel an attraction to power.57 
                                                 
51 Paul S. Herrnson, ‘United States’, in Pippa Norris (ed.), Passages to Power: Legislative 
Recruitment in Advanced Democracies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 
188. 
52 Elizabeth McLeay, ‘Roles, Rules and Leadership’, in Margaret Clark (ed.), Three Labour 
Leaders: Nordmeyer, Kirk and Rowling (Palmerston North: Dunmore Press, 2001), pp. 70-71. 
53 Donald R. Matthews, ‘Legislative Recruitment and Legislative Careers’, Legislative Studies 
Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 4, November 1984, p. 554. 
54 Elizabeth McLeay, ‘The New Parliament’, in Jonathan Boston, Stephen Church, Stephen 
Levine, Elizabeth McLeay, and Nigel S. Roberts (eds.), Left Turn: The New Zealand General 
Election of 1999 (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2000), p. 204. 
55 Donald R. Matthews, The Social Background of Political Decision-Makers, p. 11. 
56 James David Barber, The Lawmakers: Recruitment and Adaptation to Legislative Life (New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1965), p. 14. 
57 Stephen Levine and Nigel S. Roberts, ‘From Lobby Fodder to Leadership’, p. 43. 
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It is interesting to note, however, that few legislators cite power as a 
motivating factor in their decision to stand. A United States study showed 
that self-identified motivations amongst legislators were primarily 
admiration for or dissatisfaction with politicians or political situations, or a 
sense of obligation.58 Data from the 1993 New Zealand Election Study 
showed that candidates’ motivations were ‘to have an influence’ (16 
percent), to ‘do a good job’ (8 percent), and ‘to represent people’ 
(7 percent).59 Given that ‘influence’ is a synonym for ‘power’, New Zealand 
political candidates may be more forthright about identifying power-based 
motives than their US counterparts. 
 
Legislator Roles 
 
The roles expected of legislators are complex and varied. However, there are 
no job descriptions and no standard qualifications for the role, nor are there 
any guiding laws. Thus it is up to MPs and parties to determine how 
legislators should act. 
 
Despite the high profile of MPs, the public knows little about their day-to-day 
actions. Definitions of legislators’ roles in New Zealand are deliberately 
ambiguous. As David McGee argues, ‘the office to which members are elected 
has a considerable amount of legal freedom guaranteed to it so that 
members themselves have the capacity to carry out the duties of the office as 
they see fit and indeed are able largely to define what the duties of that office 
are.’60 Speaker Jonathan Hunt defined parliamentary business as ‘the 
undertaking of any task or function that a member could reasonably be 
                                                 
58 Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, Leroy Ferguson, and John C. Wahlke, ‘The Political 
Socialization of American State Legislators’, pp. 201-203. 
59 Helena Catt, ‘New Zealand’, p. 156. 
60 David McGee, Parliamentary Practice in New Zealand, Third Edition (Wellington: Dunmore 
Publishing, 2005), p. 34. 
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expected to carry out in his or her capacity as a Member of Parliament and 
that complements the business of the House of Representatives.’61 
 
At a basic level, most people know that MPs speak in parliament and act as 
representatives. According to McLeay, the public expects legislators to: 
 
represent the needs of their constituents and the policies of their 
parties. They should debate and influence policy through the 
legislative process, and they should monitor and scrutinise the 
actions of the executive. Above all, they should be responsive to 
the citizens they represent.62 
 
Beyond this, however, the role is largely unknown. Consequently, when MPs 
are first elected, they likely have little understanding of legislator roles. This 
section addresses role expectations amongst new MPs. 
 
Role Expectations amongst New MPs 
 
There is little scholarly work on new legislators’ role expectations, but the 
work that does exist shows MPs’ understanding of their job to be vague. In 
their study of freshman legislators in Canada, Harold D. Clarke and Richard 
G. Price found that legislators have reasonably accurate general conceptions 
of their role before incumbency in that they have ‘expectations, albeit 
frequently vague, of performing constituency service and related 
representational tasks.’63 This suggests that many neophyte MPs have no 
better understanding of legislators’ roles than members of the public who 
expect an MP to ‘act as a representative’. The simplest way to do so is to find 
a constituency that accepts them as legitimate and as ‘their’ representative. 
Even so, the lack of specific knowledge of how to act as a representative may 
mean that the representative role is a steep learning curve for new MPs.64 
                                                 
61 Jonathan Hunt, quoted in Grant Gillon and Raymond Miller, ‘Role of an MP’, in Raymond 
Miller (ed.), New Zealand Government and Politics, Fourth Edition (Melbourne: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), p. 174. 
62 Elizabeth McLeay, ‘The New Parliament’, p. 215. 
63 Harold D. Clarke and Richard G. Price, ‘Freshman MPs’ Job Images: The Effects of 
Incumbency, Ambition and Position’, Canadian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 13, No. 3, 
September 1980, p. 584. 
64 Harold D. Clarke and Richard G. Price, ‘Freshman MPs’ Job Images’, p. 584. 
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Constituency representation is, however, but one part of legislators’ role. 
Kathy Stuart argues that new MPs must go through an ‘admission’ stage in 
adjusting to their role. The uncertainty inherent in running for parliament 
means that individuals cannot adequately prepare for becoming an MP.65 
Even if they are essentially guaranteed success, candidates cannot be sure of 
their victory until election day. Thus candidates turn their mind to the 
campaign rather than the specifics of the job they covet. 
 
Moreover, job expectations are likely to be unrealistically high in the period 
following MPs’ initial election to the legislature, especially if they were 
successful on their first attempt. If the political experiences of new 
legislators are coloured by a successful run for parliament, they are likely to 
view their role in grander terms than those who have more extensive 
political experience, particularly those who have previously failed to be 
elected.66 
 
Some new MPs do, however, have reasonably good understandings of 
legislator roles but have low expectations about their ability to become 
influential. In this case legislators have adopted a ‘realistic’ understanding of 
the largely ineffectual nature of the backbench role and thus find adaptation 
to that role relatively easy.67 These legislators understand the institutional 
norms of parliament and are aware that they must gain experience before 
they can become influential. 
 
The ambitions of individual MPs may also affect their knowledge about the 
job before incumbency. Clarke and Price argue that legislators who are 
progressively ambitious will seek to do ‘something else’, above and beyond 
the tasks carried out by their less ambitious colleagues, in order to stand out 
                                                 
65 Kathy Louise Stuart, Emotional Labour and Occupational Identity, p. 86. 
66 James David Barber, The Lawmakers, p. 246. 
67 Harold D. Clarke and Richard G. Price, ‘A Note on the Pre-Nomination Role Socialization of 
Freshmen Members of Parliament’, Canadian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 10, No. 2, June 
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 29 
to party leadership. Thus in addition to a constituency focus, progressively 
ambitious new MPs may take a special interest in a policy area or legislative 
business.68 MPs with progressive ambitions educate themselves on a broader 
range of legislative tasks and thus have more complex job definitions. 
 
Representation 
 
The representational side of legislators’ roles is important to MPs and the 
public alike. However, there is no set way in which parliamentarians 
‘represent’. This section addresses the differences in representational focus 
between electorate and list members and discusses the concept of thematic 
representation. 
 
Defining Political Representation 
 
The concept of representation is problematic. Various models have been 
posited to describe legislators’ representative functions – for instance, 
delegate, trustee, politico, and partisan – although none have yet adequately 
described the complexity of the task.69 Gerhard Loewenberg argues that: 
 
representation, like lawmaking, is an ill-defined concept that has 
acquired conflicting meanings through long use. It may be 
employed to denote any relationship between rulers and the 
ruled or it may connote responsiveness, authorization, 
legitimation, or accountability. It may be used so broadly that 
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any political institution performs representative functions or so 
narrowly that only an elected legislature can do so.70 
 
Representation implies that decisions of representatives are accepted by the 
citizenry as legitimate and authoritative, and that representatives are 
accountable.71 Atkinson and Thomas argue that representation occurs when 
‘the interests of citizens find expression in the actions of governments.’72 
There is an assumption of a legitimate relationship between representatives 
and constituencies, whether they are individuals, geographic districts, social 
communities, political parties, or particular points of view. 
 
Therefore, for the purposes of this study representation is defined as: 
 
the relationships between elected Members of Parliament and 
constituencies. Constituencies are identified by the legislator and 
the constituents themselves. For political representation to 
occur, legislators and constituents must deem the relationships 
to be legitimate and authoritative and the legislator must be 
accountable to the represented group. 
 
The task of representation is complicated by the difficulty in discerning 
constituencies. Where single-member constituencies are exclusively used, 
constituencies are generally understood as the geographic districts that 
directly elect members. However, this overlooks the need for MPs to act as 
representatives of their broader party and its policies. When considering 
electoral systems such as MMP, identification of constituencies becomes 
even more difficult. Some members are elected in geographic districts and 
others are elected via party lists. However, all members must represent their 
parties and policies. Thus constituencies are identified by legislators and 
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constituents themselves; legislators do not have exclusive control over 
whom or what they represent. 
 
It is commonly assumed that to be representative, a legislature must be a 
microcosm of society.73 Descriptive representation sees legislators sharing 
similar backgrounds or characteristics such as occupation, gender, or 
ethnicity with constituents. This assumes that shared sociological traits 
between legislators and the general population lead to meaningful 
representation.74 However, representation does not necessarily imply that a 
legislature should be a mathematical replica of society-at-large.75 Simply 
sharing a particular sociological background does not mean that an MP 
necessarily represents that community. Substantive representation 
measures the level of active representation each social group receives. For 
instance, only the election of legislators who claim to represent women – 
regardless of the legislator’s gender – guarantees substantive representation 
for women.76  
 
Descriptive representation is useful, however, in assessing the access to 
power minority groups enjoy. MPs who share sociological backgrounds with 
minorities may cause minorities to feel more satisfied with the political 
process and thus be more likely to contact MPs.77 Moreover, the presence of 
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minority MPs increases the likelihood of minorities voting.78 Thus while 
parliament ought not to be required to mirror society perfectly, descriptive 
representation is symbolically important and may provide a pathway to 
greater substantive representation. 
 
Constituency Members 
 
Within New Zealand, the best-known legislator roles are the extra-
parliamentary roles of electorate MPs. MPs representing specific geographic 
districts are expected to act as advocates for their local area.79 There is a long 
tradition of easily-accessible local MPs in New Zealand.80 Electorate 
members usually live in or near their constituency and hold regular 
constituent clinics.81 MPs assist constituents with concerns primarily related 
to government departments and services, most commonly housing, 
immigration, taxation, and schooling.82 
 
The time New Zealand MPs allocate to constituency work each week is not 
known. In 1987, when the first-past-the-post electoral system was used, J. 
Theodore Anagnoson found that MPs spent an average of 19.5 hours each 
week on constituency matters.83 Whether this changed under MMP is not 
clear. The introduction of MMP saw the size of parliament rise from 99 to 
120 members, although only approximately half are electorate MPs. Karp 
argues that the decrease in the overall number of electorate MPs has 
increased each electorate member’s caseload.84 On the other hand, Vowles 
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and Aimer argue that contacts between MPs and constituents have declined 
since 1999.85 Miller suggests that since the introduction of MMP the 
frequency of meetings with individual constituents has decreased, but the 
regularity of meetings with community groups has grown.86  
 
It is likely that the level of constituency work undertaken varies based on 
each electorate’s characteristics. For instance, lower socio-economic 
electorates are more likely to require the services of their local MP.87 
Geographically large electorates are less likely to utilise the services of their 
MP due to physical and time barriers, resulting in less contact in rural 
areas.88 There is also evidence that less constituency work occurs in ‘safe’ 
seats.89 
 
Moreover, the level of constituency activity varies between individual 
members. New MPs, for instance, tend to prioritise electorate work as they 
seek to consolidate their local position.90 Amongst longer-serving MPs, 
constituency service is greater amongst those who perceive their chances of 
promotion to be low.91 Further, younger MPs place greater emphasis on 
constituency work than their older colleagues, possibly to ensure that their 
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seat is ‘safe’ for a long political career.92 Thus there is no benchmark that all 
members must meet when it comes to servicing geographic constituencies. 
 
List Members 
 
List seats were introduced in New Zealand with the change to MMP in 1996. 
List MPs gave parties an opportunity to reconsider members’ 
representational roles. As list members are not directly elected by 
geographic constituencies, there is greater scope for them to represent 
demographics or groups that are not necessarily geographically connected. 
Fiona Barker and Stephen Levine argue that list MPs had an opportunity to:  
 
develop a distinctive parliamentary role, freed from the 
constraints of constituency service. This new group of MPs could 
articulate the philosophy of their party; act on behalf of the 
interests of a particular sector of society; focus exclusively on a 
particular issue; or seek to exercise their judgement on behalf of 
the ‘national interest’.93  
 
They conclude, however, that New Zealand’s political parties have largely 
failed to realise list MPs’ potential.94 
 
List MPs have developed a reputation in New Zealand as being ‘second-class’ 
MPs. Leigh J. Ward argues that list MPs are unfairly perceived by the media, 
parliamentary colleagues, and the public as illegitimate party ‘hacks’ who are 
unqualified to perform their jobs and who perform lesser tasks than 
electorate MPs.95 Although it is correct that list MPs are accountable to their 
parties, to criticise them for this overlooks that electorate MPs are in the 
same position. Even electorate MPs in safe seats rely on their parties for 
nomination and re-nomination; therefore they are significantly influenced by 
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party considerations, although this influence is qualitatively different to that 
felt by list MPs.96 Secondly, list and electorate MPs are similar in their 
qualifications for the job – both have similar levels of education and list MPs 
are more likely to come from professional backgrounds.97 
 
In recommending MMP, the Royal Commission on the Electoral System 
expected that list MPs would undertake some constituency work.98 However, 
in the larger electorate-dominated parties list MPs are largely expected to 
establish themselves in a constituency and act as though they had won the 
seat.99 McLeay and Vowles argue that list MPs have shown a desire to 
become established at a constituency level in order to be seen as ‘“doing 
something” that is known and respected as part of the proper function of an 
MP.’100 One would therefore expect that as MMP becomes more established 
list MPs will be less dependent on electorate roles as their role becomes 
more normalised and legitimate. This may already be happening,101 although 
this thesis will further test this point by examining the constituency-based 
roles adopted by first-term list MPs. 
 
Within smaller list-based parties the situation is different. Because small 
parties seldom win electorate seats there are fewer obligations for their 
members to establish themselves in constituencies.102 However, this does 
not mean that the expectations of small party list members are well-defined. 
New Zealand is unusual in that small parties do occasionally win electorate 
seats – a useful safeguard against political oblivion should the party not 
reach the five percent threshold required to enter parliament.103 This means 
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that even for members in list-dominated parties, there may be an 
expectation that they establish themselves in a constituency as a kind of 
electoral insurance and to confirm their legitimacy as MPs. 
 
Thematic Representation 
 
Thematic representation is representation of groups that are not necessarily 
geographically grouped. Representing groups that are not geographically 
connected is simpler under proportional representation than plurality 
systems. Because parties develop lists of candidates, extra emphasis is often 
placed on achieving ‘balanced’ lists – lists that broadly represents the society 
at large. Ticket-balancing is a rational strategy employed by parties to ensure 
that all groups or factions within the party commit to the list and to broaden 
the party’s electoral appeal. Running unbalanced tickets may result in 
internal disharmony and criticism of biases within parties.104 When parties 
run balanced lists, there is a greater chance of a broader cross-section of 
society being represented in parliament. For instance, women and ethnic 
minorities are more likely to be elected by means of party lists in 
proportional systems than they are in single-member constituencies.105 
Likewise, there is a greater chance of youth representation.106 
 
All MPs – even those representing geographic constituencies – hold more 
than one identity. As Eulau et al argue, ‘different foci of representation need 
not be mutually exclusive. They may occur simultaneously, and appropriate 
role orientations may be held simultaneously.’107 Thus thematic 
representation is not the exclusive domain of list MPs; electorate members 
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may also identify with particular ethnicities, occupations, socio-economic 
strata, and so on. The identities of legislators may be disparate and appear 
unrelated. Multiple identifications allow thematic representation to occur 
across legislatures. 
 
Parliamentary Roles 
 
Within parliament itself legislators are expected to undertake a diverse 
range of tasks. Some tasks, such as speaking in the House, are public and 
well-known. Others, like participating in caucus and caucus committees, are 
conducted behind closed doors. This section discusses the expectations of 
MPs within parliament. 
 
The House 
 
Speaking in the House is a well-known role. This is not necessarily good, 
however, as MPs are often criticised for their ‘childish’ behaviour in the 
House.108 How new MPs adapt to the House impacts on how their party and 
the public perceive them. Wahlke and Eulau argue that the nature of the 
legislative floor leads to unconsciously irrational behaviour.109 It is therefore 
likely that new MPs quickly shed desires to avoid childishness, switching 
instead to an adversarial approach. Even the influx of new MPs following the 
first MMP election quickly adopted the adversarial behaviour of New 
Zealand’s parliament.110 The conflict inherent in parliament makes the 
transition into legislative roles difficult because it undermines any sense of 
broad collective identity.111 MPs have little choice but to create identities 
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based around their own party and thus have few opportunities to engage 
with and understand the perspectives of members opposite. 
 
This highlights the limited relevance of parliamentary debate. Major 
decisions are not made in the House; they are made by the leaders of 
political parties and those closest to them. Thus, as Boston et al argue, 
‘debate in the House is an opportunity for parties to state their views on 
particular matters which, primarily, the Government is proposing. It is not 
normally a means of changing members’ opinions.’112 Moreover, although the 
image of the House is the ‘public face’ of legislators’ roles, parliamentary 
debate is not how MPs communicate with their constituents. Extra-
parliamentary activity is the primary means of MP/constituent 
interactions.113 While MPs’ performances in the House are important to their 
parties and to their public image, the substance of the debate is of limited 
importance. 
 
Despite this, the profile of the House in the minds of citizens means that 
speaking is essential for MPs to become known to the public. The most 
important forum for speaking is during Question Time – the hour or so of 
parliament’s daily activity that regularly makes television news bulletins. 
Asking questions is a skill that members must develop, just as answering 
questions is a skill that ministers acquire.114 Moreover, supplementary 
questions must be adjusted based on answers to earlier questions. 
 
However, backbench MPs are limited in their ability to use this forum. Senior 
party members – who are aware of the media appeal of Question Time – 
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closely guard their allocation of questions.115 This is true of larger opposition 
parties who wish to present their frontbench as an alternative government, 
leaving junior members with more mundane opportunities for pre-scripted 
supplementary questions. Government backbenchers ask ‘patsy’ questions 
that highlight the government’s successes. Only junior MPs within smaller 
parties genuinely have scope to use Question Time as they are more likely to 
hold important spokespersonships than their larger party colleagues. 
 
Select Committees 
 
Select committees are an essential part of considering legislation. Indeed, 
they are sometimes called the ‘engine room’ of parliament.116 Select 
committees have become even more important in the multi-party MMP 
environment.117 For backbench MPs, select committees are perhaps the only 
forum in which they can assert their own point of view, albeit along their 
party lines.118 
 
Unsurprisingly, most MPs take their select committee responsibilities very 
seriously. Levine and Roberts constructed a nine-part typology of MPs’ select 
committee roles: leaders, moderators, conciliators, analysts, humorists, 
journeymen, itinerants, novices, and oddities.119 While each ‘type’ of MPs 
takes a different approach to select committee work, they all treat the 
committees with respect and reverence. The nature of debate in select 
committees is therefore quite different to that of the House. There is often an 
attitude that members are part of the same ‘team’ and thus partisanship is 
reduced.120 Stuart argues that MPs view select committees as a part of the 
democratic process that is not the ‘property’ of the government; the open 
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and participatory nature of select committees ensures contribution from all 
MPs regardless of party. 121 
 
The committees that MPs serve on play an important role in determining 
their political future. Before their promotion to cabinet, ministers generally 
serve on the select committees related to their portfolios. Thus it is 
important that MPs are appointed to either their areas of speciality or areas 
they wish to pursue. Each party has different processes regarding committee 
appointments, but it is usual for MPs to discuss their preferences with the 
party leadership. Appointment as a select committee chairperson is 
sometimes considered a precursor to a ministerial position, although even in 
a small parliament like New Zealand’s, not every chairperson can become a 
minister.122 Appointment as a committee chairperson can also be a role used 
by party leaders to placate members who are not deemed suitable for 
ministerial office. 
 
Caucus 
 
Attending caucus is an important part of MPs’ roles, but little is known about 
how caucuses operate. Parties treat caucus as a ‘backroom’ environment 
where members discuss and argue points of policy before coming to an 
agreed position. Thus in the name of party unity, caucus meetings are 
conducted away from the public eye.123 
 
Although it is an important forum for discussion, in reality the role of the 
caucus is constrained. Major decisions are generally made by party leaders 
and their advisors. While caucus provides an opportunity for MPs to be kept 
informed and to debate the merits of particular approaches, the influence of 
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caucus should not be overstated. Despite this, it would be foolhardy for a 
party to ignore the views of its caucus lest dissent become public. 
 
Caucus committees act as a branch of the caucus process in the National and 
Labour parties. When in government, large parties use caucus committees to 
stay in touch with party opinion. Government committees may be chaired by 
and largely composed of backbenchers, giving backbenchers opportunities to 
become involved in policy development. When in opposition, caucus 
committees draw on the support of parliamentary research units to develop 
policies.124 Opposition committees are usually chaired by senior MPs and 
populated by lower-ranked MPs.  
 
However, caucus committees may be little more than exercises in keeping 
MPs busy, especially government backbenchers. Barker and Levine argue 
that committees keep MPs occupied preparing reports while the important 
decisions are made in cabinet. Thus government backbenchers are ‘in a 
sense associated with power while excluded from its exercise.’125 Smaller 
parties generally rely on the extra-parliamentary party to engage in policy 
development due to the small size of their caucuses. 
 
Policy 
 
The scope for backbench MPs to influence policy is limited. This is 
particularly true in government when the cabinet determines policy with the 
benefit of public service advice. However, this does not preclude 
backbenchers from taking an active interest in policy. Promotion is 
necessary to truly have influence over policy.126 Therefore, ambitious 
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backbenchers may seek to gain policy knowledge to demonstrate their 
suitability for higher office.127 
 
Developing policy specialities and interests is not necessarily easy for new 
MPs, who are likely to be allocated select committees related to their pre-
parliamentary experience. This allows backbenchers to demonstrate that 
they are competent in familiar areas, but prevents them from accumulating 
more diverse skills in new areas. This reinforces assumptions that MPs ought 
to possess general skills of compromise and negotiation over specialised 
policy details.128 
 
In larger parties, new MPs run the risk of upsetting senior colleagues if they 
take a greater interest in policy areas than their status permits. Major policy 
decisions are the realm of party leaders.129 Backbenchers are expected to 
focus primarily on constituency work. This is less significant in smaller 
parties, where backbench MPs are often allocated significant portfolios.130 
Given that the overwhelming majority of electorate seats are won by larger 
parties, backbenchers from National and Labour are likely to be generalists 
(regardless of whether they hold a list or constituency seat), while 
backbenchers from smaller parties are more likely to be specialists.131 On the 
other hand, small party MPs may also become generalists due to the 
significant workloads they are expected to shoulder in the absence of a large 
caucus. 
 
New MPs may also struggle to develop policy specialities due to their 
‘amateur’ status. Given the complexity of MPs’ roles, policy concerns may be 
sidelined until more basic functions, such as servicing electorates and 
speaking in the House, are mastered. For amateurs, immediate concerns 
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outweigh future considerations. Thus planning is limited and MPs may 
become reactive.132 However, focusing on matters that are directly 
observable by the public may be beneficial. Few members of the public have 
clear policy interests that they measure MPs’ performances against.133 They 
are more likely to assess MPs on their representative functions, House 
performances, and media prominence. Thus MPs may choose to focus on 
these areas. 
 
Having outlined the contributions the existing literature has made to the 
areas considered by this thesis, attention will now turn to candidate 
selection in New Zealand. 
 
                                                 
132 Michael M. Atkinson and David C. Docherty, ‘Moving Right Along’, pp. 299-300. 
133 John Wahlke, ‘Policy Demands and System Support: The Role of the Represented’, British 
Journal of Political Science, Vol. 1, No. 3, July 1971, pp. 271-273. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Candidate Selection 
 
 
Before legislators can exercise power, they must first be elected. In countries 
with strong political parties, like New Zealand, election is almost impossible 
without first being selected as a candidate by a political party. This chapter 
focuses on the selection processes individuals must go through to become 
candidates. It also considers supply and demand arguments and compares 
established theories with the experiences of political candidates in the 2008 
general election.  
 
For the sake of clarity, nominees are individuals who put themselves forward 
for selection. Candidates are successful nominees. 
 
Supply and Demand 
 
Candidate selection is often described in terms of supply and demand. As 
described in chapter two, supply concerns the individuals who put 
themselves forward for political office, while demand describes the types of 
individuals political parties seek to recruit. Understanding the types of 
people who stand for office sheds light on their approach to the legislator 
role and their broader world views. Understanding who parties seek to 
recruit exposes who they wish to appeal to and their intended future 
direction. There is no guarantee that supply will match demand.1  
 
The supply of political candidates is mediated by a degree of self-filtering. 
Western political parties no longer have large memberships; the rate of party 
membership has been decreasing in New Zealand since the 1960s.2 Thus 
                                                 
1 Pippa Norris, ‘Introduction: Theories of Recruitment’, in Pippa Norris (ed.), Passages to 
Power: Legislative Recruitment in Advanced Democracies (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1997), p. 2. 
2 Jack Vowles, Civic Engagement in New Zealand: Decline or Demise?, Inaugural Professorial 
Lecture (University of Auckland, 13 October 2004), pp. 4-7. 
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those who join political parties are atypical of the electorate. Moreover, even 
within political parties only a small proportion of members put themselves 
forward as nominees, making them even more atypical. Supply is thus 
limited to a select group of individuals. 
 
Supply limitations are exacerbated by the qualities of the few individuals 
who put themselves forward for selection. Political power usually 
accumulates in those who exhibit the values most dominant within a 
society.3 Potential candidates who exhibit the qualities most dominant 
within each party are more likely to put themselves forward for selection 
than those who diverge from party norms. Thus parties find their supply of 
potential candidates limited to a relatively homogenous group.4 
 
On the demand side, the centralisation of power in New Zealand political 
parties means candidate selection may be the only time local party members 
feel that they hold power within their parties. However, where selection is 
somewhat devolved to local members, the power of the central party to 
screen nominees before selection and to confirm candidates after local 
decision-making ensures that candidates are effectively selected centrally.5 
In many cases, selection meetings simply ratify centrally-made decisions.6 
 
The preferences and prejudices of the selectorate affect who eventually 
become MPs. Like nominees, selectors are in some ways atypical. Party 
members who are active enough to become a delegate, hold a central party 
office, or vote in a semi-open primary make up a fraction of the population as 
a whole. Thus the selection of candidates may be controlled and manipulated 
by a minority of party members.7 In many cases selectors do not know 
nominees before selection; selection decisions are often made on the basis of 
                                                 
3 Kenneth Prewitt, ‘Political Socialization and Leadership Selection’, Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, September 1965, p. 98. 
4 David Boyd, Party Candidate Selection Procedures and Objectives Under MMP (University of 
Auckland: Unpublished MA Thesis, July 1996), p. 50. 
5 Michael Gallagher, ‘Introduction’, p. 5. 
6 David Boyd, Party Candidate Selection Procedures and Objectives Under MMP, pp. 29-30. 
7 Michael Rush and Philip Althoff, An Introduction to Political Sociology (London: Thomas 
Nelson & Sons, 1971), pp. 149-150. 
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a CV, a speech or a meet-the-candidates meeting.8 If nominees know 
selectors personally, their chances of selection are higher, demonstrating the 
exclusive nature of candidate selection.9  
 
For those who do not know selectors, aspirants are best served to examine 
the qualities of sitting MPs. By replicating the types of people who have been 
successful in a legislative career aspiring MPs can make themselves 
attractive to selectors.10 Moreover, nominees share many qualities with 
selectors themselves, proving that like attracts like.11 While parties make 
efforts to recruit a diverse range of MPs, candidate selection is an inherently 
conservative process. Indeed, in some respects, candidate selection is a risk 
assessment of future potential political leaders. 
 
Candidate selection usually appears to be a peaceful process within political 
parties. The importance of ticket-balancing, especially within proportional 
representation systems encourages parties to minimise factional in-
fighting.12 On the other hand, the imperative of each faction to gain 
maximum influence can lead to bitter selection battles. As Simon Sheppard 
argues, the selection process is ‘the place at which future parliamentary 
caucus factions, and the identity and agenda of future governments, have 
their beginnings. Accordingly, the struggle between individuals and interests 
for party nomination is often exhaustive, acrimonious and bitter.’13 
 
Factional divisions sometimes lead to compromise. Selectors are often more 
ideological than the voting public. John Bochel and David Denver argue that 
                                                 
8 Helena Catt, ‘New Zealand’, in Pippa Norris (ed.), Passages to Power: Legislative Recruitment 
in Advanced Democracies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 141; Keith 
Jackson, ‘Candidate Selection and the 1978 General Election’, in Howard R. Penniman (ed.), 
New Zealand ant the Polls: The General Election in 1978 (Washington DC: American 
Enterprise Institute for Public Research, 1980), p. 105. 
9 Pippa Norris and Joni Lovenduski, Political Recruitment, p. 140. 
10 Pippa Norris and Joni Lovenduski, Political Recruitment, pp. 126-127. 
11 David Boyd, Party Candidate Selection Procedures and Objectives Under MMP, p. 72. 
12 Michael Gallagher, ‘Conclusion’, in Michael Gallagher and Michael Marsh (eds.), Candidate 
Selection in Comparative Perspective: The Secret Garden of Politics (London: Sage 
Publications, 1988), p. 277. 
13 Simon Sheppard, ‘The Struggle for the Agenda: New Zealand Labour Party Candidate 
Selections 1987-93’, Political Science, Vol. 49, No. 2, Jan 1998, p. 199. 
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selectors are aware of this and select less ideological candidates than they 
would otherwise prefer to increase their party’s chances of success.14 Where 
factional fighting exists, the desire to keep the opposing faction’s candidates 
out has the same effect.15 This may prevent selection of the best candidates. 
 
Key Supply and Demand Factors 
 
Although each MP differs, it is possible to identify key qualities selectors 
favour amongst nominees. This section addresses how ambition, political 
socialisation, occupation, ethnicity, and party service were selections factors 
in the 2008 general election. 
 
For the first time, this section also presents data collected from interviews 
with the 2008 intake of new MPs. Quotes from MPs, which are italicised and 
separated from the main body of the text, are used to illustrate particular 
responses to supply and demand factors. 
 
Ambition 
 
The ambition of those who aspire to become legislators is both a supply and 
demand factor, albeit a somewhat intangible one. As set out in the previous 
chapter, Stanley A. Renshon defines ambition as ‘the capacity, desire and 
ability to invest oneself for the accomplishment of one’s immediate and life 
purposes’.16 In determining the ambition of nominees, therefore, it is salient 
to examine how they articulate their goals and their strategies for 
achievement. 
 
The act of putting oneself forward for selection in itself demonstrates that an 
individual is ambitious and has a goal that they are pursuing. Stanley A. 
                                                 
14 John Bochel and David Denver, ‘Candidate Selection in the Labour Party: What the 
Selectors Seek’, British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 13, No. 1, January 1983, p. 68. 
15 Keith Jackson, ‘Candidate Selection and the 1978 General Election’, p. 105. 
16 Stanley A. Renshon, The Psychological Assessment of Presidential Candidates (New York & 
London: New York University Press, 1998), p. 186. 
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Renshon notes that achieving high office “requires an enormous investment 
of time, energy, and oneself.”17 Whether goals are inwardly or outwardly 
focused (that is, for personal gain or public good) is irrelevant as their mere 
presence and paths towards achievement is sufficient evidence of ambition. 
Nominees have numerous goals which aid the development of other goals as 
they are achieved or not achieved. The outward goal of public service also 
satisfies the inward goal of personal advancement. 
 
The goal of serving the public interest was the most common goal shared by 
the 2008 intake of MPs. This is unsurprising given normative assumptions 
about legislators’ roles. Indeed, this declared ambition to serve the public is 
likely the default answer given by MPs when they are asked about their 
ambitions. To appear focused on themselves over the public interest would 
be unseemly for MPs. 
 
With regards to public service, some MPs articulated clear visions of areas of 
public policy they would like to influence and communities they would like 
to serve: 
 
By doing the right things in education we can actually turn around 
the tail of underachievement in a very, very short space of time – 
over the next five years. We don’t have to wait generations for 
Maori to learn and achieve. 
 
Why did I do it? Simply because of an increasing concern over the 
plight of the global ecological system that humanity is creating for 
itself and for other species. 
 
On the other hand, some MPs focused on serving the public through 
ideological or partisan means: 
 
My goals for being here are around social justice. And it seems to 
me that a Member of Parliament is really in a position to fulfil 
some of that promise of social justice and really advocate for 
change and achieve that. 
                                                 
17 Stanley A. Renshon, The Psychological Assessment of Presidential Candidates, p. 186. 
 49 
 
It’s the possibility of contributing to the [party] and everything 
that the party stands for – all the values and the policies that I 
have a long-standing commitment to. 
 
Individual ambitions were also articulated by many MPs. To test levels of 
personal ambition, MPs were asked in each of the interview rounds about 
their future possibilities within politics. In their first interviews, 75 percent 
of MPs said they aspired to become a minister; 74 percent took this position 
in the second interviews. 
 
Unsurprisingly, given the importance of deferring to party leadership and 
moderating personal ambition within strong party systems, many MPs 
couched their personal ambition within higher public service goals: 
 
My community was really important to me. We’d never had a 
representative from our side of the House in our community and I 
saw an opportunity to try and do that. 
 
It’s a way of – and I know this sounds really cheesy – but it is a way 
of giving back, it’s a way of doing something for the community. 
 
A smaller group were open about their ambition to progress within politics, 
citing the need to be in a high position in order to effect change: 
 
I want to be a decision-maker. I want to be in a position of having 
the opportunity to make courageous decisions. It used to frustrate 
me putting ideas out and ministers would go, ‘oh, I don’t think we 
can do that’. Well I want to be a minister that says, ‘yeah, we can 
do that’. 
 
I think it’s important that you aim to be a cabinet minister. Only 
when you get to that level do you truly have a capacity to influence 
in a big way. You’re subject to the Executive and the Cabinet and a 
whole range of other checks, but by and large you have the ability 
to make some very big changes. 
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To meet Renshon’s definition of ambition, legislators must demonstrate the 
‘capacity, desire and ability’ to achieve their goals.18 Therefore, MPs were 
asked about how confident they were about being able to achieve their 
goals.19 
 
MPs were confident about their ability to achieve. Eighty-six percent rated 
their chances of success as high or medium. Some were forthright about their 
desirable qualities: 
 
I think I’m intelligent, I’m hard-working. I think I can speak well, I 
think I can articulate a vision and I’ve got a philosophy and I’ve 
got a plan for New Zealand. 
 
There aren’t that many people here with the sort of business 
background I’ve got… or the trading background I’ve got – which 
means the skills and competencies I’ve got are in shorter supply – 
then you say well maybe I’ve got a better chance of doing that. 
 
Others who were confident were also realistic about the challenges they 
faced: 
 
There are people in our 2008 intake who are going to make 
fantastic ministers one day. But not everybody’s going to do that. I 
don’t think everybody’s got their head around that yet. 
 
Have you seen the people that I’ve come into parliament with? I 
mean it’s a very, very talented bunch. It’s an incredibly talented 
bunch; I guess I’m acutely aware of that. 
 
The few MPs who rated themselves poorly tended to emphasise the 
changeability of politics and the difficulty in future planning: 
 
Politics is a tidal thing, there’s always gonna be tides coming in 
and tides going out and at some point the people who are in the 
hot seat at the moment will move off and do other things. 
 
                                                 
18 Stanley A. Renshon, The Psychological Assessment of Presidential Candidates, p. 186. 
19 This, of course, puts to one side the effect of overstating ones’ own ability. This is 
undoubtedly common, but as all participants were given the same opportunity to overstate 
their ability the overall impact should be nil. 
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I think there are a whole lot of other factors that come into play in 
terms of your timing and other people that may be ahead of you on 
the list.  
 
Ambition is a supply and demand factor. Those who are ambitious are more 
likely to put themselves forward for selection as they believe that they have 
the skills required of successful legislators. Selectors in turn are attracted to 
nominees who have strong ambition to work within the party to secure 
desirable goals. Therefore it is unsurprising that a vast majority of MPs 
expressed strong ambition and rated their chances of success highly. 
 
Political Socialisation 
 
Political socialisation is a supply factor as an active interest in politics is 
essentially a prerequisite for putting oneself forward for nomination. This 
sub-section will consider whether political socialisation is also a demand 
factor. 
 
Seventy-six percent of MPs first elected in 2008 traced their interest in 
politics to their childhood. It is therefore unsurprising that the family was 
cited as the primary source of political awareness: 
 
My earliest memory is of my father listening to parliament. 
 
My parents are both very interested and I daresay that’s how I 
developed my interest. 
 
MPs who were politically socialised as children were equally likely to 
attribute their political awareness to a specific event or a more general 
interest. ‘Trigger’ events are moments when individuals become aware of the 
importance of the political sphere: 
 
I was 13 when Norman Kirk died and watched his funeral 
coverage avidly when most of my friends would have been outside 
kicking a rugby ball around or doing whatever normal people do. I 
was just there fascinated. 
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I took my class out on strike because we were being arbitrarily 
told that we couldn’t read ‘The Little Red Schoolbook’. I had no 
idea what was in it – and I still can’t remember now, actually – but 
it offended me in principle that you should be told what you could 
or couldn’t read in democracy like New Zealand. 
 
Those who became interested in politics via general events identified their 
interest as an innate quality: 
 
I was born interested in politics. 
 
It was just normal for us, so I don’t know how to describe it. You 
just got involved in what was going on. 
 
Interestingly, those who identified their families as a key source of political 
socialisation did not necessarily consider their families to be political. MPs 
made a clear distinction between families being interested and active in 
politics. Amongst those who came from ‘non-political’ families, politics was 
followed and discussed within the family: 
 
Neither of my parents were particularly politically involved, but 
my father had quite strong political views and so we used to have a 
lot of political debates. 
 
I remember my parents talking about politics at all sorts of 
intervals, so I was aware of political debate. 
 
For those who came from activist families, politics was a primary family 
focus: 
 
I spent my entire childhood delivering leaflets and being bribed 
with chocolate to deliver leaflets for the Vietnam War and anti-
racism stuff. 
 
Politics was there in the family every day… We used to have a 
tradition where we would have our dinner together… At that stage 
there were discussions about the whole day: what’s happening in 
business, in politics – whenever there was a hot topic, that used to 
be discussed. 
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Thus the intensity of political activity matters less than the simple existence 
of some form of political dialogue in the home for the socialisation of 
children.  
 
Amongst the few MPs (12 percent) who were politically socialised during 
their adolescence, families played a minor role. For some, specific issues led 
to the formation of political opinions, demonstrating that ‘trigger’ events 
may occur regardless of age: 
 
As a teenager I was very concerned about French nuclear testing, 
which was a major political issue in the 70s. I was concerned about 
nuclear ship visits in the 80s – I protested about them. 
 
There was one turning point when I was at high school. A New 
Zealand Anglican priest who lived in South Africa and was a 
member of the ANC. He’d had both his hands blown off and he was 
blind – he’d lost his sight – from a parcel bomb that was sent to 
him from the South African security forces. This was during the 
apartheid years. And he came and spoke to a group of students at 
school. And that really changed my life. 
 
Others were drawn to politics by general concerns rather than specific 
events. One MP claimed to have only become interested in politics when they 
first attended a party meeting: 
 
I first turned up to a political meeting and was elected Women’s 
Vice Chair for the Southern Region. And I was not active, and I 
didn’t have any real involvement before that. 
 
Those who were socialised as adolescents cited the desire to ‘make a 
difference’ as a motivating factor. This suggests adolescents who become 
politically interested are influenced more by increasing awareness of the 
existing political landscape than the broader political goals that develop 
amongst socialised children. Individuals who are socialised as adolescents 
are not necessarily ignorant of politics before their socialisation; rather they 
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have yet to transfer their knowledge, values, and attitudes into a political 
form.20 
 
A small proportion of MPs were politically socialised as adults. This group 
emphasised that they never aspired to be politicians. Rather than having 
long-standing ambitions to enter parliament, these MPs became aware of 
political implications as adults and responded to the opportunity to stand 
when it arose: 
 
It’s not like I had any grand aspirations, but when the opportunity 
came along I thought, okay, jump in feet first and start swimming. 
 
I realised the effect politics has on people when I was married and 
I had a house and a business. 
 
This suggests that those who are socialised as children set parliament as a 
career goal. The evidence to support this is mixed. Some MPs who were 
socialised as children found becoming an MP an appealing prospect from a 
young age: 
 
When I was four I did tell my mother that I wanted to be in 
Government when I grew up. 
 
From an early age I’ve loved following parliament, so the 
opportunity to be in it appealed to me. 
 
Others did not plan a parliamentary career: 
 
I didn’t have a life-long ambition to be a Member of Parliament – it 
just kind of all fell into place. 
 
I never had been interested in actually coming to parliament, but I 
always have had an interest in politics. 
 
                                                 
20 Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, Leroy Ferguson, and John C. Wahlke, ‘The Political 
Socialization of American State Legislators’, p. 196. 
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A final group located parliament as a potential goal, but not one actively 
pursued: 
 
I never woke up one day and thought, ‘right, I’m going to aspire to 
be an MP’. I never had a five year plan to be an MP and in fact I 
second guess anyone who simply aspires to the position because I 
think anyone who approaches this job should approach it with a 
lot of trepidation. 
 
I’m very much a belief or philosophy driven type of person. So I 
might set my agenda according to what I might think is the right 
thing to do rather than career advancement or anything like that. 
 
While some MPs who were socialised as children became interested in 
politics as a potential vocation, others were interested in a more passive 
manner. Thus being socialised young does not necessarily lead to a greater 
possibility of children entering politics. A caveat should be added, however. 
Being a politician is not widely regarded as an admirable job in New Zealand 
society. Therefore some aspiring children may hide their ambition to 
conform to social norms. One MP spoke of how she was reluctant to tell 
people of her desired career, but how her actions were a dead giveaway: 
 
I told a few people. My sister jokes that she remembers back then 
[when] there was a politician on the news I’d be like, ‘shhhh, 
shhhh’, which I guess isn’t particularly normal for that age group. 
 
It is interesting to note that a number of MPs had been involved in student 
politics prior to entering parliament. Although participants were not 
specifically asked about their student politics involvement, 29 percent raised 
it unprompted. This high rate suggests that for many aspiring legislators 
student unions may provide opportunities to test their political skills and to 
get a taste of political life.  
 
Political socialisation is undoubtedly a supply factor as without an interest in 
politics nominees would not put themselves forward. However, the evidence 
of socialisation as a demand factor is weak. Given the preponderance of MPs 
who were politically socialised as children it is tempting to conclude that 
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selectors desire candidates with a long history of political interest and 
activity. However, in this case, supply masquerades as demand. Those who 
were socialised as children have a greater personal stake in politics and thus 
are more likely to put themselves forward for selection. Selectors can only 
choose from those presented before them. 
 
Occupation 
 
Some occupations are consistently overrepresented in Western legislatures. 
Individuals from ‘sheltered’ occupations – occupations which are flexible in 
allowing individuals the time to stand for office – are consistently 
overrepresented. These occupations are primarily ‘talking’ professions: jobs 
requiring verbal dexterity, such as law, teaching, journalism, and public 
service.21 Thus professional convergence occurs whereby the qualities of 
particular professions match the qualities desirable in legislators.22 
 
High status occupations, therefore, are supply and demand factors. On the 
supply side, individuals with transferable experience feel confident of 
success and have more time and flexibility to pursue a nomination. 
Moreover, MPs’ high status ensures that even if they leave one status 
occupation, their social status will increase as a legislator.23 On the demand 
side, selectors are drawn to nominees who exhibit skills that have been 
successful in other MPs and occupational background and professional 
success are excellent measures of these qualities. 
 
                                                 
21 Donald R. Matthews, ‘Legislative Recruitment and Legislative Careers’, p. 551. 
22 Morgens N. Pedersen, ‘Lawyers in Politics: The Danish Folketing and United States 
Legislatures’, in Samuel C. Patterson and John C. Wahlke (eds.), Comparative Legislative 
Behavior: Frontiers of Research (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1972), p. 39. 
23 James Walter, The Acculturation to Political Work: New Members of the Federal Backbench 
(Canberra: Australasian Political Studies Association, 1979), p. 42. The social status of MPs in 
New Zealand is a vexed issue given the widespread distrust of politicians that is 
demonstrated by news surveys that consistently rank MPs as one of the least trusted 
professions, along with used car salespeople and journalists. However, the power and 
influence associated with the job ensures that MPs are considered high-status, even if they 
are disliked. 
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Occupational biases are apparent in the 2008 intake of MPs. Managers, 
lawyers, and professionals were the largest occupational groups entering 
parliament. Indeed, when compared to the occupational structure of all MPs, 
the proportion of managers and lawyers increased, as did other ‘status’ 
occupations such as public servants and diplomats. Some MPs identified the 
legislative role as an extension of their professional experience: 
 
I’m a lawyer by background and I have a real interest in the way 
laws are made and created and written, so I have a natural love of 
the parliamentary process. 
 
I came from the private sector but before that I actually worked in 
government and so I sort of felt like I’ve gone in a full circle. 
 
For many MPs their occupation was a factor that made them confident they 
could succeed as an MP: 
 
I’ve worked in investment banking, I’ve worked as a lawyer and 
I’ve also worked as a business owner. So it’s a deep experience both 
within the public and private sectors. 
 
My life outside of parliament brought me here from time-to-time 
which meant that I interacted with MPs, and I was doing a lot of 
lobbying and that sort of thing. 
 
The occupational breakdown of the 2008 intake shows parties value 
professionals over lower-skilled individuals. For instance, no farmers or 
service workers entered parliament in 2008.24 This confirms the increasing 
professionalisation of legislatures. Until recently, being a legislator was 
                                                 
24 The absence of farmers may be explained by the National Party’s success. National 
traditionally performs well in rural areas, to the extent that Federated Farmers is 
humorously referred to as ‘the National Party in gumboots’. However, in 2008 few rural seats 
were available for new National candidates. Of the 15 new National MPs, only three stood in 
electorates that had a higher proportion of electors in the agriculture, forestry, and fishing 
sectors than New Zealand as a whole. Thus it is logical that in a year where the National 
Party was especially successful in urban areas the number of farmers entering parliament 
should be reduced.  
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considered a part-time occupation.25 As recently as 1983 the support 
available to New Zealand MPs indicated that the vocation was semi-
professional.26 Professionalisation of politics has resulted in MPs whose 
ultimate career ambition is to become and remain legislators for as long as 
possible. Thus the lead-up to becoming an MP may be a dress rehearsal: 
 
I’ve been quite deliberate in designing my career in working in 
quite a different range of industries ’cause I thought that might be 
beneficial when I got here in terms of understanding a whole 
range of different issues and having a broad approach on a range 
of portfolios. 
 
I have a sense of how the state sector works, how policies are 
formed, how governments work. I’ve been involved at the 
periphery for a long time. 
 
Occupational background is also a supply factor when considering MPs’ 
quality of life. While MPs earn notably more than the average wage, the 
professions from which MPs are frequently recruited offer a greater rate of 
remuneration.27 Moreover, the hours worked by MPs are significant. 
Therefore a reduction of income in return for more work is a reality for 
many MPs. However, this was offset by enjoyment of the job and a sense of 
public service: 
 
I’m working way longer hours than I used to work as a lawyer and 
getting paid considerably less to do it. It isn’t something that you 
do for any other reason except a slightly altruistic reason. But to 
me the trade-off was more about the fact that I enjoy it more, so 
it’s worth the fall in money. 
 
I’m a self-employed businessman. I’m independently wealthy. I 
don’t say that in an aggressive sense – I’m not super, super 
wealthy, but I didn’t go out to work for a salary. 
                                                 
25 See James David Barber, The Lawmakers: Recruitment and Adaptation to Legislative Life 
(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1965) for an excellent account of the semi-
professional legislative role in the United States shortly before professionalisation occurred. 
26 For instance, many MPs’ wives were expected to carry out administrative tasks, including 
taking phone calls at home on behalf of the MP. See J. Theodore Anagnoson, ‘Home Style in 
New Zealand’, Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 8, No. 2, May 1983, pp. 157-175. 
27 The base salary of backbench MPs is $131,000, plus $14,800 in expense allowances. 
http://www.parliament.nz/en-NZ/MPP/MPs/Pay/9/b/0/00FinanMPPSalary1-MPs-salary-
and-allowances.htm, accessed 23 September 2009. 
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The presence of professional politicians is also a demand factor as selectors 
must understand the ambitions of nominees and determine whether they are 
the kinds of MPs they wish to represent the party for years to come. Whereas 
in the past the semi-professional nature of the role made it transitory, 
professional politics reduces the ability of parties to renew ranks. Thus in 
proportional representation systems the ability of parties to give low 
rankings is a powerful tool in encouraging MPs to consider their futures.28 
 
Women 
 
Women have long been underrepresented in Western legislatures. Although 
this is changing over time, women are usually the primary caregivers within 
families. A career that interferes with this role may be rejected.29 Thus 
traditional gender roles may prevent women from putting themselves 
forward for selection until their children are old enough to care for 
themselves. 
 
Family considerations were important amongst the female MPs elected in 
2008. The primary family concern female MPs had was the impact their 
absence would have on their children: 
 
The kids were a little nervous about what it would mean and 
whether they would see me. And it has been hard on them and they 
make a huge sacrifice in that respect. 
 
I guess [my son’s] kind of split. In some ways he likes it. Whenever 
we go somewhere he’ll be the person cheering the most for me. But 
also on the other side things are difficult because he doesn’t see as 
much of me. 
 
                                                 
28 Jack Vowles, Jeffrey Karp, Susan Banducci, Peter Aimer, and Raymond Miller, ‘Reviewing 
MMP’, in Jack Vowles, Peter Aimer, Jeffrey Karp, Susan Banducci, Raymond Miller, and Ann 
Sullivan (eds.), Proportional Representation on Trial: The 1999 New Zealand General Election 
and the Fate of MMP (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2002), p. 182. 
29 Elizabeth McLeay, ‘The New Parliament’, in Jonathan Boston, Stephen Church, Stephen 
Levine, Elizabeth McLeay, and Nigel S. Roberts (eds.), Left Turn: The New Zealand General 
Election of 1999 (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2000), p. 215. 
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However, while female MPs noted their family considerations, none viewed 
their role as entirely – or even primarily – negative in terms of the effect it 
had on their children: 
 
They get exposed to different experiences and different knowledge. 
I mean, I heard my nine year-old explaining to her classmate how 
the list system works. Not many nine year-olds know that! Not 
many adults know that!  
 
It’s not been a surprise. I think it’s an adjustment, but probably not 
as big as what some people would have thought it would be. 
 
Family considerations are also an important demand consideration as 
selectors may invoke ‘traditional family values’ as a reason – explicitly or 
implicitly – to reject female nominees. One MP who unsuccessfully sought a 
nomination in 2005 cited her family situation as a reason for her previous 
failure to be nominated: 
 
I had young children, and they’re still young, but I think that 
having a one year-old, for some people they just couldn’t cope with 
that. 
 
This reinforces the research of Mark Unsworth, who examined voters’ 
attitudes towards female candidates in New Zealand in 1980. Unsworth 
found that, overall, voters disproved of women with young children entering 
politics.30 Now, three decades later, it appears that selectors share the same 
sexist attitudes towards mothers in parliament. 
 
On the other hand, gender stereotypes can be beneficial to women if parties 
wish to portray themselves as more ‘caring’ or ‘honest’.31 Moreover, as 
gender balance has become more important, parties have become much 
                                                 
30 Robert Mark Unsworth, Women as Parliamentary Candidates: An Asset or Liability? 
(University of Canterbury: Unpublished MA Thesis, 1980), p. 18. 
31 Pippa Norris and Joni Lovenduski, Political Recruitment, p. 134. 
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more aware of the benefits of recruiting women into their ranks and 
reflecting the broader electorate.32 
 
Forty-four percent of the female MPs believed that gender was a positive 
factor in their selection. However, for these MPs gender was not a 
determining factor on its own; rather it was just one of a range of factors that 
appealed to selectors: 
 
I think it was that I was young, I think that they could see that I 
was passionate about it, that I am a woman, that I am a lawyer, 
that I knew the system – the parliamentary system – and knew 
how to make myself heard. 
 
[My party] was looking for youth. I’m 31 so in the scheme of things, 
I guess in politics that’s youth. We needed more women. I’m a 
woman. 
 
While agreeing that her gender was advantageous for her party to achieve a 
gender balance, one MP noted that it was a disadvantage in achieving a high 
list placing: 
 
I did feel resentful about some of the men who got higher than me 
on the list in the second round of the candidate selection because I 
didn’t think they were competent. 
 
Gender is a supply and demand factor as women are less likely to put 
themselves forward and selectors are less likely to pick women who try for 
selection. While the proportion of women in New Zealand’s parliament has 
increased under MMP, women remain descriptively and substantively under-
represented.33 
                                                 
32 A good example of this is the recent efforts within the National Party to recruit women to 
achieve better gender balance and therefore appeal to a broader range of female voters. See 
Elizabeth McLeay, ‘Representation, Selection, Election: The 2002 Parliament’, in Jonathan 
Boston, Stephen Church, Stephen Levine, Elizabeth McLeay, and Nigel S. Roberts (eds.), New 
Zealand Votes: The General Election of 2002 (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2003), pp. 
300-301 for comments on National’s previous inability to successfully recruit women and 
Maori. 
33 Descriptive representation is a quantitative measure that refers to the presence of a 
particular group in a legislature that is equal to the proportions of that group in wider 
society. Substantive representation, measures the level of active representation each social 
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Ethnic Minorities 
 
Ethnic minorities, including Maori, have traditionally been hugely under-
represented in parliament. The under-representation of indigenous peoples 
is largely caused by their lower socio-economic status and resulting 
disenfranchisement. New Zealand has addressed the problem of ensuring 
Maori representation through the use of Maori electorate seats since 1867, 
although descriptive representation approximately aligned with the 
proportion of the population who identifies as Maori was not achieved until 
MMP was adopted in 1996.34 Sixteen percent of the current parliament 
identify as Maori, compared with 18 percent of the general population.35  
 
Representation of non-indigenous ethnic minorities has been a more recent 
occurrence in New Zealand. One Pacifica MP was elected in 1993, increasing 
to five by 2008. The first Asian MP was elected in 1996, rising to six in 2008. 
Thus Pacific MPs comprise four percent of Parliament versus seven percent 
of the New Zealand population, while Asian MPs make up five percent of 
parliament versus nine percent of the population.36 While representation of 
ethnic minorities has increased in recent years, a level of descriptive 
representation commensurate with overall population has not been 
achieved, revealing the selectorate’s reluctance to respond to demographic 
changes. 
 
                                                                                                                                     
group receives. See Manon Tremblay, ‘Do Female MPs Substantively Represent Women? A 
Study of Legislative Behaviour in Canada’s 35th Parliament’, Canadian Journal of Political 
Science, Vol. 31, No. 3, September 1998, p. 463; and Elizabeth McLeay and Jack Vowles, 
‘Redefining Constituency Representation: The Roles of New Zealand MPs Under MMP’, 
Regional and Federal Studies, Vol. 17, No. 1, March 2007, pp. 87-88. 
34 Parliamentary Library, Final Results 2002 Election and Trends in Election Outcomes 1990-
2002 (Wellington: Parliamentary Library, August 2002), p. 3. Also see Susan Banducci, Todd 
Donovan, and Jeffrey A. Karp, ‘Minority Representation, Empowerment, and Participation’, 
The Journal of Politics, Vol. 66, No. 2, May 2004, pp. 534-556 for a comparative analysis of 
ethnic minority representation in New Zealand and the United States. 
35 Parliamentary Library, Final Results of the 2008 General Election (Wellington: 
Parliamentary Library, December 2008), p. 9. 
36 Parliamentary Library, Final Results of the 2008 General Election, p. 9. 
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Of the new MPs who self-identified as Maori, only 40 percent cited their 
ethnicity as a significant factor in their decision to stand or their 
attractiveness to selectors. For these MPs, their Maori ethnicity made up a 
significant part of their identity and their goals within parliament: 
 
What I really want to do is make life easier for our people, to make 
sure that we don’t have the discrimination that we’re currently 
experiencing. 
 
Amongst the other Maori MPs, ethnicity was only one part of their decision 
to stand and their appeal to selectors. One MP recounted how she had 
previously been asked to stand based on her ethnicity and gender: 
 
He said, ‘you’re bright, brown, and double-breasted’ [laughs]. And 
I’m not offended by that unless people think it’s only because 
you’re Maori or only because you’re a woman. To me those are 
‘add values’ to me having substance beyond that. I’d be offended if 
the only reason I was selected was because I ticked an ethnicity 
box. 
 
Ethnicity was unanimously identified as a selection factor for all MPs from 
other ethnic backgrounds.37 Eighty percent claimed their ethnicity made 
them attractive for demonstrating diversity: 
 
In my past seven or eight years’ experience and discussions with 
my community I realised that there was representation but not 
from someone who was from the community and understands all 
the psychology… Everyone felt that there should be someone from 
the [ethnic] communities. 
 
For the remaining 20 percent, ethnicity was a disadvantage due to difficulties 
dealing with the cultural dimensions of the selection process and gaining the 
support of their own disparate ethnic community: 
 
You need to present yourself to them to tell them how good you 
are and then you need to convince your own community again to 
give you a clear mandate… For the majority community members 
                                                 
37 This includes MPs from Asia and the Pacific. 
 64 
– i.e. Pakeha or even Maori – things may be relatively easier, 
simply because you guys know the games. 
 
As with Maori MPs, parliamentarians from other ethnic minorities saw their 
ethnicity as only one factor in their selection. Thus, they felt they possessed 
multiple political identities: 
 
When you think about minorities – whether it’s [National MP] 
Melissa Lee and Korean people [or] the Maori MPs – there’s always 
that capture. But I temper those comments by saying these are the 
people that voted me in, this is the party that I represent, these are 
the people that live in the electorate that I represent, these are 
also the people that I share a lot with. 
 
No ethnic minority MPs believed they had faced significant discrimination on 
their path to parliament. However, to suggest ethnicity is not a barrier to 
entering parliament is incorrect – it is important to remember the 
participants in this study were successful in becoming MPs. One can argue, 
however, that selectors a) actively recruit ethnic minority candidates, or b) 
consider ethnicity secondary to other positive attributes. Although selection 
preferences vary between parties, it is likely that actively recruiting ethnic 
minorities is the preferred option in many cases. Thus the low descriptive 
representation of ethnic minorities may be a supply rather than demand 
issue. 
 
Party Loyalty 
 
Typically, in strong party systems individuals with a long history of party 
service are more likely to be selected as candidates than those whose 
membership is brief. Long service allows candidates to prove their 
commitment to their party’s values.38 Norms about the value of party loyalty 
and partisanship in parliamentary systems are also passed to potential 
legislators over the course of party activity. Moreover, party service allows 
members to access current and former MPs, who are important sources of 
                                                 
38 David Boyd, Party Candidate Selection Procedures and Objectives Under MMP, p. 23. 
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knowledge and advice.39 Thus party service is a supply and demand factor 
and minimises risk on the demand side. 
 
The extent to which long service is important in New Zealand is debatable. 
David Boyd argues that the National and Labour parties demand long service 
as a criterion for selection.40 On the other hand, Helena Catt argues that New 
Zealand parties fast-track individuals with ‘MP potential’, an approach 
facilitated by MMP.41 Small parties complicate the issue as their newness 
means that party experience is less important.42 Minor parties also have 
smaller party organisations, robbing candidates of the opportunity to 
become deeply involved in the party. Instead, smaller parties value 
demonstrated commitment to their party’s ‘cause’.43  
 
The 2008 intake of MPs does not entirely conform to the expectations of 
party service. Table 3.1 shows the average length of party service by party. 
 
Most striking is the variation between National and Labour MPs. If the 
existing literature is correct, one would expect both parties to require 
approximately the same length of service. However, National prefers an 
average of almost twice the length of service expected of Labour MPs. 
 
This can be explained by the fact that 2008 saw National form a government 
after nine years in opposition. When asked about the factors they considered 
when deciding to stand for parliament, National MPs were twice as likely as 
Labour MPs to cite general dissatisfaction with the country’s direction: 
                                                 
39 Harold D. Clarke and Richard G. Price, ‘A Note on the Pre-Nomination Role Socialization of 
Freshmen Members of Parliament’, Canadian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 10, No. 2, June 
1977, pp. 394-395. 
40 David Boyd, Party Candidate Selection Procedures and Objectives Under MMP, p. 23. 
41 Helena Catt, ‘New Zealand’, p. 151. 
42 Elizabeth McLeay, ‘Representation, Selection, Election: The 2002 Parliament’, p. 293; 
Raymond Miller, ‘Who Stood for Office, and Why?’, in Jack Vowles, Peter Aimer, Susan 
Banducci , Jeffrey Karp, and Raymond Miller (eds.), Voters’ Veto: The 2002 Election in New 
Zealand and the Consolidation of Minority Government (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 
2004), p. 85. 
43 Raymond Miller, ‘Who Stood for Office, and Why?’, p. 92; Ariadne Vromen and Ankia Gauja, 
‘Protesters, Parliamentarians, Policymakers: The Experiences of Australian Green MPs’, The 
Journal of Legislative Studies, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2009, p. 91. 
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I looked at the country we were living in and thought that we 
weren’t heading in the direction we should be. 
 
I joined the party in, I think it was 2002, just because I didn’t like 
the way the country was going. 
 
Thus National MPs were likely to have joined the party over the course of the 
Labour Government as a remedy to their dissatisfaction.  
 
Table 3.1 – Average Length of Party Membership amongst the 2008 
Intake by Party 
Party Average Length of  
Membership (years) 
National 10.2 
Labour 5.6 
Green 4.7 
ACT 6.0 
Maori 0 
Average 5.3 
 
On the other hand, Labour MPs were more likely to have been asked to stand 
by their party or one of its MPs: 
 
I’d been told for a number of years that I’d make a good politician 
and that politics was my next step, but I actually hadn’t seriously 
considered it until I was approached. 
 
The [incumbent] MP decided quite late in the process to stand 
down. So I then I was approached to stand. 
 
Thus to renew, Labour reached out to individuals who did not have strong 
links with the party. 
 
Unfortunately, the sample size of minor party MPs is too small to make 
reliable conclusions about party service. However, one cautious observation 
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can be made. Green MPs had considerable experience working or 
volunteering within organisations aligned with their party’s core 
philosophies. The Greens emphasise community involvement, meaning that 
this service – or activism – may act as a surrogate for party membership. 
 
Community and Volunteer Experience 
 
In order to connect with communities, parties may select candidates who are 
well-known for their community and volunteer experience. Catt argues that 
individuals who have been involved with community groups are more likely 
to become candidates.44 This may be a supply and demand factor, as parties 
recruit individuals with proven community experience and individuals with 
community connections hold the political capital required to successfully 
seek candidacy.45 
 
The 2008 intake named an average of 1.2 community or volunteer 
organisations that they had been involved with. The groups covered a 
diverse range of areas: family, gender, education, religion, sexuality, the 
environment, the Treaty of Waitangi, and so on. The most common 
community groups, however, were those dedicated to health and political 
causes. 
 
Experience in community health is somewhat unexpected, but may be due to 
the prominence of particular health-related causes, such as breast cancer 
and HIV/AIDS. Political causes, on the other hand, are entirely predictable 
given the MPs’ choice of vocation. It was interesting, however, that MPs 
considered their political parties to be community groups: 
 
I’ve found with running a business, [completing] my MBA, my 
family, and a heavy involvement with the party, that the party was 
my community development. 
 
                                                 
44 Helena Catt, ‘New Zealand’, p. 151-153. 
45 Pippa Norris, ‘Introduction’, p. 13. 
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Most of my local work was through the local party. I also got 
involved in [the party’s youth wing], for instance, and was Vice 
President of that for a while. 
 
Of course, political parties have a community focus. However, they are 
notably different to other community groups in that their primary aims are 
self-interested – political parties seek to exercise political power in 
parliament. While many other community groups also advance political 
goals, they aim to influence – rather than become – decision-makers. 
 
Small party MPs had more community experience than large party MPs, 
confirming the observation that a dedication to their party’s causes may 
replace the traditional requirement of party service. Green Party MPs had 
significantly more community experience than other MPs, with an average of 
2.6 groups reported, versus an average of only 0.8 for all other parties. This 
reinforces the ‘grassroots’ nature of green politics. 
 
Also significant was the tendency for electorate MPs (1.5) to have greater 
community experience than list MPs (1.1). This confirms the primacy of a 
community focus amongst electorate MPs. It is also likely that community 
experience makes gaining an electorate seat nomination simpler on account 
of being known and trusted in the community. Thus gaining community 
experience before seeking nomination is an important strategy for aspiring 
electorate MPs. 
 
Perceptions of the Candidate Selection Process 
 
Every nominee has different experiences of the selection process. For some, 
competing for selection is excellent preparation for the campaign-proper. 
For others, it may be a gruelling experience. This subsection considers how 
MPs regarded their candidate selection experiences. 
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Generally, candidate selection was a positive experience for a majority of 
MPs, with 71 percent of responses describing the process favourably. As one 
MP noted: 
 
Each step has been such an opportunity for personal growth 
where if I’d fallen away at any of the steps then I could have said, 
‘this has actually been a really good opportunity, I’ve really grown 
as a result of this.’ 
 
This positive attitude is hardly surprising given that the MPs interviewed 
were individuals who were successful in gaining their party’s nomination 
(and ultimately being elected). Unsuccessful nominees may take a more 
negative view of the candidate selection process. 
 
The challenges of being selected as a candidate are not dissimilar to the 
challenges of running in an election. Unsurprisingly, then, candidate 
selection was viewed as good training for the campaign-proper and 
becoming an MP: 
 
The process of getting selected and then elected is quite a natural 
entrée in terms of local politics – getting round meeting people, 
building your network, getting out and about, being seen, finding 
out about the community. So that’s all groundwork for being the 
MP. 
 
It prepares you for the campaign and it’s also really important in 
terms of understanding more about what the job is, and that’s part 
of going into it with your eyes wide open. 
 
Amongst those who had a generally negative perception of the selection 
process the stress of having to compete for something they wanted so badly 
was the main reason for their negative outlook: 
 
The closer you get the more you want it and the more stressful it 
becomes, the more you live and breathe it… For the whole time I 
felt like my chest was constricted. I couldn’t eat much, I couldn’t 
sleep much. It’s just that I wanted it so much. 
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It’s a testing, vigorous process in [the party], particularly when 
you’re going for a seat that is viewed as a highly winnable seat… 
You have to lobby the delegates very hard – it’s a popularity 
contest, at the end of the day. It’s a stressful, time-consuming, 
draining process. 
 
Thus negative perceptions were not due to candidate selection, per se. When 
high ambition mixes with uncertainty it is hardly surprising nominees found 
the process stressful. 
 
Candidate Selection and ‘Types’ of MPs and Party Size 
 
As New Zealand has two types of MPs – electorate and list – how each 
individual MP experiences candidate selection depends on whether they 
stood in an electorate, on their party list, or both, and whether they expected 
to enter parliament as an electorate or list MP. For example, a list MP who 
expected to win an electorate may have a more negative view of their 
selection than an MP who unexpectedly won an electorate. 
 
In New Zealand, the large parties more-or-less retain a stranglehold on 
electorate seats, with the notable exception of the Maori Party’s success in 
the Maori seats.46 Thus one would expect large party MPs to place greater 
emphasis on being selected in electorates than they do on their party list 
ranking, while small party MPs would prioritise the list over electorate 
selections.  
 
For many large party MPs, winning an electorate was crucial to confirming 
their legitimacy; the list was a secondary – and less desirable – method of 
entry: 
 
It was always very clear to me from the moment that I got that 
[electorate seat] nomination that I would be done no favours on 
                                                 
46 The Maori Party depends on the Maori seats to enter parliament due to its high popularity 
in these seats and low overall party vote. The ACT, United Future, and the Progressive party 
leaders also currently hold electorate seats which they use as safeguards against the five 
percent threshold necessary to enter parliament under the MMP electoral system.  
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the list. And that was fine with me because that’s how I wanted to 
get in. 
 
I guess I’m old-fashioned. If I didn’t win my seat I’d take a list MP 
position no problem at all, but fundamentally I want to be there 
because my electorate has chosen me to represent them. 
 
Small party MPs framed their selection around the qualities important to 
selectors and their ability to make a specific contribution to a small caucus: 
 
I think I impressed electorates and branches around the country. 
One of the things that I focused on was, ‘well, we need to be more 
strategically inclined and more focused in the way that our 
parliamentary team works’. 
 
Without wishing to be unkind to backbench National MPs – or let’s 
be more specific, new National backbench MPs – the amount of 
potential difference I can make as opposed to them is much 
greater. And I’m very lucky to be in that position. 
 
MPs from small parties invariably had positive opinions about the candidate 
selection process. On the other hand, only 67 percent of large party MPs felt 
positive about their selection. It is therefore important to consider why the 
process was more agreeable in small parties. 
 
The majority of large party candidates contested electorate seats.47 
Nominations for these seats were contested in 82 percent of cases, making 
candidate selection a high-stakes competition: 
 
It was a bit gruelling. There were three candidates… There were 
60 people you had to convince that you were the right candidate, 
you were the best candidate, and you were the candidate that had 
the ability to win this electorate. 
 
There were 30 delegates – 10 of whom you had to persuade to 
nominate you. When I found out that the other candidate was 
going round slagging me [laughs] I then got into super-
competitive mode and I persuaded 21 of the 30 to nominate me, 
                                                 
47 National and Labour each allow only five candidates to stand exclusively on the list. All 
other candidates are expected to stand in an electorate. 
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which meant that there were only nine left, which meant that he 
was short of one to get to the bar. So he and I had to meet and I 
agreed to give him one. 
 
Small party MPs also stood in electorates, but National and Labour’s virtual 
stranglehold on these seats meant small party candidates were released 
from the pressure of achieving a credible result in an electorate. Indeed, in 
many cases the party had to ask them to stand: 
 
It was a little bit of a soft push in the back to stand in the 
[electorate] but once I had decided to stand then it’s only for the 
experience itself. 
 
I was asked to stand in [electorate] – they just simply needed 
somebody to run. 
 
With regards to list selection, small party MPs were more relaxed about the 
ranking of candidates than large party MPs. Despite the party list generally 
being a less desirable means of entry to parliament for large party 
candidates, those standing in ‘unwinnable’ constituencies must fight for a 
winnable list position: 
 
Each spot on the list comes up and you nominate for it and then 
there’s a vote. And you win or lose – it’s completely out in the open. 
Everybody can see it. It’s brutally competitive. And for a lot of 
people it’s a very bruising and even crushing process. 
 
I got told if I didn’t get in this election, I might get in mid-term – 
that’s the way the list-ranking things work. And then, there were 
three or four people ahead of me in terms of list ranking that they 
thought they would never win a seat ever, and they thought I will 
win a seat eventually. 
 
Small party MPs, on the other hand, had no expectation of winning electorate 
seats and therefore could direct their full attention to the list ranking 
process. This is competitive, but small party MPs felt comfortable to leave the 
decision in the hands of members; list ranking was approached with a degree 
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You have to acknowledge that you’re going to be ranked and that’s 
just what happens. 
 
When [the list was released] they said that ‘you’re going to be the 
cliff-hanger’. And that was it, they were dead right… I am the most 
fragile, greenest, weakest MP you’ll ever have anything to do with. 
 
Thus where large party MPs faced stress and competition, small party MPs 
embraced the will of the party. While the small party approach appears more 
desirable, there is little large parties can do to reduce the stress of their 
selections. The imperative for large parties to win electorates ensures that 
competition is fierce in winnable seats. It is the large parties that form 
governments, meaning that the stakes are arguably higher for their 
candidates, which may lead to less enjoyable candidate selections. Moreover, 
election by way of the party list will be the less desirable option as long as 
list MPs are perceived as less legitimate than electorate MPs.48 Thus small 
party MPs will have more enjoyable selection experiences for the foreseeable 
future. 
 
Temperament 
 
Before moving on to discuss legislator roles, it is salient to pause and 
consider the temperaments typical of political candidates. Temperament is 
an elusive quality that describes how individuals act, transcending the what 
or why of behaviour.49 Examining candidates’ temperaments allows a greater 
understanding of how legislators behave and therefore builds a broader 
framework with which to analyse political behaviour. 
 
MPs were asked to describe their temperament in order to gauge how they 
approach their work and other aspects of their life.50 Unsurprisingly, given 
how difficult temperament is to define, answers were diffuse and were often 
                                                 
48 The perceived illegitimacy of list MPs is examined extensively in chapters four and five. 
49 Jan Strelau, Temperament: A Psychological Perspective (New York: Plenum Press, 1998), p. 
31. 
50 It is extremely important to highlight once again that this study relies on self-reported 
data. Therefore, results in areas such as temperament should be treated with caution as they 
rely on the self-insight and honesty of participants, neither of which can be guaranteed. 
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descriptions of personality. Therefore, responses were grouped into four 
categories: internal composure, relatedness, character, and internal 
response.  
 
Internal composure measured whether MPs took a calm approach to their 
tasks or whether they were easily frustrated or agitated. Sixty-one percent of 
MPs were self-reported as primarily stable in their internal composure. 
Indeed, the single most common term used by MPs to describe their 
temperament was ‘calm’, followed closely by ‘easy-going’ and ‘even’. Women 
and electorate MPs had a more stable internal composure than other MPs: 
 
I do get stressed occasionally but I would say that I’m a reasonably 
easy-going character. Sometimes I feel the pressure of being 
overloaded and that can make me stressed… I think you have to be 
fairly easy-going in this job. 
 
Pretty balanced, I suppose. Every now and again if something 
really pisses me off then I’ll sort of flare up and it dies within about 
10 minutes. But you have to be pretty calm. 
 
The 39 percent of MPs who had an agitated internal composure viewed their 
volatility as necessary to make progress: 
 
I tend to be impatient… I get irritated if things unnecessarily get in 
the way of doing things. 
 
I know the direction I want the country to be going in, so I will 
fight against anything that I think is the wrong way. 
 
Relatedness was measured using Renshon’s model of individuals’ tendency to 
move either toward, away from, or against other people. Individuals who 
move towards people achieve psychological benefits from being close to 
others; those who move away see other needs as more important than 
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relationships; and those who move against others want contact but their 
methods ensure distance, not friendship.51 
 
In the 2008 intake, 56 percent of MPs primarily moved towards others, 33 
percent moved away from others, and 11 percent moved against others. 
Electorate MPs were more likely to move towards others than list MPs – 
perhaps an indication of the importance of engaging with electorates. Men 
and women were equally likely to move towards others, but women were 
significantly more likely to move away from others, whereas men moved 
against others. 
 
Amongst those who moved towards others, being personable was a 
necessary and enjoyable aspect of their role: 
 
You’re constantly mixing with people all the time. If you can’t 
relate comfortably with people from a wide range of ages and 
interests and background, then you’re going to struggle in the job. 
 
I’m a grafter; I like to do the hard work. I need to understand what 
the issues are. I like communicating with people. 
 
MPs who moved away from others stressed the primacy of the task at hand 
over relationships: 
 
You can say, ‘there’s a great injustice here’ and jump up and down 
or you can actually study it and think, ‘how do we get out of it 
what I need through planning and hard work and a bit of 
intelligence and so on?’. 
 
[I’m] occasionally grumpy, usually out of impatience to get things 
done and moving faster than the people around me. 
 
                                                 
51 Stanley A. Renshon, The Psychological Assessment of Presidential Candidates, p. 193. 
Renshon built on the work of Karen Horney in assessing relatedness. See Karen Horney, The 
Neurotic Personality of Our Time (New York: Norton, 1937). See also Jon Johansson, Two 
Titans: Muldoon, Lange and Leadership (Wellington: Dunmore Press, 2005), pp. 106-109 for 
an assessment of the connection between ambition and relatedness. 
 76 
The small group of MPs who moved against others identified themselves as 
independently-minded, but this led to a distance between themselves and 
others: 
 
I’m a very plain-spoken person. I will tend to call a spade a fucking 
shovel rather than a digging implement. I use the ‘f’ word quite 
deliberately. The traditional formulation of that is ‘he tends to call 
a spade a bloody shovel’. Well, I would tend to call it a fucking 
shovel. 
 
There was no indication from MPs that one characteristic was preferable to 
another. Even MPs who moved against others – the most isolating of the 
three categories – were content with this position. This suggests relatedness 
is an innate trait that individuals are unable to easily change, meaning they 
are comfortable with whatever method they use to relate to people. 
Alternatively, MPs may lack the self-insight to modify their maladaptive 
behaviour. 
 
According to Renshon, character shapes beliefs, information processing, and 
styles of behaviour. Character is ‘pervasive not only across time and 
circumstance, but also across personality itself’.52 Character, therefore, is the 
underlying superstructure on which personality develops. It is an especially 
important element for political actors given the high importance of beliefs in 
their profession. Character was classed as secure or insecure based on how 
clearly MPs were able to articulate their beliefs and reconcile them with their 
behaviour.53 
 
The 2008 intake were remarkably secure in their character, with 73 percent 
being self-classified as secure. Men were more secure in their character, 
although this could be an effect of gendered language, with men speaking in 
more authoritative terms. Those who were secure expressed confidence in 
their beliefs and were able to articulate them in a consistent manner: 
 
                                                 
52 Stanley A. Renshon, The Psychological Assessment of Presidential Candidates, p. 184. 
53 Renshon termed this ‘character integrity’. Stanley A. Renshon, The Psychological 
Assessment of Presidential Candidates, pp. 188-194. 
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I wanted to name the issues of racism, the issues around disability 
discrimination, and the issues of loss of power to the feminist 
movement. I’ve got some things to say and I’m good at talking, so 
why shouldn’t I? 
 
I’m pretty opinionated. I’m certainly not short of something to say 
most of the time – I’m not shy when expressing my opinions… I 
think I can get along with most people in a situation but they 
certainly know where I stand on things. 
 
On the other hand, those who demonstrated character insecurity were 
unable to express their beliefs in a manner that retained fidelity to them: 
 
I’m an idealist and pragmatist at the same time… I will always aim 
for something that I think is probably quite an idealised outcome 
in a political sense but will be pragmatic about whether or not we 
can reach it. 
 
It is unsurprising MPs should be so secure in their character. Standing for 
parliament requires strong beliefs. Character security (or rigidity) increases 
with age; MPs who were insecure in their character were on average 10 
years younger than the 2008 intake as a whole. Thus character, including its 
flaws, is built upon with life experiences. 
 
Finally, internal response measured whether MPs were primarily rational or 
emotional in their approaches to situations. This information was based on 
how MPs described their approach to life, for instance, ‘logical’ versus 
‘compassionate’. Internal responses offer an understanding of how MPs think 
about problems and the considerations behind their actions. 
 
The 2008 intake was split in terms of internal response, with half being 
rational and half being emotional. True to form, those with rational internal 
responses gave concise descriptions of their thought patterns: 
 
I have a fairly low emotional metabolism that is akin to Buddhist 
detachment. There’s usually a level of underlying logical analysis 
that’s going on fairly dispassionately. 
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I’m a rational lawyer turned MP. That’s how I describe myself. 
 
Amongst emotional MPs, passionate responses were primary means of 
mobilisation to advocate for their beliefs: 
 
I have a burning sense of justice, really. So I do get angry, I do get 
wound up by things that offend my sense of justice. 
 
This is a hard word to use because it’s so overused these days… I’m 
very passionate, so I take on ideas and I try to see them through to 
the end. 
 
Interestingly, the divide between rationality and emotion was most 
significant along gender lines. Sixty-three percent of men were rational 
versus only 25 percent of women. This suggests that legislatures are 
masculine institutions in which rationality is considered superior to 
emotion.54 Electorate MPs were more emotional than list MPs, likely due to 
the empathetic nature of the electorate role and the more specialised policy 
role of list MPs.55 
 
In combining the four temperamental factors, MPs elected in 2008 were 
stable in their internal composure, moved towards others, secure in their 
character, and rational if men or emotional if women. These are positive 
qualities. Being stable and well-rounded is important for candidate selection, 
both from the supply and demand side. It should be remembered, however, 
that temperament is just one factor in how successful an MP will be. 
 
Candidate Selection and Community Leadership 
 
This chapter has somewhat confirmed the importance of community 
leadership amongst legislative aspirants. Certainly, the fact that most new 
                                                 
54 Kathy Louise Stuart, Emotional Labour and Occupational Identity, p. 142. 
55 When MMP was adopted it was assumed that parties would use the list to recruit MPs who 
had specific policy knowledge but would be unable to win an electorate seat. See Elizabeth 
McLeay and Jack Vowles, ‘Redefining Constituency Representation’, p. 86. This will be 
explored further in chapter five. 
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MPs have some experience volunteering for community organisations shows 
that parties are enthusiastic about candidates with pre-existing community 
ties. Moreover, the typical temperament of MPs suggests that selectors – 
quite reasonably – choose candidates who are well-placed to develop 
relationships with a range of groups and individuals. This suggests that 
political candidates are the types of people who are well suited to provide 
community leadership. 
 
It is important to consider the motivations of candidates. Normatively, it is 
imperative for MPs to act as community leaders. However, many MPs 
highlighted personal attributes that were not necessarily connected with 
community leadership, suggesting that candidates may be inwardly-
focussed. This does not necessarily preclude MPs from demonstrating 
community leadership once elected; indeed, self-insight may increase an 
individual’s ability to conduct this role. On the other hand, it is possible that 
candidates over-emphasise their ‘desirable’ skills that may contribute to 
their ability to perform community leadership while minimising the personal 
gains they seek to achieve as a legislator. Thus the rhetoric of candidate 
selection may be based on community compatibility and service, but this 
does not guarantee that candidates will serve as community leaders once 
elected. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Candidate selection is a complex process. Chances of success are determined 
by a variety of factors including the degree of openness of the selection 
process and a myriad of supply and demand factors. This chapter has 
confirmed that both supply and demand factors are responsible for 
recruiting political candidates who are highly ambitious, often politically 
socialised while young, come from professional and high-status occupations, 
with some disadvantage for women and minority ethnic groups. 
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The relationship between the selectorate and candidates can be 
characterised as one of socialisation and grooming. Both groups want the 
best for their parties and thus candidate selection is designed to test 
candidates to ensure that they are prepared to become legislators. 
 
New MPs place great emphasis on public service. This is not surprising as 
MPs occupy a privileged social and professional space. Given the widespread 
public scepticism about MPs’ intentions it is heartening to find MPs espouse 
such noble goals. MPs were aware of their own privilege and were grateful to 
selectors, their parties, and the public for placing such great faith in them. 
 
Now the focus turns to the roles MPs adopt once they have been elected to 
parliament, beginning with the most well-known of all legislator roles: 
representation. 
 
 81 
Chapter 4 
 
 Representation 
 
 
 
The roles of legislators are largely undefined. Rather than clear-cut job 
descriptions setting out what is expected of MPs and how performance will 
be monitored there exist vague assumptions about ‘representation’, usually 
of a geographic constituency or particular demographic. This chapter 
addresses the concept of representation – who new MPs count as their 
constituents, how new MPs view their representative functions, the 
legitimacy of new MPs in their claims to represent constituents, and 
representation as a demonstration of community leadership. 
 
Defining Representation 
 
Although a vague and diffuse term, it is important to define representation, 
as without understanding who legislators seek to represent the term is 
essentially meaningless. In chapter two, representation was defined as: 
 
the relationships between elected Members of Parliament and 
constituencies. Constituencies may be identified by the legislator 
or the constituents themselves. For political representation to 
occur, legislators and the constituents must deem the 
relationships to be legitimate and authoritative and the 
legislator must be accountable to the represented group. 
 
This definition captures the diverse groups legislators seek to represent and 
the conditions upon which the representative function is premised. 
 
There is an assumption that legislators ought to represent not only the 
citizens who voted for them but also a broader cross-section of society. 
However, there is a wide scope for legislators to undertake this role. Edmund 
Burke held that representatives should act as ‘delegates’ and thus are bound 
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by the preferences of their constituents.1 ‘Trustees’, on the other hand, rely 
on their own judgment to make decisions that are best for the community as 
a whole.2 Both the delegate and trustee models are outdated, however, as 
they treat legislators as individuals who have complete agency over how to 
cast their votes – political parties are not considered. This is also true in the 
‘politico’ model, which sees legislators switching between their own 
judgment and the explicit wishes of the electorate.3 This assumes that 
political parties do not play a large role in shaping representatives’ decisions.  
 
The reality of party influence is clear in parliamentary systems. Although 
MPs have no legal obligation to follow their party’s instructions, conventions 
see legislators defer to their party’s wishes. The ‘partisan’ role contends that 
MPs should represent the policies of their political parties. Doing so creates a 
link between citizens and government that is tightly controlled by parties.4 
This model, however, downplays any autonomy – perceived or actual – that 
legislators may hold. 
 
It is likely that legislators fulfil different and multiple representative role 
orientations depending on their circumstances. As Vernon Bogdanor argues, 
‘the question of the appropriate focus of representation is likely to be 
determined by the point at which the nomination takes place: to whom does 
the parliamentarian own his recruitment into the legislature?’5 
 
                                                 
1 Heinz Eulau, John C. Wahlke, William Buchanan, and Leroy C. Ferguson, ‘The Role of the 
Representative’, pp. 749-750; Richard S. Katz, ‘Role Orientations in Parliaments’, in Richard 
S. Katz and Bernhard Wessels (eds.), The European Parliament, The National Parliaments, and 
European Integration (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 62. 
2 Jack Vowles, Peter Aimer, Helena Catt, Jim Lamare and Raymond Miller, Towards 
Consensus? The 1993 Election in New Zealand and the Transition to Proportional 
Representation (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1995), p. 123. 
3 Donley T. Studlar and Ian McAllister, ‘Constituency Activity and Representational Roles 
among Australian Legislators’, The Journal of Politics, Vol. 58, No. 1, February 1996, p. 71; 
Jack Vowles, Peter Aimer, Helena Catt, Jim Lamare, and Raymond Miller, Towards Consensus?, 
p. 124. 
4 Donley T. Studlar and Ian McAllister, ‘Constituency Activity and Representational Roles 
among Australian Legislators’, p. 71; Jack Vowles, Peter Aimer, Helena Catt, Jim Lamare, and 
Raymond Miller, Towards Consensus?, p. 124. 
5 Vernon Bogdanor, ‘Introduction’, in Vernon Bogdanor (ed.), Representatives of the People? 
Parliaments and Constituents in Western Democracies (Hants: Grover Publishing Press, 1985), 
p. 4. 
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The representative function of electorate MPs is relatively well-known in 
New Zealand. There is an expectation that MPs have a public service focus.6 
In New Zealand it is the norm for constituency MPs to live in their electorate, 
hold constituency clinics (meetings with constituents), and attend local 
events and gatherings. Elizabeth McLeay and Jack Vowles argue that MPs’ 
roles include ‘seeing individual constituents in the citizens’ advice role; 
navigating between state and individuals; meeting delegations of local 
groups; and keeping in close touch with local government, paying attention 
to local issues and speaking on those issues in the House.’7 
 
Given that advocating for geographic electorates is a well-known and 
legitimate role, new legislators place great emphasis on this aspect as a 
means of settling into their jobs. Studies in Canada and Australia have shown 
that notions of constituency service dominate pre-incumbency role 
expectations and consolidating their presence in an electorate is a priority 
for new legislators.8 MPs’ lack of lawmaking experience before becoming a 
legislator makes the comparatively simple task of constituency service 
appealing.9 
 
In 1983, J. Theodore Anagnoson found that newer MPs in New Zealand 
placed greater emphasis on constituency work than their more experienced 
colleagues and were more likely to have electorate offices, send newsletters, 
hold constituent clinics, and have personal ties with local bureaucratic 
offices.10 This is logical, as new MPs seek to build political capital to make 
                                                 
6 Morgens N. Pedersen, ‘Lawyers in Politics: The Danish Folketing and United States 
Legislatures’, in Samuel C. Patterson and John C. Wahlke (eds.), Comparative Legislative 
Behavior: Frontiers of Research (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1972), p. 44. 
7 Elizabeth McLeay and Jack Vowles, ‘Redefining Constituency Representation’, p. 75. 
8 Harold D. Clarke and Richard G. Price, ‘Freshman MPs’ Job Images: The Effects of 
Incumbency, Ambition and Position’, Canadian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 13, No. 3, 
September 1980, p. 604; James Walter, The Acculturation to Political Work: New Members of 
the Federal Backbench (Canberra: Australasian Political Studies Association, 1979), p. 28. 
9 Michael M. Atkinson and Paul G. Thomas, ‘Studying the Canadian Parliament’, Legislative 
Studies Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 3, August 1993, p. 445. 
10 J. Theodore Anagnoson, ‘Home Style in New Zealand’, Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 8, 
No. 2, May 1983, p. 172. 
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their seat ‘safe’ throughout their political career.11 Once this has been 
achieved, MPs may turn their attention to broader political issues and 
ambitions. 
 
There is an attitude in New Zealand that list members are ‘second-class’ MPs. 
This is primarily linked to the idea that list MPs lack a mandate as they are 
elected only by virtue of their party list ranking. It is assumed that a tension 
exists between constituency service and party loyalty which prevents list 
MPs from being legitimate representatives.12 This attitude is amplified by the 
fact that MPs may enter parliament on the party list despite having lost a 
contest for an electorate seat. Thus list MPs are sometimes seen as party 
‘hacks’ who represent parties rather than the people.13 This overlooks the 
fact that all MPs in strong party systems like New Zealand rely on a party 
nomination regardless of the method of election.14 
 
In recommending MMP, the Royal Commission on the Electoral System 
argued that it was beneficial for some MPs to be freed from the obligations of 
servicing a geographic constituency. List members would be able to 
represent minorities and communities of interest, or have a greater policy 
focus.15 However, in practice it has been assumed that list MPs take on lesser 
tasks than their electorate colleagues.16 This is at least in part due to some 
list MPs acting like constituency MPs, thereby creating the perception that 
list MPs have no discernible roles other than mimicking electorate MPs. 
                                                 
11 Valerie Heitshusen, Garry Young, and David M. Wood, ‘Electoral Context and MP 
Constituency Focus in Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand and the United Kingdom’, 
American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 49, No. 1, January 2005, p. 37. 
12 Valerie Heitshusen, Garry Young, and David M. Wood, ‘Electoral Context and MP 
Constituency Focus in Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand and the United Kingdom’, p. 
38. 
13 Leigh J. Ward, ‘“Second-Class MPs?” New Zealand’s Adaptation to Mixed-Member 
Parliamentary Representation’, Political Science, Vol. 49, No. 2, Jan 1998, p. 127; Jack Vowles, 
Jeffrey Karp, Susan Banducci, Peter Aimer, and Raymond Miller, ‘Reviewing MMP’, in Jack 
Vowles, Peter Aimer, Jeffrey Karp, Susan Banducci, Raymond Miller, and Ann Sullivan (eds.), 
Proportional Representation on Trial: The 1999 New Zealand General Election and the Fate of 
MMP (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2002), p. 182. 
14 Leigh J. Ward, ‘“Second-Class MPs?”’, p. 139. 
15 Royal Commission on the Electoral System, Report of the Royal Commission on the Electoral 
System (Wellington: Government Printer, 1986), p. 68. 
16 Leigh J. Ward, ‘“Second-Class MPs?”’, p. 127. 
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Political parties, for their part, have largely failed to guide list MPs in 
developing new non-electorate-related roles.17  
 
Given the dominance of the large parties in electorate seats, list MPs in 
National and Labour often act as ‘buddy’ constituent MPs in electorates not 
held by their party. Thus even though they are list MPs they work within the 
framework of electorate representation.18 List MPs from major parties who 
believe they have a chance of winning an electorate are more likely to act like 
a constituency MP than their small party colleagues.19 Moreover, having an 
electorate presence may increase the likelihood of list MPs being reselected 
by their parties – even if only on the list – as electorate work demonstrates a 
commitment to the community and the party.20 
 
There may be benefits for constituents in electorates where one or more list 
MPs have a strong presence – the level of constituency work undertaken by 
electorate MPs may be related to the level of competition they face in the 
electorate.21 However, even where list MPs have a constituency presence 
they have less contact with constituents than their electorate MP 
colleagues.22 It is currently unknown whether list MPs based in opposing 
party ‘safe’ seats invest less time in electorate work than list MPs in marginal 
seats. This chapter will consider this point.  
 
                                                 
17 Fiona Barker and Stephen Levine, ‘The Individual Parliamentary Member and Institutional 
Change’, p. 113. 
18 Elizabeth McLeay and Jack Vowles, ‘Redefining Constituency Representation: The Roles of 
New Zealand MPs under MMP’, Regional and Federal Studies, Vol. 17, No. 1, March 2007, pp. 
81-82. 
19 Elizabeth McLeay and Jack Vowles, ‘Redefining Constituency Representation’, p. 87; Valerie 
Heitshusen, Garry Young, and David M. Wood, ‘Electoral Context and MP Constituency Focus 
in Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand and the United Kingdom’, p. 7. 
20 Valerie Heitshusen, Garry Young, and David M. Wood, ‘Electoral Context and MP 
Constituency Focus in Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand and the United Kingdom’, pp. 
37-38. 
21 Jeffrey A. Karp, Candidate Effects and Spill-Over in Mixed Systems: Evidence from New 
Zealand, Paper presented at the 64th Annual Conference of the Midwest Political Science 
Association, Chicago, Illinois, 20-23 April, 2006, p. 6. 
22 New Zealand Election Study, Electoral System Opinion and the Evolution of MMP: A Report 
to the Electoral Commission, 28 July 2000, http://www.nzes.org/docs/papers/nzes_2000.pdf, 
accessed 20 May 2009, p. 4. 
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List MPs from smaller parties shape their roles more broadly around the 
party identity, reflecting the differences in constituency engagement 
between the large and small parties.23 Perceptions that list MPs are ‘second-
class’ MPs are particularly harmful for small parties as most of their MPs are 
list members. If list MPs are less legitimate than electorate MPs, then small 
parties are less legitimate than large parties.24 On the other hand, small party 
list MPs may be viewed differently to large party list MPs who have a greater 
obligation to service a geographic constituency. 
 
One of the arguments for list MPs is their ability to represent minority 
communities that are typically under-represented in legislatures. Thus 
parties can use lists to ensure representation of particular groups, most 
notably women and ethnic minorities. However, given their perceived lack of 
legitimacy it is unclear whether minorities are adequately represented by list 
MPs.25 It may be preferable for minorities to be represented by a mixture of 
electorate and list MPs. Mixed representation has occurred in areas where a 
concentration of Maori and Pacific voters has facilitated the election of 
minority community members to electorate seats.26 
 
As a means of understanding how new legislators understand their 
representational roles, MPs were asked in each of the two rounds of 
interviews who their constituents were. Additionally, MPs were asked in 
each interview about their most important role. These questions were 
designed to test the link between constituency identification and role 
orientations. Moreover, they allowed role changes to be tracked over time.  
 
                                                 
23 Jack Vowles, Susan A. Banducci, and Jeffrey A. Karp, ‘Forecasting and Evaluating the 
Consequences of Electoral Change in New Zealand’, Acta Politica, Vol. 41, 2006, p. 276. This 
distinction between large and small parties also occurs in Germany, which also uses MMP: 
see Tony Burkett, ‘The West German Deputy’, in Bogdanor, Vernon (ed.), Representatives of 
the People? Parliamentarians and Constituents in Western Democracies (Hants: Grover 
Publishing Press, 1985), pp. 129-130. 
24 Leigh J. Ward, ‘“Second-Class MPs?”’, p. 143. 
25 Leigh J. Ward, ‘“Second-Class MPs?”’, p. 135. 
26 Elizabeth McLeay, ‘Representation, Selection, Election: The 2002 Parliament’, in Jonathan 
Boston, Stephen Church, Stephen Levine, Elizabeth McLeay, and Nigel S. Roberts (eds.), New 
Zealand Votes: The General Election of 2002 (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2003), p. 
295; Elizabeth McLeay and Jack Vowles, ‘Redefining Constituency Representation’, p. 82. 
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Geographic Constituency Representation 
 
Electorates as Constituencies 
 
Geographic electorates were typically the constituencies most likely to be 
identified by new MPs, with 68 percent of MPs taking this position in the first 
interviews and 74 percent in the second. Unsurprisingly, electorate MPs 
were unanimous in identifying their constituency: 
 
For me, I’m fairly broad. It’s really anyone living within my 
electorate, whether they are on the [electoral] roll, whether they 
voted for me or not. 
 
People that live in the electorate – anybody that lives in the 
electorate. 
 
List MPs also emphasised the importance of representing geographic 
electorates, with 47 percent identifying an electorate as their constituency in 
the first interview and 56 percent in the second: 
 
Well first and foremost my constituents are the people of 
[electorate], because that’s the electorate I live in. 
 
The people of [electorate] is who I represent and that’s where my 
heart is. 
 
It is significant that the proportion of list MPs who identified their 
constituency as a geographic electorate increased between the two rounds of 
interviews. List MPs may gravitate more and more towards ‘traditional’ 
electorate MP roles. This suggests that list MPs are reluctant to identify 
alternative constituencies or that perceptions of their subordinate position 
results in increased adoption of constituency roles to feel legitimate. This is 
also true of government backbenchers, who may come to feel that 
constituency work is the one area where they have control and a sense of 
making a contribution. 
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The expectation in large parties that list MPs should have an electorate 
presence is confirmed by the way large party MPs identify their 
constituencies in comparison to small party MPs. In the first round of 
interviews, 58 percent of large party list MPs identified a geographic 
electorate as a constituency. This increased to 73 percent in the second 
interviews. Only 20 percent of small party MPs, by contrast, identified 
geographic electorates in each of the interview rounds. Thus large parties 
clearly assume that their list MPs ought to act like electorate MPs. 
 
Regions as Constituencies 
 
As an alternative form of geographic representation, legislators sometimes 
identify geographic regions as constituencies. Regions encompass a number 
of electorates and are often associated with provincial divisions. The most 
significant difference between electorate and regional representation is the 
informality of the latter. New Zealand does not elect regional MPs; therefore 
MPs who claim to represent regions self-identify this constituency regardless 
of whether they are electorate or list members. 
 
The proportion of list MPs who identified a regional constituency increased 
significantly between the two interviews. In the first round only 12 percent 
of list MPs considered themselves to be regional representatives. This 
increased to 63 percent in the second round of interviews.27 In contrast, only 
nine percent of electorate MPs considered themselves to be regional 
representatives in each interview round. Thus regional representation is 
considered a list MP responsibility: 
 
                                                 
27 A possible explanation for such a dramatic increase is the way in which MPs were asked to 
identify their constituents in each of the interview rounds. In the first interviews, MPs were 
asked ‘are there any particular groups that you see yourself as representing in parliament?’ 
By contrast, the question posed in the second interviews was ‘who would you say are your 
constituents?’ It is possible that the line of questioning in the second interviews encouraged 
broader constituency identification. Indeed, in the first interviews MPs identified an average 
of 2.5 constituencies. This increased to 2.7 in the second interviews. Therefore sizable 
variations in constituency identification should be treated cautiously. 
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People in Christchurch and beyond, within the Canterbury 
province. 
 
I wasn’t selected to be [region’s] direct representative, but [my 
party] has selected me to represent their views in those areas. 
 
Only eight percent of large party list MPs identified a regional constituency 
in the first interviews, but 73 percent did so in the second round. Regional 
representation is most likely a strategy used by list MPs to raise their profile 
across a large area to let constituents know who they are and what they are 
doing, thereby increasing their legitimacy, and widening the number of 
electorates in which they could run. This is a rational self-interested 
approach to increasing job security. 
 
Amongst small party list MPs, 20 percent identified regional constituencies 
in the first round of interviews and 40 percent did so in the second. Small 
party regional focus is probably due to the obligation small parties feel to 
work within electorate-dominant frameworks and thus make token efforts to 
act like electorate MPs. The lack of MPs available, however, means that small 
party MPs must engage on a regional rather than electorate level. 
 
Geographic Constituency Representation 
 
When asked about their most important role in the first round of interviews, 
75 percent of MPs responded that their primary role was to represent their 
community, act as a community organiser, or address constituent issues. 
This proportion increased to 81 percent in the second round of interviews.28 
Thus MPs see it as imperative to advocate for their constituents: 
 
The single most important thing is working with people outside of 
parliament and the integrity of that relationship. The only thing 
that is really worth being here for is actually being in support of 
                                                 
28 It should be noted that few MPs were able to constrain themselves to identifying only one 
primary role. For instance, parliamentary work was also cited as a primary role by 57 and 44 
percent of MPs in each round of interviews. Regardless, community/constituency work was 
the single most reported role. 
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those people and… to show some integrity with the issues, some 
understanding and respect for the issues, and some willingness to 
be effective and lobby with all the tools I’ve got for the issues they 
live everyday. 
 
I think it is very important to be both an advocate for your 
electorate in parliament and also an assistant to the constituents. 
As I say, a huge part of the work is people contacting us to just 
express their concern or asking us to promote a particular 
viewpoint or to help them. They feel like they’ve been banging 
their heads against the system, which is usually a government 
department of one form or another, sometimes a local authority 
and they come to an MP in a state of exasperation and a ‘you’re my 
last chance’ sort of attitude. And trying to help those people isn’t 
always easy because I can’t wave a magic wand – I don’t have one. 
But where we can help, and sometimes we can, that’s very 
rewarding. 
 
New MPs emphasised the importance of retaining strong connections with 
the electorate: 
 
No matter how often you’ve heard the issue or matter or 
complaint or how important or unimportant it seems, if the person 
comes to you it’s important to them so you owe them the courtesy 
to listen and help where you can. 
 
I think it is the role of an MP to be very clear or transparent about 
what you are doing and to be accountable back to people for that. 
It’s about doing things but it’s also about telling people what 
you’re doing and finding out what people think you should be 
doing. 
 
Some MPs were more candid, however, noting that priorities change as 
legislators gain experience and influence: 
 
I think if you come into parliament you either want to be the 
greatest constituency MP in the world – and look, to be honest, I 
don’t think I’m ever going to be that – or you aspire to be a 
minister to influence a particular area of policy, which I’d like to 
do sometime in the future. 
 
I think as you grow into the role and if you’re lucky enough to be 
promoted I think it probably would change quite a bit because 
then you really are able to effect change to the law. If you’re a 
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select committee chair you have more of a role in that and that 
may personally become more important for you. 
 
This confirms that acting as an electorate representative is the default 
position for MPs and is based on normative beliefs about the legislator role. 
However, role definitions become more sophisticated with experience and 
MPs often branch out into more diverse areas. 
 
MPs are expected to engage in constituency casework within the geographic 
areas they represent. Many MPs have a constituency office with at least one 
staff member – funded by Parliamentary Services – to assist with their 
constituency role. In 1987, Anagnoson found that MPs spent an average of 
19.5 hours per week on constituent casework – approximately two and a half 
days.29 
 
Amongst the 2008 intake, 54 percent reported spending three days each 
week on constituency matters and a further eight percent allocated four or 
more days.30 These MPs went out of their way to make themselves accessible 
to their constituents: 
 
If people ring into the office, they’ll get an appointment with me 
either on a Friday or a Monday when I’m down there. And then the 
other way we do it is every month on a Sunday I go to a suburb 
and what we do is write to the houses in the suburb… So all the 
streets and basically the suburb gets a letter from me saying, ‘I’m 
gonna be parked up on the corner of this street and this street 
between this time’, and do it in two or three places, and people can 
come and see me. So that’s just to suit [working] people who it’s 
not so easy for them to come during the week. 
 
Unsurprisingly, electorate MPs spent a significant amount of time on 
constituency casework. Seventy-eight percent of electorate MPs spent three 
                                                 
29 J. Theodore Anagnoson, ‘Does Constituency Work Have an Electoral Impact? The Case of 
New Zealand MPs’, Political Science, Vol. 39, No. 2, Dec 1987 
30 It should be noted that MPs were asked about constituency work generally, not casework 
specifically. This was intentional as it allowed each MP to determine what they considered 
‘constituency work’ to be, reflecting the amorphous nature of the role. 
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days each week on constituency work. This confirms the expectation that 
electorate MPs must be accessible and active within their communities: 
 
We have a very high workload. We have, on average, 400 enquiries 
a month through my office, be that correspondence, telephones, or 
meetings. And that’s not including all the visits to schools, 
retirement villages and so on. If you took those into account you’d 
probably be touching, literally, a thousand or more a month. 
 
Well it’s at least eight hours on a Monday, at least eight hours on 
Friday. And whatever else I can do during recess. And Saturdays. 
 
Constituency casework was also important for list MPs. Like electorate MPs, 
most were willing and enthusiastic about constituency work and invested 
significant energy in their tasks: 
 
In the weeks that the House sits I will have constituents’ clinics on 
Mondays between 10 and 2:30, and on Fridays I do businesses, 
NGOs, schools, visits. So on the Monday they come to me; on the 
Friday I go out to them. Recess weeks there might be a little more 
than that. 
 
The best thing though is the constituency work. People come into 
the office wanting help. It’s really rewarding when you can help 
them. I’ve got a friend of mine who’s one of the top social workers 
in New Zealand. I never really could understand why he did his job 
and now I do. 
 
Some list MPs tried to act like electorate MPs but found they were hampered 
by institutional restrictions: 
 
I’ve got a third of the resources that those guys have to do the job, 
and I think that’s unfair. I stood in an electorate and lost, that’s the 
way things are, but that means I’m still trying to cover that 
electorate, but with a third of the resources. 
 
A small group of list MPs avoided constituency casework altogether: 
 
I don’t do any constituency work at all. If people need help from 
their local MP, they get sent to their local MP. That’s their 
responsibility… I think as a list MP we can do better by working on 
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issues and working with communities and networks, like 
campaigning on issues rather than one-to-one constituent 
advocacy. 
 
Interestingly, electorate MPs undertake approximately the same amount of 
constituency work regardless of whether they hold a safe or marginal seat.31 
Seventy-five percent of electorate MPs in safe seats spent three days each 
week on constituency work versus 80 percent of electorate MPs in marginal 
seats. MPs in marginal seats emphasised the volatility of their position: 
 
MPs who represent safe seats can normally think: okay well I’ll be 
here for another 15 or 20 years and plan accordingly. I don’t know 
whether I’ll be here in three years’ time. 
 
Everywhere I was going people were saying, ‘oh, congratulations, 
you’ve picked up a safe [party] seat, you’re away laughing’. And I 
said, ‘no, [the previous incumbent’s] first majority was 250’. 
 
Electorate MPs who held safe seats, on the other hand, emphasised the need 
for them to consolidate their win and ensure their seat remained safe. 
Interestingly, there was a perception amongst ‘safe’ MPs that their seats 
were somewhat marginal: 
 
My big ambition is just to increase my majority where I am and 
make it a safe as houses seat, which is why my focus is on the 
constituents. 
 
I think for me personally as a constituency MP it is about making 
my seat safe, it is about getting a good reputation there because I 
think all of that filters through. 
 
The finding that safe and marginal electorate MPs spend roughly the same 
amount of time on constituency work is contrary to the existing literature, 
which suggests that ‘safe’ MPs devote less time to constituency service than 
their more marginal colleagues.32 However, it is consistent with the 
                                                 
31 A seat was classified as ‘safe’ if the margin of victory in the 2008 general election was 10 
percent or greater. 
32 See, for instance, J. Theodore Anagnoson, ‘Does Constituency Work Have an Electoral 
Impact?’, p. 106; Ivor Crewe, ‘MPs and the Constituents in Britain: How Strong are the 
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expectation that new MPs place greater emphasis on constituency work than 
their more senior colleagues. It is likely that once ‘safe’ MPs realise their 
fortunate position and begin to progress within their political careers they 
will place less emphasis on constituency work. Marginal MPs, on the other 
hand, may maintain their constituency focus as a means of self-preservation. 
 
Amongst list MPs who stood – and lost – in opposing parties’ safe seats, 
levels of constituency work were notably low: 60 percent of list MPs in this 
position committed less than one day each week to constituency work. 
Twenty percent claimed to spend two days per week on this work and a 
further 20 percent allocated three days per week. This is significant as it 
suggests these members either see their role as less constituent-focused than 
electorate MPs or they believe their chances of winning that seat in the 
future are limited and therefore having a strong electorate presence is not 
worthwhile. 
 
However, a caveat is required in explaining these results. This group of list 
MPs includes a number of small party MPs whose electorate focus is limited 
for reasons other than the safety or otherwise of the seat they stood in. 
Limiting the sample to only large party MPs, 50 percent spend less than one 
day each week on constituency work, 25 percent allocate two days and a 
final 25 percent allocate three days. In breaking this data down further, MPs 
who allocated two or three days to electorate work lost their seat by an 
average of 6,460 votes. By contrast, those who spent less than one day each 
week on constituency work lost by an average of 10,441 votes. Therefore 
there is a correlation between perceived chances of success and constituency 
work amongst large party list MPs who operate in safe seats held by an 
opposing party. 
 
                                                                                                                                     
Links?’, in Vernon Bogdaner (ed.), Representatives of the People? Parliamentarians and 
Constituents in Western Democracies (Hants: Grover Publishing Press, 1985), p. 48; Valerie 
Heitshusen, Garry Young, and David M. Wood, ‘Electoral Context and MP Constituency Focus 
in Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand and the United Kingdom’, p. 36. 
 95 
Unsurprisingly, list MPs who stood in marginal seats spent a significant 
amount of time on constituency matters. These MPs all spent at least three 
days each week on constituency work. Clearly, these MPs operate on the 
premise that more constituency work leads to a greater chance of winning 
the electorate seat in the next election. This further confirms that for list MPs 
the level of constituency service is directly related to their chances of 
winning an electorate seat. 
 
Electorate MPs were unanimous in their surprise about how much 
constituency work they received: 
 
I don’t think I’d realised just how much your life gets on a 
treadmill and, being a constituency MP, when I’m in the electorate 
my focus is almost entirely on local issues, dealing with the 
matters that constituents bring to the office, trying to get on top of 
all the different ways that you can help in understanding how 
councils work and government departments work and all the rest 
of it. 
 
I’d like to say that I leave my constituent work in [the electorate] 
and when I’m here [in parliament] I’m just dealing with the 
parliamentary stuff, but the reality is that I probably do a couple 
of hours of constituent work while I’m here, whether it’s meeting 
with ministers and following up with issues or drafting letters or 
ringing constituents. So there’s a lot of it. 
 
Forty percent of list MPs received more constituency work than they 
expected. In these cases the constituency workload was attributed to greater 
than anticipated community acceptance: 
 
I didn’t expect to get such good buy-in from the community so 
early as a list MP in that area. I think some of that’s due to the 
laziness of the existing constituency MP. 
 
Another forty percent of list MPs received less constituency work than they 
expected: 
 
We’re just about to open an office – well, it was supposed to be 1st 
of August, then 1st of September, then 1st of October… And that’s a 
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really high-profile office, so we’ll get a lot more. But now as the 
brand slowly gets out there, people are beginning to come in and 
realise there’s a presence. 
 
Very little. People have come to me simply because they either 
know me or know of me and ask me to do things that I have done 
or tried to do. But a very limited amount. 
 
The issues MPs dealt with in their constituent casework were predictable. 
Thirty-two percent cited immigration concerns, 29 percent dealt with Work 
and Income issues, 25 percent helped with education cases, and 18 percent 
cited ACC or housing cases: 
 
We’re dealing increasingly with immigration issues at the 
moment. There’s a lot of deportation going on, people who have 
been here on short-term work visas, work’s dried up and they’re 
being deported. We’ve got a lot of Housing New Zealand, but that’s 
pretty steady. Increasing numbers of Work and Income cases, 
people sort of coming and saying, ‘I don’t meet this particular 
criteria, is there some way around it, is there something you can 
do to help me?’ 
 
Electorate MPs cited Work and Income issues as their primary constituent 
casework (45 percent), while list MPs dealt primarily with immigration 
issues (29 percent). This may be due to the fact that MPs from ethnic 
minorities are more likely to be list MPs than electorate MPs – ethnic 
minorities may turn to ethnic list MPs for immigration help on the 
assumption that they have greater knowledge of these issues.  
 
Given the diversity and importance of the cases they deal with, MPs were 
asked whether they felt qualified to deal with the constituency issues 
presented to them. Seventy-five percent of electorate MPs felt they were 
qualified for constituency-related tasks: 
 
It’s amazing the difference a phone call from an MP or even the 
MPs’ office will make. 
 
 97 
Amongst the remaining 25 percent of electorate MPs, the difficulty of 
constituent problems made their confidence more mixed: 
 
It’s not always easy. I think in a job where people come to you with 
their problems you soon realise that you can’t solve all their 
problems. 
 
You’re not going to be able to help with all problems or help with 
all issues. 
 
Only 43 percent of list MPs felt qualified to deal with constituent matters. 
Some MPs believed the cases that came to them were largely beyond 
redemption. This indicates that constituents turn to list MPs only once the 
local electorate MP has already been unable to assist: 
 
We get lots of immigration enquiries and they’re always urgent 
and they’ve always waited until it’s almost impossible to do 
anything because they’re being deported the next day or whatever. 
 
I’ve had some people who have gone to the constituency MP… and 
got annoyed with her and come back and said, ‘she can’t help me. 
Can you?’ 
 
Other list MPs felt that learning how to deal with constituent issues was an 
ongoing process where every case left them feeling more and more equipped 
to assist: 
 
I do feel like I’m learning the ropes on how to deal with casework 
and every new case is probably gonna demonstrate to me there’s a 
new area that I need to learn. But I feel like I’ve got the tools 
available to me to manage them. 
 
For many people the MP’s office is the last port of call, they’ve been 
struggling to get things done – also to get things out into the open, 
to have the ability to get things into the public eye, to access senior 
officials or local government politicians or whatever. So I think 
that work is really important. 
 
Thus list MPs take longer to settle into constituency-based roles than their 
electorate colleagues. This is logical as most constituency casework goes to 
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electorate MPs in the first instance, leaving list MPs with the leftovers. Over 
time, however, list MPs with a strong electorate focus build up the skills 
necessary to fully service an electorate, which may increase their future 
chances of winning an electorate seat. 
 
Ethnic Constituency Representation 
 
Ethnic Groups as Constituencies 
 
Some diversity in ethnic background exists among New Zealand MPs: 16 
percent of current parliamentarians identify as Maori, five percent Asian and 
four percent Pacifica. It is often assumed that MPs from ethnic minorities act 
as representatives for their communities. Thirty-two percent of the MPs who 
participated in this study were Maori, Asian or Pacifica. If assumptions about 
ethnic representation are correct, the same proportion of participants should 
identify their ethnic group as a constituency. 
 
Twenty-nine percent of new MPs identified an ethnic constituency in the first 
round of interviews, dropping slightly to 26 percent in the second 
interviews. Amongst these MPs there was an attitude that they were able to 
best represent their communities as they had a deep understanding of them: 
 
Because I am Pacific I can obviously empathise with where 
Pacifica’s at more than anything else. 
 
The identification of ethnic constituencies was more pronounced amongst 
list MPs, with approximately one-third of list MPs identifying an ethnic 
constituency in each interview. By contrast, only 18 percent of electorate 
MPs claimed to represent ethnic communities. This confirms the importance 
of the party list to elect MPs who may not otherwise be elected. As one ethnic 
MP noted: 
 
The reasoning behind list and constituency MPs was to really 
increase our representation. And I think this system is much more 
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representative. Look how long it took for us to get Maori MPs into 
parliament, let alone ethnic ones and we still don’t have people 
with Arabic names and Somali names yet. It’ll happen. In 50 years 
it will happen and it will be this system that will do it. 
 
Some ethnic MPs noted that constituents from ethnic communities outside 
their own ethnicity approached them as they were seen as a broader 
representative of ethnic minorities, leading to greater overall legitimacy: 
 
I think all [the] ethnic community is turning towards me. And the 
way the Island people are approaching me makes me comfortable 
that they are accepting me. And I’m really happy if I’m able to help 
them when they approach me, I’ll feel much better that I’m their 
representative also, not just my ethnic community’s. 
 
It’s hard for me to distinguish between Maori and Pacific 
sometimes. We have a lot of the same issues, we share culture, we 
share history, we share so many things. So I do feel a sense of 
obligation there as well. 
 
Only one MP from an ethnic minority did not claim to represent their ethnic 
community. It should be noted, however, that this MP held an electorate seat 
and thus felt that their electorate must receive their full attention: 
 
My mandate comes from being an electorate MP. 
 
Thus it is not necessarily true that increasing descriptive representation for 
ethnic groups results in a parallel rise in substantive representation, 
although it should be noted that the vast majority of ethnic minority MPs did 
identify ethnic communities as constituents. 
 
Ethnic Constituency Representation 
 
Representing an ethnic group does not exempt MPs from assumptions about 
geographic representation. In the first round of interviews, 56 percent of 
ethnic MPs claimed to represent a geographic constituency and a further 11 
percent cited a region. By the second interviews, 63 percent claimed to 
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represent an electorate and 38 percent identified a region. Ethnic MPs 
desired the legitimacy of holding an electorate seat: 
 
I want to win a constituency seat because politically it’s got more 
mana but also because I’m tangata whenua. I want to be able to 
say there’s a specific crowd of people who expect me to represent 
them and to whom I have to be accountable. 
 
The desire to represent geographic communities is interesting as it indicates 
MPs from ethnic minorities believe that they are able to represent their 
ethnic community and the broader community. Ethnic MPs demonstrated 
some diversity in their constituencies: 
 
I’m actually an MP, regardless of race, who happens to be 
[ethnicity], who happens to be a male, who happens to be an 
Aucklander. So there’s a number of ways you can define yourself. 
 
I am an MP in the first place and happen to be [ethnicity]. And of 
course I know my other duty is to provide service to the wider 
constituency. 
 
One MP had positioned themselves as a specialist on migrant issues: 
 
I’m an Auckland MP and that’s pretty central in terms of where 
these communities live so they can come. That’s my constituency. 
But then I have similar constituencies in the other large centres. So 
say in Hamilton I’ve got a large constituency there, and the 
Napier/Hastings way. Wellington is one, Hutt Valley another, 
Christchurch, Dunedin, and Invercargill. Now I’m progressively 
spending time in those. 
 
Unsurprisingly, ethnic MPs were more involved in immigration-related 
casework than their Pakeha colleagues. Forty-four percent of ethnic MPs 
reported dealing with immigration issues versus 26 percent of Pakeha MPs. 
Ethnic MPs were also more likely to deal with issues related to Work and 
Income; education; and Child, Youth and Family. However, these results are 
probably the unfortunate result of the lower socio-economic status of Maori 
in New Zealand. Regardless, the availability of ethnic MPs to assist 
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constituents with these matters is a strong endorsement for the MMP 
electoral system. 
 
Party Representation 
 
Given the strength of political parties in New Zealand, it is not surprising that 
a number of new MPs viewed themselves as party representatives. New 
Zealand does not have a tradition of electing independent MPs, so 
endorsement by a party is essential to becoming an MP. MPs are obliged to 
promote their party within the community. Thus party representation is a 
role potentially fulfilled by all MPs, regardless of other constituencies. 
Moreover, the need to act as a party representative occurs in all aspects of 
constituency work. For instance, an electorate MP who assists a constituent 
with an immigration issue does so not only as the local representative but 
also as a party representative. 
 
In the first round of interviews, 21 percent of MPs said one of their key roles 
was to represent their party, dropping slightly to 19 percent in the second 
interviews. Given that MPs rely on their party for their election this response 
is surprisingly low. However, it is likely that MPs underreport their party 
representation role because they are aware of normative assumptions that 
MPs ought to represent their communities over and above their parties and 
therefore choose not to specifically cite their party representative role. 
 
Despite the fact that party representation is important for all MPs, there are 
variations among the MPs who identify this role. In the first round of 
interviews 18 percent of electorate MPs said they were party 
representatives, dropping to nine percent in the second interviews: 
 
I’m not silly to think that I wouldn’t be here without the party, so I 
do represent the party. If I’d run as an independent I wouldn’t have 
gotten close. And the day I forget that, the day I think I’m bigger 
than the party, is the day I shouldn’t be here. 
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List MPs were more likely to identify their party representation role. In the 
first round of interviews, 24 percent of list MPs said they represented their 
party, rising slightly to 25 percent in the second interviews: 
 
It’s just getting out there, getting the brand out there. The [party] 
brand is more powerful than any MP, without a question of a 
doubt. 
 
I place a high amount of priority on making sure I reflect the 
values of my party. 
 
The gap between electorate and list MPs is not as significant as expected if 
list MPs’ role orientations are based on pleasing their parties, as critics of 
MMP argue. This is possibly explained by the short length of time between 
MPs’ election and the first round of interviews. New MPs feel positive 
towards their parties when they are elected for the first time – few situations 
would have arisen to make new MPs doubt their parties or feel constrained 
by them. Moreover, MPs feel a sense of obligation to the party for getting 
them elected. Thus newly-elected MPs believe in the primacy of their party 
and their duty to serve it. 
 
By the second interviews, however, some MPs had developed more critical 
attitudes towards their parties. As electorate MPs become more settled in 
their electorates they begin to realise that so long as they retain their party’s 
nomination they will probably be re-elected. It is often difficult for parties to 
‘de-select’ electorate MPs, especially where selection is largely devolved to 
local committees.33 Therefore electorate MPs enjoy greater autonomy from 
their party; while promoting the party may be beneficial for ensuring a good 
party vote at the next election, it is not necessarily the strongest determinant 
of their political future. List MPs, on the other hand, retain their party 
representation role as they acknowledge the party’s success is directly linked 
to their own political future. 
                                                 
33 Keith Jackson, ‘Candidate Selection and the 1978 General Election’, in Howard R Penniman 
(ed.), New Zealand ant the Polls: The General Election in 1978 (Washington DC: American 
Enterprise Institute for Public Research, 1980), p. 106; Jeffrey A. Karp, Candidate Effects and 
Spill-Over in Mixed Systems, p. 5. 
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However, it is notable that only a quarter of list MPs cited representing their 
party as a key role. Ergo, three-quarters of list MPs either do not consider 
party representation to be a key role or did not consider it noteworthy when 
compared to other roles such as electorate representation. Thus concern 
over list MPs’ primary allegiance to political parties may be overstated. 
 
Interestingly, party representation became less important for large party 
MPs while it became more important for small party MPs. In the first 
interviews, 23 percent of large party MPs cited representing their party as an 
important task while only 17 percent of small party MPs said the same. By 
the second interviews, 14 percent of large party MPs cited party 
representation versus 33 percent of small party MPs. 
 
This is probably explained by the expectation that large party MPs have a 
strong electorate presence regardless of whether they are electorate or list 
members, meaning that their focus moves from the party to the electorate. 
This may be a reaction to broader feelings that they lack influence outside of 
their electorate roles. Small party MPs become increasingly aware of their 
reliance on their party for re-election due to the small caucuses in which they 
operate and their own ability to influence their party’s chances of success at 
the next election, particularly in parties that hover around the five percent 
electoral threshold. Thus it is in small party MPs’ best interests to focus their 
attention on the party rather than on specific electorates. Moreover, the 
smaller group dynamics of these parties may foster stronger team bonds 
around the party identity. Thus inclusive team camaraderie may develop 
more quickly. 
 
General, Ill-Defined, and Absent Representation 
 
Becoming an MP is the first time many MPs have held a representative role. 
It is therefore unsurprising that some MPs struggle to understand who they 
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represent and how to act as a representative. In these situations 
representation is described very generally – or not at all. 
 
The most common generally-defined constituency was the catchall group of 
‘New Zealanders’. Overall, 14 percent of new MPs claimed to represent New 
Zealanders in the first interviews, rising to 19 percent in the second. List MPs 
were more likely than electorate MPs to define their constituencies in this 
way, with 24 percent taking this position in the first interviews and 25 
percent in the second: 
 
The people of New Zealand are our constituents as list MPs. 
 
I haven’t found a terribly politically correct way to describe myself 
but if I may I would say that I’m happy to represent all New 
Zealanders in general. 
 
Of course, ‘New Zealanders’ can be a legitimate constituency, but this claim is 
dubious amongst new MPs. To represent a constituency it is essential to be 
accepted as legitimate by that grouping. Therefore, representing broad 
constituencies like ‘New Zealanders’ requires widespread legitimacy. For 
instance, a prime minister can legitimately claim to represent New 
Zealanders through their mandate as the head of government. The vast 
majority of new MPs, however, are unknown to the wider public. Thus MPs 
who claim to represent the entire populace demonstrate a blurry conception 
of representation. 
 
Identifying New Zealanders as constituents was most common amongst 
small party list MPs, with 40 percent taking this stance in each interview 
round. This may be due to small party MPs emphasising that their parties 
have stronger ideal or value bases than larger parties, and they believe these 
ideals are best for New Zealand and thus New Zealanders. Alternatively, 
small party MPs may be unclear as to who they represent. This is surprising 
because small parties have a niche following; one would expect constituents 
would be identified as party supporters. However, it is likely the tendency to 
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identify ‘New Zealanders’ as constituents is an attempt to transcend their 
niche. It is unsustainable for small parties to cater only to die-hard 
supporters. Instead, small party MPs seek to build broader support by 
reaching out to general constituencies and presenting themselves as 
‘mainstream’ parties. Alternatively, smaller parties may aim to link their 
ideals to the widest possible constituency, for instance, the Greens and the 
environment. 
 
Unsurprisingly, general constituency identification barely registered 
amongst electorate MPs. No electorate MPs claimed to represent ‘New 
Zealanders’ in the first round and only nine percent did so in the second. 
Thus MPs who believe they represent all New Zealanders are those who may 
lack other clear constituencies. Indeed, male list MPs were the most likely to 
identify their constituency as ‘New Zealanders’, with 36 percent doing so. 
 
It is important to note the groups that MPs did not identify as their 
constituents in order to identify groups that may not be adequately 
represented. Table 4.1 shows some of the less-common constituencies. 
 
Table 4.1 – Uncommon Constituencies 
Constituency First 
Interview 
(%) 
Second 
Interview 
(%) 
Youth 14 4 
Gender 11 8 
Gay Community 7 4 
Unions 7 0 
Business 4 7 
Rural Interests 4 7 
Occupational 
Groups 
4 0 
Social Class 0 8 
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It is surprising that few MPs identified women as constituents. This is 
particularly unexpected because – as outlined in chapter three – 44 percent 
of female MPs noted that gender was a factor in their selection as candidates. 
Therefore female MPs were aware that their parties expected them to 
represent women. However, the majority of female MPs interpreted this 
simply as their party’s desire to achieve greater descriptive representation 
for women. As a result, most female MPs do not appear to feel any obligation 
to represent women any more substantively than simply by being female 
parliamentarians. This confirms the need for parties to select candidates – 
male or female – who advocate for women’s interests.34 
 
Moreover, the lack of youth representation is contrary to expectations of an 
MMP parliament. The average age of MPs first elected in 2008 was 42 years – 
nine years younger than the average for parliament as a whole. The new 
MPs, then, were relatively young when one considers that individuals often 
enter politics later in life. However, youth were of minimal importance as a 
constituency in the first round of interviews and were mentioned by only 
one MP in the second. This MP took youth representation seriously and 
lamented its scarcity: 
 
I feel a real sense that there is actually a lack of voice for young 
people in politics, much more so than I’ve ever felt it before on the 
outside – I think it’s even worse than I expected. So that’s another 
group that I don’t think I have an elected mandate necessarily to 
represent but I feel the obligation to build a mandate. 
 
Ironically, the oldest MPs were the most likely to speak of the importance of 
youth being elected to parliament: 
 
I feel a tension between the investment of learning that you get 
when you actually get here and learn how to do stuff and the need 
                                                 
34 Manon Tremblay argues that descriptive representation of women does not lead to 
substantive representation; substantive representation only occurs by electing feminists, 
regardless of their gender, who consciously act for women. See Manon Tremblay, ‘Do Female 
MPs Substantively Represent Women? A Study of Legislative Behaviour in Canada’s 35th 
Parliament’, Canadian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 31, No. 3, September 1998, pp. 464-
465. 
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to make sure our party is refreshed and has some good young 
women, particularly. I’d like to see some good younger women get 
in. 
 
I can see a lot of young people around me as well and they have a 
fraction of my experience. But they bring something else and for 
them it’s fascinating as well. They’re motivated to achieve 
particular goals. 
 
It is interesting that organisations generically described as ‘interest groups’, 
such as unions and business, were largely overlooked as constituencies. This 
may be due to the assumption that representing interest groups is against 
the public interest. This position overlooks the fact that ‘mainstream’ 
constituencies like electorates, regions, and ethnic groups also have special 
interests and that interest groups are legitimate organisations within civil 
society.  
 
It is also interesting that some MPs were uncomfortable with the concept of 
representation itself. While a small group, these MPs viewed political 
engagement as a continuous process requiring individual participation. In 
this view, one person cannot represent another: 
 
I don’t see myself as representing anything. I see myself as 
somebody who has a relationship with certain groups. I know this 
is a Westminster system and the idea of representation is at its 
heart, but I have difficulty with the idea that I can represent 
anybody else. 
 
This issue is worthy of further scholarly attention. It may be unlikely that 
MPs maintain this rejection of representation over time, as their ability to 
make decisions or influence decision-makers ensures that the public expects 
them to act as representatives. While the concept of having ‘relationships’ 
with constituents is admirable, it may not be satisfactory for constituents 
who expect representation. 
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Legitimacy 
 
Being perceived as ‘legitimate’ is essential for legislators. In democratic 
nations, the power of citizens to select and deselect their legislators and 
governments implies legitimacy. However, legitimacy for an office does not 
necessarily equate to legitimacy for the individual holding an office: 
legislators build their own personal legitimacy. 
 
It is difficult to assess the extent to which an individual is considered 
legitimate. A comprehensive assessment of legitimacy would require 
extensive discussions with those who to accept or reject legislators – that is, 
voters. Such a task is outside of the scope of this thesis. However, some 
indication of legitimacy can be gained from MPs’ own reflections on the 
extent to which constituencies have accepted them as ‘their’ representative. 
Although probably skewed towards greater acceptance than reality may 
permit, MPs’ own self-insights offer a means by which their conceptions of 
legitimacy can be examined. 
 
Overall, 50 percent of new MPs said they had been accepted by their self-
identified constituencies. Unsurprisingly, no MPs admitted to being rejected 
by their constituents, although 35 percent reported mixed feelings of 
acceptance. A further 15 percent stated they did not know if they had been 
accepted. 
 
Electorate MPs were the most likely to feel legitimate, with 78 percent saying 
they had been accepted versus only 27 percent of list MPs. This is significant 
as it confirms the attitude that electorate MPs are more legitimate than list 
MPs. Eighty-nine percent of electorate MPs argued that their legitimacy was 
confirmed by the level of access constituents had to them. Thus regular 
contact with constituents was essential: 
 
I think one of the good things about the New Zealand political 
system is we are very accessible. Not many other countries you’d 
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see Members of Parliament just wandering around at the school 
gala where you can go up and just say hello to them. 
 
I have a constituency clinic at least every week. I am literally fully 
available to my constituents. I think it would be pretty hard of a 
constituent of mine to say that they couldn’t come and meet me or 
see me. 
 
Sixty-seven percent of electorate MPs regularly organised or attended local 
events: 
 
I think that’s a really key, important thing – making an effort to be 
at significant community events, just so people can see you and 
come and speak to you and raise issues. 
 
In the recess I had three public meetings – one in each area… [I] 
put an ad in the paper, put stuff over the radio, sent letters to 
schools and parents. 
 
Seventy-eight percent of electorate MPs also reported receiving positive 
feedback: 
 
Certainly the feedback I get has been reasonably good. You know, 
some people don’t like some of the government decisions, some 
people do. But I think that you know you hear a lot of, ‘well, we 
don’t necessarily like the outcome, but we appreciate you coming 
to talk to us about it’. 
 
I get told I’m making my mark – that I’m doing well. I have people 
saying to me that they didn’t think that I’d do it and now they’re 
very impressed. You get things like that quite often. 
 
List MPs felt less legitimate, with 55 percent claiming to have mixed feelings 
about their acceptance, versus only 11 percent of electorate MPs. List MPs 
emphasised that legitimacy had to be built over time: 
 
I think it takes some time. Especially there’s a traditional view on 
what Pacific leaders are and young is not [the norm]. This is quite 
new having someone like me coming into it. So it takes some time 
in terms of demonstrating that I am there to serve their interests 
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and that I’m doing a good job and I think I’m gaining some 
traction as I’m going along. 
 
That’s hard for me to say because the piece of information that 
would confirm or otherwise refute that is how much of the 
[constituency] work is going to the other MPs. You know, I might 
be the tip of the iceberg. I don’t think that’s the case, I think they 
do see me as a legitimate avenue for having their concerns aired. 
 
List MPs also emphasised the importance of being accessible, although to a 
lesser extent than electorate MPs (55 and 89 percent respectively): 
 
What happens is that people pull me up in the street or in the 
petrol station or going to the supermarket, ‘oh gidday [name], how 
are you doing? Can I just have a minute of your time? Blah, blah, 
blah.’ That’s really neat. My kids find it weird, but it’s quite 
humbling. 
 
I moved the office to a far more prominent premises with better 
access by constituents. It’s on the bus route, it’s ground floor 
access, it’s got its own access and things like that. It also happens 
to be far more prominent, so it’s very much [the party] brand in 
the city. 
 
Once again, it is important to note that MPs are likely to self-report their 
legitimacy as higher than others may perceive. Regardless, most MPs fit into 
two categories: a) those who feel immediately legitimate by virtue of their 
office; or b) those who believe legitimacy must be earned individually. That 
electorate MPs largely fall into the former category and list MPs into the 
latter confirms that electorate MPs have more legitimacy and greater mana 
as a result of their ‘inherent’ legitimacy when compared to list MPs. 
 
Fifteen percent of MPs claimed to not know whether their constituents had 
accepted them. These MPs preferred not to speculate on their legitimacy, 
believing instead that the only true test is whether they were re-elected:  
 
I’ve not thought about it and nor do I care to, probably. That’s for 
others to judge and decide. We’ll see in two years’ time. 
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Talk to me in October 2011 and we’ll see [laughs]. I don’t know, it’s 
hard to know. 
 
Sixty percent of large party MPs reported that they had been accepted by 
their constituents compared with only 20 percent of small party MPs. This is 
unsurprising as the dominance of electorate-based representation means 
large party MPs feel more legitimate than their small party counterparts who 
do not undertake geographic representation tasks as enthusiastically. 
 
As with list MPs generally, small party MPs emphasised that legitimacy must 
be earned: 
 
I would say that I’m beginning to be accepted. Some of them 
already knew me but were waiting to see how I would perform in 
this environment. Some of them, they are beginning to know me as 
a legitimate voice. 
 
Small party MPs believed that their ability to select ‘non-traditional’ 
constituencies, such as non-geographic community groupings, meant they 
could better understand their constituents’ views, which were overlooked by 
larger parties: 
 
I think there are some groups who would see me or [my party’s] 
MPs as being the only ones who actually ‘get’ what they’re on 
about, therefore representing their perspective. 
 
Thus for small party MPs legitimacy was not necessarily tied to constituency 
service. Rather, small party MPs sought to legitimise their parties within 
what largely remains a two-party parliament. This reinforces the level of 
responsibility small party MPs take on within their parties. These MPs often 
make up one-fifth or one-quarter of their entire caucus. Therefore their 
actions have a significantly greater impact on the legitimacy of their parties 
than those of their Labour and National counterparts. 
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Representation and Community Leadership 
 
In carrying out representative tasks it is apparent that MPs exercise a form of 
leadership. MPs place great emphasis on serving their constituents and the 
wider public. MPs hold privileged positions within society by virtue of their 
office. MPs are aware of this and shape their representative roles around 
notions of community service. In this regard it is apparent that MPs see 
themselves as community leaders. 
 
This ex-officio leadership role is important for both MPs and their 
constituents. However, in considering leadership within a broader political 
framework it is salient to consider how MPs exercise community leadership 
above and beyond what their office requires. MPs achieve a level of mana 
upon their election. A true test of leadership skills is the extent to which MPs 
increase their mana and, in turn, develop political capital, and what purposes 
that capital is then applied to. 
 
Arguably, acting as a representative for a geographic community is the most 
basic expression of community leadership. The fact that many MPs aspire to 
be electorate MPs demonstrates the extent to which the legitimacy of their 
office shapes their individual legitimacy. The expectations of electorate 
service are reasonably well-known – holding constituency clinics, attending 
community events, and so on. These functions are fulfilled by whoever 
happens to represent each electorate – the leadership skills required are 
minimal. 
 
On the other hand, MPs may fulfil representative tasks which demonstrate 
leadership above and beyond simple ex-officio roles. For instance, MPs may 
identify multiple or disparate constituencies that have few commonalities. 
MPs in this situation can apply their leadership skills to identify shared goals 
and facilitate the development of community bonds. Thus these MPs 
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demonstrate community leadership by building, as well as representing, 
communities. 
 
An example of this kind of community leadership was provided by an 
electorate MP who sought to foster bonds within their community: 
 
I’m wanting to try and find ways of interacting and getting people 
to think about their communities a bit more… I organised a 
screening of the New Zealand versus Iraq soccer game, and I did 
that at the Confederations Cup and obviously I did it mainly for the 
sake of the Iraqi community, that they could have an event that 
they could feel was for them – and it would help link them up with 
football people from around [the city] and that just gives them a 
feeling that there’s a place for them in their community. We got 
nearly 100 people at 6:30 on a Sunday morning. Absolute madness. 
And it was a nil-nil draw and both teams didn’t play that well 
actually [laughter] but it was a really, really good event. So stuff 
like that’s great, you feel like you’re part of the community if you 
do that. 
 
MPs who use their leadership skills to build communities form the pool of 
future political leaders. Political leadership is qualitatively different to other 
types of leadership because political leaders must lead not within specialised 
domains, but across domains.35 Thus MPs who demonstrate their ability to 
lead disparate community groups display their potential to become bona fide 
political leaders. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Representational roles are of significant importance to New Zealand MPs. 
This chapter has shown that assumptions about MPs being primarily bound 
to serve a constituency – usually geographic – have not changed since the 
switch to MMP. Indeed, a hierarchy of legislators has been demonstrated 
throughout this chapter: list MPs mimic electorate MPs but still feel less 
legitimate than their electorate colleagues. 
                                                 
35 Jon Johansson, Two Titans: Muldoon, Lange and Leadership (Wellington: Dunmore Press, 
2005), p. 18. 
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These dynamics primarily occur in the large parties, who assuredly have 
done a poor job of considering alternative roles for backbench list MPs and – 
more significantly – legitimising list MPs’ existence. Within the context of 
representation, this is particularly unfortunate as there are many 
demographics that remain under-represented in parliament. Even where 
some degree of descriptive representation has occurred (for instance, in the 
election of ethnic minority MPs) the overall illegitimacy of list MPs reduces 
the quality of representation. Moreover, the intra-party and intra-
parliamentary MP hierarchy that sees many list MPs lust after electorate MP 
status further undermines minority representation and reinforces the 
perceived primacy of electorate-based representation. 
 
Small parties have done a better job at fulfilling list MPs’ potential due to the 
fact that most small party MPs are list MPs. Small party MPs are less likely to 
undertake electorate-based activity, although they do simulate the 
electorate-type role in their regional work. This reasonable level of freedom 
from geographic representation allows small party MPs to develop 
connections with broader and more creatively-defined constituencies than 
electorate-focused list MPs from larger parties. Despite this, small party MPs 
report mixed feelings of legitimacy more than any other MPs, suggesting they 
struggle to operate within a role that remains dominated by old-fashioned 
ideas of electorate representation. 
 
This chapter began by briefly discussing various models of representation: 
delegates, trustees, politicos, and partisans. It was argued that these models 
were outdated and that MPs likely engage different aspects of each of these 
representative ‘types’ based on each particular situation. This has proved to 
be the case for new MPs. New MPs emphasised community service and the 
need to remain connected with constituents – expressions of the delegate, 
trustee, and politico models. However, political parties were acknowledged 
as important factors in MPs’ future prospects, which fits within the partisan 
model. Therefore the diversity of constituents and representational tasks 
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means that these models of representation are indeed outdated. Moreover, 
the complexity of representation means that developing catchall models may 
be a futile exercise. 
 
Of course, for MPs to succeed they must also thrive in the parliamentary 
environment itself. This thesis turns to parliamentary roles in chapter five. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Parliamentary Roles 
 
 
Parliament holds a central location in popular conceptions of legislators’ 
roles. Indeed, speaking in the House is perhaps one of the few tasks 
undertaken by MPs that is widely known. However, parliamentary roles 
extend far beyond this single task. This chapter sets out the parliamentary 
roles of new MPs. It discusses the arrival of new MPs at parliament, the 
House, select committees, political parties, policy responsibilities, and, 
finally, the demonstration of leadership amongst new MPs in the 
parliamentary environment. 
 
Arriving at Parliament 
 
Arriving at parliament for the first time is assuredly an exciting, proud, and 
nerve-wracking experience for new MPs. As the symbolic centre of a 
democracy, the legislature occupies a unique place in the public mind. New 
MPs generally hold parliament in high esteem upon their arrival and face the 
task of transforming this extraordinary symbolic institution into an ordinary 
workplace: 
 
We came down here straight after the election on the Monday – I 
felt like I was a tourist being shown around. I didn’t actually feel 
like I was an MP. 
 
Unfortunately for new members, the support available to help them through 
their initial days in parliament is limited. Parliamentary Services runs a one-
and-a-half day induction seminar for new MPs in the week following the 
election, the agenda of which is included as Appendix V.  
 
A second seminar is held by the Office of the Clerk about a month after the 
election to brief new members on House procedures, lawmaking, select 
committees, and the parliamentary library. Finally, a series of eight dinner 
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sessions are hosted over the first six months of parliament’s sitting which 
cover pecuniary interests; advertising, office signage and sponsorship; the 
parliamentary press gallery; staff management; research services; 
regulations review; estimates; and parliamentary privilege (Appendix VI).  
 
While assuredly useful, new MPs’ institutional induction is hardly 
exhaustive. This was reflected in the fact that few MPs mentioned the formal 
induction when asked about their initial days in parliament – and those who 
did were often less than complimentary: 
 
We have this formal induction that’s absolutely irrelevant, what 
they do with Parliamentary Services. I didn’t understand a word of 
it and it was all the formal stuff. The things you need to 
understand here are not formal; they’re about how power works 
and who you can trust and all the kind of stuff. And it’s about 
getting advice on how to behave in a select committee! 
 
Some parties, however, provide informal support and guidance for new MPs 
through relationships between new MPs and more senior colleagues: 
 
They’ve all given me advice – there’s been no formal induction 
from them, but they’ve all given me advice. They have done the 
whakawhanaungatanga [process for getting to know each other] 
sort of things, which makes you feel like part of the family.  
 
I chose [senior MP] as my buddy MP. So whenever something 
comes up that I’m not sure about I go see her and she’s usually 
good. 
 
Thus induction is largely limited to abbreviated technical information and 
informal mentor arrangements with senior colleagues. Therefore, new MPs 
are largely expected to learn on the job. 
 
Parliamentary work can be broken down into three separate – but related – 
areas: the House, select committees, and party responsibilities. 
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The House 
 
House speeches are prominent in public perceptions of legislators' roles. The 
House is viewed as a forum for MPs to articulate the wishes and concerns of 
their constituents.1 
 
The House, however, is not necessarily respected by the public. MPs are 
often chastised for their childish behaviour – a result of the House’s 
adversarial nature. The physical arrangement of the House encourages this 
type of behaviour. The government and opposition face each other in close 
proximity. Even the backbenches are relatively close to the frontbenches, 
where the most intense exchanges occur. MPs must conform to Standing 
Orders and Speakers’ Rulings, but this does not prevent fiery exchanges – 
they merely mediate them. Thus the physical environment and rules of the 
House may lead to MPs acting passionately and, at times, irrationally.2 
 
Initial Experiences in the House 
 
It is not surprising that new MPs approach the House for the first time with 
mixed feelings of excitement and trepidation. Most new MPs admitted to 
feeling excited the first time they sat in the House: 
 
I was elated. Fully elated. I got to sit in the chair and we had like 
mock Question Time. And I loved it. We had Lockwood [Smith] 
sitting in the Chair, before he had been made Speaker. And that 
was a blast. 
 
Electric. I loved it. 
 
                                                 
1 Grant Gillon and Raymond Miller, ‘Role of an MP’, in Miller, Raymond (ed.), New Zealand 
Government and Politics, Fourth Edition (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 178. 
2 John C. Wahlke and Heinz Eulau, ‘The Historical and Institutional Context of Legislative 
Behavior’, in John C. Wahlke and Heinz Eulau (eds.), Legislative Behavior: A Reader in Theory 
and Research (Illinois: The Free Press, 1959), p. 8. 
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A number of MPs noted that sitting in the House for the first time made the 
job seem real: 
 
I sat down in the seat and as soon as I sat down – after having 
rushed in there – I looked around and suddenly clocked my 
environment and I suddenly thought, ‘oh my goodness me’! 
  
Certainly a bit of excitement there and it all felt very real on that 
date. Until then you’ve been talking about it, thinking about it, but 
then you’re sitting there. 
 
Understandably, MPs felt a sense of pride when they sat in the House: 
 
To be able to say, ‘I was in the Chamber when this happened’, 
that’s just a privilege. The whole job is a privilege, really. You 
should never lose sight of that. Here’s this little guy from 
[electorate], and still fairly young as far as MPs go. 
 
It’s a very humbling experience to sit there. So pride, all of those 
emotions went through me. 
 
Some MPs were surprised by the ceremonies required to open parliament: 
 
Probably more formal and ceremonial than I had thought. 
 
The first bits are highly ceremonial, which are just kind of arcane. 
Interesting – I quite enjoyed them. 
 
The size and layout of the House also surprised some new members: 
 
I sit up by the Sergeant-at-Arms, but the cross-benches are 
actually closer than you think. That was one of the things that 
surprised me. 
 
I thought it was a very small House – I thought it was bigger than 
that. That was the physical reaction to it. You’re a backbencher so 
you know where you are. 
 
The standard of behaviour surprised many new MPs: 
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Oh my God! And I still think that. What a bunch of baying morons. 
Like, what is going on here? I mean, I had watched them on TV but 
then you’re sitting there with all the pomp and ceremony… They’re 
claiming a status of ‘we are here to do this serious stuff’. And we 
have a karakia to acknowledge that we are here for the nation and 
then it’s pathetic – backbiting and personal attacks and time 
wasting and disrespect. 
 
We started off with all the pomp and ceremony and everyone was 
being very nice to each other and the Leader of the House got up 
and said what he needed to say and Michael [Cullen] got up and 
said whatever the appropriate response was. It was all very lovely. 
And then we got into the real business and it was like that [snaps 
fingers]! It was like sharks smelling blood [laughs]. The intensity 
just went straight through the roof. And the bickering and all the 
noise up the front… 
 
For new MPs, sitting in the House for the first time can clearly be an 
overwhelming experience. 
 
Maiden Speeches 
 
By convention, newly elected MPs deliver a ‘maiden speech’. Maiden 
speeches are an opportunity for MPs to speak freely about matters that are 
important to them. Thus MPs may use their 15 minute allocation more-or-
less as they see fit. 
 
Overall, MPs viewed their maiden speeches as tremendously important.3 A 
number of MPs noted that the importance of delivering their maiden speech 
made them nervous: 
 
I thought I was going to pass out when I stood up. I knew it was a 
big deal so there was some anxiety. 
 
                                                 
3 The significance of maiden speeches is confirmed by the circumstances surrounding ACT 
MP John Boscawen’s maiden speech. Boscawen sought to speak during the second reading of 
the Taxation (Urgent Measures and Annual Rates) Bill before he had delivered his maiden 
speech. This caused some debate in the House about whether the first time an MP spoke in 
the House counted as their maiden speech or whether maiden speeches only occurred 
during the Address in Reply debate. See Hansard, Vol. 651, 9 December 2008, p. 121. 
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I was absolutely packing myself before I did it. And about five 
minutes in I actually thought, ‘I’m really enjoying myself and look 
at who my audience is’. 
 
MPs believed their maiden speech was a benchmark against which their 
parliamentary career would be measured. A quarter of MPs commented that 
they expected their maiden speeches to be a referent throughout their 
political careers: 
 
I thought quite a lot about what I wanted to say… people are going 
to quote it back at you endlessly and when you finish they’re going 
to say, ‘well, did you achieve any of that or not?’ 
 
You’re writing this maiden speech which is supposed to be this 
deep, insightful work that people are going to look back on in 20 
years’ time and say, ‘well, that’s what you set out to do in politics’. 
 
One MP took a particularly cautious approach to how their speech would go 
down in history: 
 
I was very aware from the advice we’d received from others in the 
caucus that the content of it was very important because… unlike 
every other speech it’s recorded and can come back and bite you. 
So I went through it many times looking for things that I might live 
to regret and eliminating any that I thought were in that category. 
 
Many new MPs showed enthusiasm to participate in the House by choosing 
to speak on bills before they had delivered their maiden speech: 
 
Protocols are you’re not supposed to speak before your maiden 
speech, right? But there were two bills that were going through on 
energy-related stuff that I have particular knowledge and 
expertise in that I had to speak on in the House. And that was 
weird, that was really weird. 
 
I had a bit of a dilemma there. My maiden speech wasn’t due until 
the second week we had the House sitting. I decided not to wait for 
my maiden speech and just start speaking on the bills anyway. 
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Other MPs patiently waited until they had delivered their maiden speeches 
before participating in debates. A number of these MPs were eager to get 
their maiden speech out of the way as it marked the point after which they 
could truly begin in their new role. These MPs were less excited about their 
maiden speeches: 
 
I just viewed it as something you must do and get it out of the way. 
People will judge you on it or they won’t. I was really keen just to 
get down to the work and couldn’t wait for the House to get on to 
other business. 
 
It’s one of those things where once you’ve done it it’s sort of a load 
off your shoulders and you can get into the other more impromptu 
speaking in the House, which has been more enjoyable probably 
than the maiden speech. 
 
The rush to prepare their maiden speech introduced some MPs to the frantic 
pace of parliament: 
 
It was such a whirlwind in the lead-up to that point – you didn’t 
have much time to relish it… I felt like I wrote my speech in bits 
when actually given the magnitude of it as a thing I would have 
liked to have spent more time on it. But that’s just the nature of the 
way things are here. 
 
It would have been a hell of a lot better if I’d been allowed to do it 
after Christmas because that first couple of months was all a bit of 
a blur… In reality it turns out to be a cobbled-together mishmash 
of thoughts and ideas because you just don’t have time to get it 
into a really nice coherent sort of articulation of your views on life. 
 
In considering the content of New Zealand MPs’ maiden speeches, two 
methods of analysis were employed. Firstly, MPs were asked about their 
maiden speech in the first interview round. Secondly, the author watched 
recordings all new MPs’ maiden speeches, read the transcripts, and tallied 
the subjects commonly covered in the speeches. The results of this analysis 
are shown in Table 5.1, overleaf. A ‘word cloud’ of the most common words 
from all MPs’ maiden speeches is shown in Figure 5.1, while Table 5.2 breaks 
down maiden speech content by MP type, party size, gender, and ethnicity.  
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Table 5.1 – Subjects included in Maiden Speeches of MPs first elected in 
November 2008 
Subject 
Occurrence in Maiden Speeches 
(%) 
Family 96 
Goals 89 
Personal History – ‘Where I came 
from’ 
82 
Party 71 
Values 57 
Geographic Constituency 54 
Constituency Seat 54 
Previous Career 54 
Supporters 54 
Educational Background 46 
Party Leader 46 
Political Philosophy 39 
Political Opponents 25 
Previous Incumbents 18 
Role of MPs 14 
 
There is a pattern most MPs follow in maiden speeches. Nearly all MPs 
mentioned their family, as maiden speeches are a forum to acknowledge 
important influences. Indeed, many MPs’ families watched from the public 
gallery as their family member delivered their speech: 
 
I was very conscious of my family being there. I had my wife and 
one of my children and my mother and my brother… My father had 
died before the 2005 election and he’d supported me for a long, 
long time, knowing that was what I wanted to do. So I felt – as I 
said in my maiden speech – I felt my father on my shoulder, and 
that sort of thing: ‘Come on boy, give it a go’. And that was great. 
That was a very memorable, wonderful day for me. 
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Figure 5.1 – Word Cloud of Most Common Words from Maiden 
Speeches4 
 
Most new MPs have specific goals they wish to achieve in parliament; setting 
out their objectives formally is the first step in actualising their goals: 
 
I wanted to identify the things that I was particularly passionate 
about and wanted to work on. 
 
The things that I focused on… were education and the fact that if 
one in five of our kids fails they haven’t got much of a future. The 
second big issue was around law and order. And the third point 
was really around bringing back some common sense and not 
letting political correctness get in the way. 
 
With regard to values, MPs articulated what they stood for and why. Some 
MPs commented that their maiden speech was their only opportunity to 
express their own values rather than those of their party: 
 
 
                                                 
4 This word cloud was generated by inserting the combined text of the maiden speeches 
delivered by the 34 MPs who were first elected in November 2008 into tagcroud.com. The 
larger the word, the greater its frequency. As a matter of interest, the combined text of 34 
new MPs’ maiden speeches consisted of 80,910 words, or 218 pages. For a commentary on 
the usefulness of word clouds for content analysis, see Alexander C. Tan, Jessica Buck, and 
Erik Schrader, ‘Portraits of New Zealand Political Science, 1980-2008: A Picture is Worth 
Eighty Words’, Political Science, Vol. 61, No. 1, June 2009, pp. 81-83. 
 Occurre ce in Maiden Speeches (%) 
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Table 5.2 – Subjects included in Maiden Speeches of MPs elected in 
November 2008 by MP Type, Party Size, Gender, and Ethnicity 
 
It was great saying what I wanted without having to worry too 
much about the party’s position because that’s the one speech 
where you nail your own personal political colours down. 
 Type Size Gender Ethnicity 
Subject 
Elector-
ate 
List Large Small Male Female Pakeha Maori Other 
Family 91 100 95 100 95 100 95 100 100 
Goals 82 94 91 83 100 67 95 50 100 
Personal 
History 
100 71 86 67 79 89 79 75 100 
Party 64 76 64 100 63 89 84 50 40 
Values 55 59 55 67 53 67 63 50 40 
Geographic 
Constituency 
91 59 50 67 47 67 37 75 100 
Constituency 
Seat 
45 29 59 33 58 44 58 75 20 
Previous 
Career 
45 59 55 50 63 33 42 100 60 
Supporters 45 59 59 33 58 44 58 0 80 
Educational 
Background 
45 47 59 0 37 67 37 50 80 
Party Leader 36 53 45 50 37 67 47 75 20 
Political 
Philosophy 
18 53 36 50 42 33 53 25 0 
Political 
Opponents 
27 24 27 17 32 11 26 50 0 
Previous 
Incumbents 
18 18 23 0 11 33 16 25 20 
Role of MPs 18 12 18 0 11 22 16 0 20 
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A lot of the senior parliamentary people had made the point that 
you really should stake out your ground because it’s probably the 
only time in parliament that you get to say what’s really, really 
important to you. 
 
Interestingly, while 71 percent of MPs acknowledged their party in their 
maiden speech, none of the interview participants mentioned their party 
when they were asked about what they wanted to articulate in their maiden 
speech. This is significant, as it confirms the reluctance of MPs to appear 
more concerned about their party than about their constituents. Also, 
observations that small party MPs are more conscious of their dependence 
on their party are confirmed by the fact that they unanimously 
acknowledged their parties in their maiden speeches, compared with only 64 
percent of large party MPs.  
 
The House 
 
Even after new MPs have delivered their maiden speech they may feel 
nervous about speaking in the House during their first few months as a 
legislator. The pace of the House is intense; the content of the debate is 
challenging and MPs must speak through interjections and heckling from 
opposing members. Thus the House may be an intimidating environment for 
those uninitiated to its ‘normal’ behaviour. 
 
Overall, 64 percent of new MPs had generally positive attitudes towards the 
House in the first interview round, with 16 percent disliking the House, and 
20 percent holding a mixed attitude. By the second interviews 80 percent of 
MPs were positive, four percent negative, and 16 percent mixed. Thus, with 
time, MPs’ perceptions of the House seem to become more positive. 
 
MPs who were positive believed the House to be theatre and took great 
pleasure in participating in the performance: 
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Oh, it’s bizarre. It’s theatre – it’s just pure theatre and if you take it 
too seriously you’ll just tie yourself up in knots. I mean, I think 
there are people on both sides of the House who – particularly 
some newbies – who just can’t understand why sometimes it’s a bit 
of a joke. Once you get your head around it, it’s just there’s a whole 
lot of enjoyment in the theatre factor. 
 
I’m in the last row – we’re the first to be tapped to go round and 
fill the empty chairs of ministers because you want a good, full 
bench. And that’s a different experience altogether – it’s quite 
electric. And you are in close proximity to the Opposition and you 
don’t know what the Supplementary Questions are going to be and 
the ministers are on edge – you can feel it, it’s palpable. And that’s 
really great fun. Great fun. 
 
MPs who took a mixed or negative attitude to the House also noted the 
theatrical elements but took less pleasure in them: 
 
The House is like 122 performing seals. 
 
The gladiatorial combat that passes for Question Time is not only 
unedifying but counterproductive to decent processes of 
democracy. 
 
MPs from small parties were more negative about the House than their large 
party counterparts. Small party MPs tend to distance themselves from the 
adversarial interactions between the two major parties. In 2007, MPs from 
the Green, Maori, United Future, and ACT parties signed a voluntary Code of 
Conduct promising to act ethically and with integrity in the House.5 Thus 
small party MPs may perceive themselves as not participating in 
inappropriate behaviour. 
 
MPs with positive attitudes towards the House generally found the 
behaviour typical of the House to be enjoyable: 
 
                                                 
5 Hon. Margaret Wilson, Report of the 19th Conference of Commonwealth Speakers and 
Presiding Officers held in the United Kingdom, Presented to the House of Representatives 
January 2008, p. 20. It should be noted that the Code of Conduct was prepared and signed by 
these parties in the 48th Parliament, not the current parliament. There was no specified 
number of parliaments that the Code was to be applied for. Therefore, the signatory parties 
may no longer feel bound to honour the Code’s principles. 
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I love it. I really enjoy being in the House. I think it’s actually 
hugely entertaining. I must admit sometimes I sit there and think: I 
know that the general public could watch this and shake their 
heads in disbelief at the childish behaviour and all the rest of it, 
and yes there is some childish behaviour and I have to admit that 
occasionally I’ve made the odd interjection and thought, ‘oh, that 
probably doesn’t sound very good or look very sensible’, but when 
you’re in there, the atmosphere is terrific. 
 
The more heated it gets, the more I like it. 
 
MPs who disliked the behaviour acted out in the House argued that childish 
behaviour was unnecessary and unproductive: 
 
The fractious kindergarten slanging between Labour and 
National, particularly at Question Time, is actually really hard to 
take… This is not actually what New Zealanders expect, want, or 
deserve from parliamentarians. When you talk to people from 
those parties they say, ‘oh, you don’t understand – this is part of a 
tradition and it’s theatre’, and all that sort of stuff. Well that is the 
most pathetic copout you could imagine. 
 
Some of the behaviour can get a bit caustic and nasty and 
disrespectful, which I don’t appreciate. And though some would 
say, ‘it’s just part of [the tradition]’, well people would say that 
about rugby as well in the 1960s, you know, punching and kicking 
and gouging – it might have been par for the course. You gotta 
step back from that and say, ‘well, it might be par for the course, 
but is it acceptable? Is that the way you want the affairs of our 
government to be run?’ 
 
Some MPs took a more nuanced attitude, disliking the behaviour of the 
House but accepting it as a necessary element of parliamentary politics: 
 
Childish behaviour is a by-product of our adversarial system and 
democratic process. So without engaging in that kind of fight we 
really cannot go anywhere. So I quietly, but not terribly 
confidently, accept it as it is. 
 
MPs with positive attitudes emphasised the good nature of the House and 
claimed that conflict was purely for fun: 
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There’s a real collegial atmosphere… You’ll be watching somebody 
yelling at somebody at one stage and then they’re sitting next to 
each other and having a good laugh at the next. It really is very 
insightful to people’s psyches. 
 
There’s a lot of good humour in there… You’d have gained from the 
fact that even though we’re on opposite sides of the political fence, 
I still like [a particular opposing MP], we get on well, I have no 
problem in just having a chat with him. But he could knock me 
down in a debate, I could stand up and have a go at him and then 
we’d just sort of have a laugh afterwards and get on. 
 
MPs were realistic about the usefulness of the House as a forum for genuine 
debate: 
 
I’m probably still in the naïve stage where one thinks that you 
might just convince someone in the House. I’m rapidly learning 
that that’s not so. But it’s a place to air points of view that get 
covered by the media; things that are brought up can be more 
widely canvassed elsewhere. 
 
In the House itself the debate is pretty much stylised. There isn’t 
much opportunity for changing someone’s mind. 
 
New MPs were surprisingly confident in their speaking abilities. In the first 
interviews, 63 percent of MPs claimed that they found it easy to speak in the 
House, versus 25 percent who found speaking difficult, and 13 percent who 
had mixed experiences. In the second interviews, 64 percent found speaking 
in the House to be easy, 14 percent claimed it was difficult, and 21 percent 
had mixed experiences. While the proportion who found speaking easy did 
not change, those who initially struggled in the House felt they were 
improving over time: 
 
I enjoy speaking. I think the number one thing is learning how to 
block out the noise that comes at you, which is quite hard. In fact, 
if you’ve got a wall of noise it’s much easier than if you can hear 
individual things. But it’s just about learning mechanisms to block 
out the noise, I guess. 
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When I speak I have some really good speeches and then I have 
some real shockers, too – you know, not being a natural speaker in 
the House, just not having the gift of the gab. 
 
The variety of bills that come before the House ensures that MPs must speak 
on subjects about which they know little. A number of MPs noted the 
difficulty of this task: 
 
Suddenly I found that I had to make a speech of around eight to 10 
minutes on one particular clause which amended the former 
Customs and Excise Act by deleting the word ‘China’ and inserting 
the phrase ‘or any party to this agreement’ – and I had to write a 
10 minute speech on that… Sometimes you take a deep breath and 
think, ‘fuck, what am I going to say here and I hope not too many 
people are listening or watching!’ 
 
Last night they said, ‘well, you’re gonna have to speak on this bill’… 
I said, ‘I don’t know anything about it’. And they said, ‘well, here 
are the speaking notes’… You’ve just gotta be thrown in the deep 
end, and it’s pretty scary really, but you just do it. 
 
Eighty-eight percent of MPs believed they received adequate speaking time 
in the House. Interestingly, in the first round of interviews no MPs claimed to 
actively pursue speaking time but 24 percent did so in the second 
interviews: 
 
I get lots of opportunities. Mind you, I go hunting for them 
sometimes, too. I go hassle the whips and say, ‘can I talk? Have you 
got anything that I can do?’ 
 
I think we’ve been getting a fair deal. But I am going to say 
something to the whips because I spoke yesterday but I think that 
was the first time in about three or four weeks that I’ve spoken. 
But that would have been an oversight. 
 
A number of MPs – all of whom were positive about the House – sat in the 
House even when they were not rostered to speak, drinking in the 
atmosphere: 
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I spend a lot of time down there, probably more than most new 
MPs would – a lot more than most experienced MPs would do. I 
just enjoy being down there. 
 
I often take my work there just to sit there and get in-tray stuff 
done while listening to the debate going on. 
 
Perhaps most telling about socialisation experiences in the House is new 
MPs’ own behaviour. As the proportion of MPs who were positive about the 
House increased between the two interview rounds it is likely that MPs 
quickly become comfortable in the cut-and-thrust of the House. As they 
became more confident, new MPs were significantly more likely to interject 
and heckle their political opponents. Thirty-eight percent of MPs admitted to 
interjecting in the first interviews, rising to 56 percent in the second. A 
number of MPs stated in the first interviews that they did not wish to 
participate in the bickering in the House: 
 
I’m not really inclined to take part in the same way as some of my 
colleagues on both sides of the House. I’m a much bigger fan of the 
disapproving headshake [laughs]. 
 
The same MP took a different approach in their second interview: 
 
I’ve always maintained that I don’t want to get into the personal 
stuff, but the House at Question Time, I’ve always said to people 
who’ve come in here, ‘it’s like theatre’. It is where you play out a lot 
of what’s going on, what are topical issues. 
 
Thus MPs’ behaviour changes as they are socialised into the House. As they 
become more comfortable in their roles, MPs rationalise their behaviour as 
‘fitting in’. Therefore MPs are unaware that their behaviour is different to 
how they expected to behave when first entering the House. 
 
The small parties’ voluntary Code of Conduct means that one would expect 
their MPs to act with restraint and exhibit good behaviour in the House. In 
the first interviews, small party MPs unanimously criticised the behaviour of 
the House, compared with 83 percent of large party MPs. By the second 
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interviews, however, small and large party MPs were equally likely to enjoy 
the behaviour of the House (67 percent), as demonstrated by these small 
party MPs: 
 
Like every new member, I suspect I came in here planning to lead 
the charge away from all childish behaviour. I would like to think 
that I don’t personally indulge in childish behaviour. Probably I’m 
guilty of egotistical behaviour, but then if you’re not an egotist 
you’re in the wrong game, probably. I would like to think that I 
don’t get into petty, vindictive, nasty stuff. I’ve certainly tried not 
to. 
 
Sitting in the Chamber and listening to the backwards and 
forwards is quite funny. And although we – as a rule but not 
always – we don’t get pulled into it sometimes you have to laugh 
and have a quiet dig.  
 
Thus while small party MPs may take the moral high ground, their behaviour 
does not always reflect their rhetoric. 
 
Select Committees 
  
Select committees are sometimes described as the ‘engine room’ of 
parliament.6 Select committees examine issues more closely than in the 
House, meaning they are valuable fora for examining and providing advice 
on a range of complex issues. Most bills are referred to select committees for 
consideration and select committees usually hear public submissions. Select 
committees examine government departments’ Budget Estimates, conduct 
financial reviews of public organisations, receive petitions, consider some 
international treaties, and can hold inquiries into matters related to their 
subject areas.7 Thus the reach of select committees is extensive. 
 
                                                 
6 Jonathan Boston, Stephen Levine, Elizabeth McLeay, and Nigel S. Roberts, New Zealand 
Under MMP: A New Politics? (Auckland: Auckland University Press with Bridget Williams 
Books, 1996), p. 79. 
7 New Zealand Parliament, Parliamentary Brief: Select Committees, 
http://www.parliament.nz/en-
NZ/AboutParl/HowPWorks/FactSheets/3/f/a/3faad934f46f4612ad8180cb294638fd.htm, 
accessed 17 November 2009. 
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Overall, new MPs had positive attitudes towards select committees: 60 
percent were generally positive in the first interview round, rising slightly to 
63 percent in the second. Seventy percent of list MPs were positive about 
select committees in the first interviews, rising to 73 percent in the second. 
List MPs enjoyed the detailed consideration they were able to give to issues: 
 
I enjoy the opportunity to get into some detail. I enjoy policy work. 
 
You have more time to go into things in depth, so that’s more 
germane to my predilection – I think to most people’s – to 
understand a thing better. 
 
By contrast, only 53 percent of electorate MPs were initially positive, rising 
slightly to 56 percent in the second interviews. Given the policy focus of 
select committees this suggests that list MPs may engage in policy discussion 
more willingly than their electorate MP counterparts – a benefit of list MPs 
promoted by the Royal Commission on the Electoral System when 
recommending MMP.8 List MPs may see policy work as central to their 
conceptions of being an effective MP, whereas electorate MPs’ attention may 
turn to constituency work as a means of ensuring re-election in their seat. 
Thus electorate and list MPs may employ different means of self-
preservation.  
 
Given the importance of select committees, MPs must work well together. In 
their typology of select committee members Stephen Levine and Nigel S. 
Roberts argue that the dynamics of select committees are qualitatively 
different to those of the House because all select committee members have 
an investment in ensuring the best possible outcome for each issue 
considered.9 This results in a greater willingness to work across party 
lines.10 Moreover, understanding how MPs behave in select committees gives 
                                                 
8 Royal Commission on the Electoral System, Report of the Royal Commission on the Electoral 
System (Wellington: Government Printer, 1986), p. 68. 
9 Stephen Levine and Nigel S. Roberts, ‘From Lobby Fodder to Leadership: New Zealand 
Parliamentarians and Select Committees’, Political Science, Vol. 56, No. 2, December 2004, p. 
44. 
10 Stephen Levine and Nigel S. Roberts, ‘From Lobby Fodder to Leadership’, p. 48. 
 134 
an insight into overall attitudes towards parliament.11 Under MMP, some 
committees are chaired by opposition members. This encourages all parties 
to aim for consensus.12 Select committee proceedings are not broadcasted, 
receive less media coverage than the House, and have relatively small 
audiences. As a result, select committees are often less adversarial than the 
House. 
 
The collaborative atmosphere of select committees was emphasised by new 
MPs in the first interviews, with 74 percent stating that members worked 
well together and that conflict was minimal: 
 
There’s a sense of bipartisanship there which is important and 
healthy. We’re not always going to agree, but you do get that sense 
of perhaps a little more cooperation in select committees that you 
don’t get in the House. 
 
It’s okay to agree with the guys on the other side of the table and 
you’re all working pretty much together. 
  
Unfortunately, MPs’ feelings of collegiality were wavering by the second 
interviews. Overall, only 40 percent of new MPs in the second interviews 
claimed that their select committees worked harmoniously – almost half that 
of only a few months prior. However, MPs were not categorically negative 
about their select committee relationships – 53 percent of MPs said the 
collegiality of committees depended on the chairperson (versus only nine 
percent in the first interviews). Thus good committee leadership ensured 
that members worked well together while a bad chairperson caused friction: 
 
There’s a huge variation in the quality of the chairman and the 
quality of how the committee operates. 
 
I have a high regard for the way in which the select committees 
are run. A lot of it depends on the chairmanship. 
 
                                                 
11 Stephen Levine and Nigel S. Roberts, ‘From Lobby Fodder to Leadership’, p. 40. 
12 Grant Gillon and Raymond Miller, ‘Role of an MP’, p. 176. As of 16 February 2010, four of 
the 18 committees are currently chaired by opposition members. 
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It is interesting to probe this issue further to determine whether new MPs 
genuinely believe that the chairperson is responsible for the overall tone of 
select committees. MPs may claim that the chairperson has great influence in 
order to rationalise their behaviour, which may not live up to their own 
expectations. Responses to questions about collegiality in select committees 
were categorised based on whether the committees MPs served on were 
chaired by their own party, another party, or – in cases where MPs served on 
multiple committees – both. The results are presented in Table 5.3. 
 
Table 5.3 – Perceptions of Collegiality in Select Committees13 
 
  Perceptions of Collegiality (%) 
 
 Harmony Conflict 
Depends on 
Chairperson 
Chaired 
by 
Same 
Party 
81 0 19 
Different 
Party 
56 19 25 
Both 29 14 57 
 
MPs who serve on committees chaired by an MP from their own party are 
most likely to believe the atmosphere is harmonious. This is unsurprising as 
MPs probably feel more respected by their own party colleagues than by 
opposing members, regardless of whether this is actually the case. 
 
MPs that had experienced the chairmanship of members from their own 
party and opposing parties were significantly more likely to believe the 
collegiality of each committee depends on the chairperson. As MPs perceive 
harmony to be at its peak in committees chaired by their own party 
colleagues it is probable that these MPs simply prefer the committees 
chaired by their colleagues. This is understandable, but suggests that 
collegiality in select committees is determined not solely by the quality of the 
                                                 
13 The responses from both interview rounds were averaged to create the data presented in 
this table. 
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chairmanship. Rather, all members influence the atmospheres of select 
committees.  
 
Within parliament, select committee responsibilities occupy a significant 
proportion of MPs’ workloads. Participating in select committees often 
assumes a level of specialist knowledge that not all MPs possess. As one MP 
noted: 
 
We have people with lifetimes of experience coming in and giving 
testimony and you’re expected to master this in 10 minutes. 
 
To keep pace with select committees MPs must complete the allocated 
readings before each meeting. However, the quantity of reading is enormous. 
In the first round of interviews 83 percent of MPs admitted that managing 
readings was difficult, rising to 91 percent in the second interviews: 
 
If someone’s stupid enough to put in a 40 page submission, I’ll read 
the front and the back page. If – as is more common – they put in a 
two or three page submission I’ll read the whole lot and absorb it 
quickly. But any submitter who thinks that their 40 page 
submission is going to change the world is dreaming. 
 
Huge amounts of reading. Often the agendas and the papers aren’t 
available until a short period before the meeting, so it’s quite hard 
to keep up with the reading. 
 
Small party MPs – who are usually on multiple select committees – find the 
burden of reading the most difficult. As one small party MP noted: 
 
When I first started, I used to read all my papers, you know, stay 
up until midnight reading my papers and attend diligently from 
the start to the finish. Now I’ve found myself doing what I’ve seen… 
more experienced MPs from smaller parties doing, which is simply 
getting up and walking out halfway through, saying you can’t 
possibly do everything. 
 
Despite the intense workload, new MPs increasingly appreciated the 
opportunity that select committees gave them to hear the views of 
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submitters and the wider public. Twenty-four percent of MPs noted this in 
the first interviews, rising to 37 percent in the second:14 
 
It’s an opportunity to really understand an area and to hear from 
people who are working on it at the front line. 
 
You get to hear a bit more about what people on the outside are 
thinking about. 
 
Interestingly, in the first round of interviews small party MPs were more 
likely than large party MPs to stress the importance of select committees for 
engaging with the public (40 percent versus 20 percent). However, by the 
second interviews this was reversed, with 43 percent of large party MPs 
taking this position against only 17 percent of small party MPs. This is likely 
due to the intense workload of small party MPs and their need to excuse 
themselves from less pressing aspects of their role, as noted above. 
Unfortunately, listening to submitters may become a lower priority for small 
party MPs out of necessity. 
 
The select committees new MPs are allocated may have implications for their 
political career.15 Select committees allow members to build up specialist 
knowledge within policy areas. If they excel in a particular area their chances 
of promotion may be improved. However, if MPs serve on committees about 
which they have little knowledge or interest their likelihood of standing out 
amongst their peers is reduced. While it is not necessary that MPs sit on 
select committees that reflect their pre-parliamentary expertise, doing so 
may be beneficial. 
 
In the first round of interviews, 55 percent of MPs said that their select 
committee assignments were aligned to their previous experience: 
                                                 
14 The low proportion of MPs in the first interviews who noted the benefits of select 
committees hearing from the public is probably due to the fact that government department 
financial reviews and estimates were the first order of business for most committees. 
Therefore at the time of the first interviews few MPs would have experienced being in 
committees that engaged in a full public submission phase. 
15 Stephen Levine and Nigel S. Roberts, ‘From Lobby Fodder to Leadership’, p. 40. 
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I was well-known for my health background and it made sense for 
me to play to my strengths so my first preference was Health. 
 
I think I’m clearly seen as someone who knows about a particular 
area and so I’ve got the Law and Order and Justice and Electoral 
Select Committees. In a way that gives some grunt to those 
committees. 
 
MPs who were allocated select committees outside their area of expertise 
viewed this as an opportunity to develop diverse skills: 
 
The party’s quite keen for me to do more in the education area, 
which is quite neat, even though I’m not a teacher or anything. 
 
It’s not my number one choice of committee. Obviously I went on it 
because that’s where there was a spot and I had some surplus 
capacity. It’s a fantastic opportunity to get into some issues that 
I’m not familiar with. 
 
Interestingly, by the second interviews 80 percent of MPs claimed their 
select committees were within their area of expertise despite few MPs 
changing committees between interviews. This suggests that new MPs 
rapidly adapt to the rigours of select committee work and quickly consider 
themselves experts. 
 
Select committees are unique within parliament in their potential to bring 
MPs together to work cooperatively to achieve shared goals. While new MPs 
quickly lose their idealism regarding the collegiality of select committees, or 
just as quickly adapt to partisanship, they retain a positive attitude towards 
the committees generally. 
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Parties 
 
The roles MPs undertake to satisfy their party functions are extensive. This 
sub-section addresses caucuses, caucus committees, and policy roles. 
 
Caucus 
 
While a major aspect of MPs’ parliamentary roles, little is known about how 
party caucuses operate. Parties and MPs staunchly guard caucus from 
outside eyes – conventions dictate caucus meetings are strictly 
confidential.16 Therefore, little is known about caucus. 
 
Within governing parties, the role of the caucus is relatively limited as major 
decisions are made in cabinet. Senior government members usually brief the 
caucus before major policy announcements, but this generally invites 
discussion rather than serious policy input. When minor policies are 
announced, backbench members may receive the news at the same time as 
the public. Thus governing parties’ caucuses are generally restrained. 
 
Opposition party caucuses may provide greater opportunities for 
backbenchers to influence policy and party positions. As opposition parties 
do not have access to advice from government officials to the same extent as 
governing parties, the expertise of caucus members are more likely drawn 
upon. However, senior members may dominate discussions and thus have a 
greater influence in shaping caucus decisions than their backbench 
colleagues. 
 
Small party caucuses are different to those of large parties due to the relative 
influence of each member based on caucus size. Whereas each National or 
Labour MP makes up only a small fraction of the caucus, each small party MP 
                                                 
16 There is one exception in the New Zealand parliament. The Green Party opens its caucus to 
party staff and parliamentary interns working for the party. The other parties in parliament 
allow only MPs and, in some cases, party officials to attend caucus. 
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comprises a comparatively larger proportion of their caucus. Moreover, 
small party MPs often hold significant portfolio responsibilities. Thus small 
party MPs are influential within their caucuses. It is poignant to note, 
however, that small parties tend to rely more on their extra-parliamentary 
parties for policy development than large parties. Therefore some influence 
is removed from small party MPs in the name of intra-party democracy. 
  
New MPs largely enjoyed caucus, with 88 percent taking a positive stance: 
 
Caucus meetings are great. That’s where you can have your 
brainstorming sessions with your colleagues in a very frank and 
candid way. 
 
They are really good. That’s when we get a chance to voice our 
views to the whole caucus. That’s the time to stand up and say how 
we feel about what’s going on, what our take is on things, what we 
think our strategy or way forward should be. And it’s democracy in 
action. 
 
Assuming that positivity about caucus is related to the level of input afforded 
to MPs, the observation that small party MPs have greater influence than 
their larger party colleagues is confirmed. Small party MPs were 
unanimously positive about caucus, against 85 percent of large party MPs. Of 
course, that large party MPs were also very positive suggests reasons for 
enjoying caucus are greater than level of input. There were no significant 
variations between electorate and list MPs in general attitudes toward 
caucus. 
 
Participating in caucus may initially be intimidating for new MPs. Given the 
secrecy surrounding caucus most new MPs have little knowledge of what to 
expect when they first enter the caucus room. Thus new MPs may take a 
passive role in caucus as they seek to ‘find their ground’. 
 
Overall, 64 percent of new MPs claimed to be comfortable participating in 
caucus, versus 14 percent who preferred to observe, and 23 percent who 
 141 
took a mixed stance. MPs who participated in caucus stressed that all 
members were equal: 
 
I find caucus a very democratic place, a place where all of us can 
speak and are encouraged to do so. And it’s free and frank. And it’s 
the most important court we have. 
 
Everybody is entitled to say whatever he or she feels okay to say. 
 
MPs who preferred not to contribute in caucus stressed that as new MPs it 
was best for them not to participate heavily until they had a better 
understanding of the norms and expectations of caucus: 
 
I’ve kept a very low profile in caucus, deliberately. I followed the 
Holyoake adage: breathe through your nose. And I follow caucus 
discussions with interest; I’m really impressed by the energy, the 
vitality, the intelligence of the vast majority of my colleagues… I’d 
like to think that I’ve had my ears open all the time, but my mouth 
shut most of it. 
 
I tend to sort of just keep my head down and watch, because that’s 
just the way I prefer to be. 
 
MPs who took a mixed approach were generally silent but occasionally spoke 
if they felt strongly about an issue: 
 
I think it would be wrong for a new MP to be standing up every 
couple of minutes and interjecting all the time. But certainly if 
there’s something I felt strongly enough about I would be able to 
have my say. 
 
Initially I was quite happy to just sit back and listen to what’s 
going on. I still think it’s important not to just talk for the sake of 
talking. But if I’ve got a burning desire to say something I don’t 
hesitate. 
 
Interestingly, there were only minimal variations between electorate and list 
MPs in their participation in caucus (67 percent versus 60 percent 
respectively claimed to be active participants). This suggests that within 
parliament the informal hierarchy of members may be breaking down. As 
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caucus is a forum for parties to determine policies and positions, the more 
specialised policy knowledge of some list MPs may offer greater legitimacy 
to their positions. 
 
There were significant variations in attitudes towards caucus between 
opposition and government members. Seventy-five percent of opposition 
members reported that they actively participated in caucus versus only 50 
percent of government MPs. Opposition MPs stressed that their caucus 
atmosphere was geared towards full engagement: 
 
Obviously you hear what’s going on, but there’s an opportunity to 
also contribute to debates about how we’re doing, what we should 
be doing, what our response should be. 
 
I put an item on the agenda and spoke at caucus last time and that 
was the fourth time I’d put something on the agenda and spoken 
to it. So the agenda’s open, you put your paper in and you’ll get 
heard. So there’s a fairness around that, there’s no doubt about it. 
 
On the other hand, government members noted that caucus was a formal 
avenue for backbenchers to be kept informed: 
 
It’s very formal. A lot more formal than I expected. And a lot of 
people are still finding their way in terms of picking what they can 
and can’t do or can and can’t say. 
 
There’s probably less participation than I would have thought. But 
then – as it’s been explained to me – it’s quite different when you’re 
in government as opposed to opposition. And a lot of the ‘debate’, if 
you like, took place over the last few years when we were 
developing our policies and now a lot of it is churning it out. 
There’s not so much left for discussion. 
 
This difference is further confirmed by comparing the level of influence 
government and opposition MPs claimed to hold within caucus. Ninety 
percent of opposition MPs believed they were influential within their caucus: 
 
I don’t think that me being a newbie backbencher is any less 
listened to than someone who’s been there for 20 years. 
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I’ve never been stopped from having my say on an issue I wanted 
to. 
 
By contrast, only 40 percent of government members felt influential: 
 
You learn pretty early that you pick your fights, which I guess is 
the same anywhere. 
 
They are information-sharing meetings, mainly, because you’ve 
got such a large caucus, relatively speaking. It’s difficult to listen, 
share, and debate policy issues at a detailed level… so caucuses 
aren’t big ‘get on the whiteboard and argue policies’, essentially 
they’re not that type of meeting. That’s for another forum. 
 
Thus caucus roles differ greatly between government and opposition parties. 
While opposition members have significant opportunities to engage in 
debate and contribute to their party’s direction, government backbenchers 
are constrained to more-or-less ‘rubber-stamping’ decisions made by senior 
members. Opposition MPs are in a stronger position to develop skills – such 
as deliberation, consultation, and debate – that are important throughout 
their political career. Government MPs, on the other hand, have limited scope 
to develop these skills and therefore may experience difficulties should they 
progress to roles of greater responsibility. 
 
There are also differences in caucus roles between small and large parties. 
All small party MPs felt influential within their parties versus only 69 
percent of large party MPs. This is logical given the few MPs that comprise 
small party caucuses. It is unavoidable that small party MPs will wield 
influence within their parties as they are expected to manage significant 
portfolios. 
 
The speed at which new MPs are socialised into parliamentary norms is 
confirmed by the reluctance with which some MPs discussed caucus. One in 
five MPs said they could not comment when asked about their general 
feeling about caucus. Most MPs were comfortable to give general 
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descriptions of caucus once they were reassured that they would not be 
identified personally. However, the length to which MPs may go to adhere to 
caucus confidentiality is demonstrated in this somewhat tense exchange: 
 
Interviewer: How have things been going with the caucus 
meetings, how have you been enjoying them? 
MP: I’m not allowed to talk about caucus.  
Interviewer: Nothing of course to do with content, but in 
terms of the general atmosphere of the caucus, is it – 
MP: I’m not even allowed – yep. Has anyone else answered that 
question? 
Interviewer: Yeah, people have been giving me kind of 
general things about whether or not they feel comfortable 
speaking and –  
MP: But your thesis is public, eh? 
Interviewer: Yeah, but no identifying –  
MP: Individuals.  
Interviewer: – information, yeah nothing.  
MP: I think it’s good, it’s good.  
Interviewer: Feel free to say that you can’t answer this, but 
do you feel like you can put up your hand and –  
MP: Absolutely, I do. 
Interviewer: Have you managed to get any kind of your 
own– 
MP: Yes.  
Interviewer: – personal proposals –  
MP: Oh hang on, I’m not going to go that far, but I feel that I 
provide a contribution that’s listened to.  
 
It should be noted that this exchange was not typical of the interviews, which 
were largely free, frank, and courteous. However, the reluctance to discuss 
the most secretive aspect of their role demonstrates the speed with which 
parliamentary norms are instilled in new MPs. 
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Caucus Committees 
 
Caucus committees are a branch of the caucus process used as a forum 
within the larger parties to discuss and develop policies. Generally caucus 
committee members have a particular interest or portfolio responsibility in 
the subject area. Caucus committees are an opportunity for caucus members 
to consider policies in greater detail than is possible during full caucus 
meetings. 
 
Arguably, caucus committees are one of the few means by which backbench 
MPs can influence party policy. Committees consider policy in great detail 
before reporting back to the whole caucus. Thus if committee members 
position themselves as competent policy-makers and provide a compelling 
argument for a particular approach they may persuade their colleagues to 
take a particular course of action. Moreover, caucus committees are 
sometimes chaired by backbenchers, providing an opportunity for MPs to 
demonstrate leadership skills. On the other hand, more cynical observers 
would note that party leaders may use caucus committees to keep backbench 
MPs occupied while the real policy work is completed at higher levels. This 
may especially be the case in governing parties.17 
 
It should be noted that currently only the large parties use caucus 
committees. The reasons for this are twofold: firstly, the few members 
available in smaller parties would make caucus committees unviable and – 
more importantly – small parties tend to place greater emphasis on their 
extra-parliamentary party in policy development. Therefore when small 
parties develop new policy, the process may be more holistic, as opposed to 
the parliament-centric model employed by the larger parties. 
 
                                                 
17 Fiona Barker and Stephen Levine, ‘The Individual Parliamentary Member and Institutional 
Change: The Changing Role of the New Zealand Member of Parliament’, in Lawrence D. 
Longley and Reuven Y. Hazan (eds.), The Uneasy Relationships Between Parliamentary 
Members and Leaders (London: Frank Cass & Co., 2000), p. 111. 
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Amongst the large party MPs, 63 percent had an overall positive attitude 
towards caucus committees: 
 
I’m part of the Economic Caucus and I’m leading a stream of work 
around productivity, which is obviously quite a key issue at the 
moment, so that’s really exciting.  
 
It certainly is a great opportunity to have discussions about 
direction and policy as its being developed, what it means and so 
on… they allow us the opportunity to talk more widely and broadly 
about issues and go into them more deeply. 
 
New MPs believed caucus committees held only limited ability to influence 
policy. Only 53 percent of MPs believed committees were influential, with 18 
percent saying they were not influential, and 29 percent believing influence 
was mixed.  
 
Interestingly, while government members (75 percent) were more positive 
about caucus committees than opposition MPs (55 percent), opposition MPs 
were marginally more likely to feel that caucus committees were influential 
(56 percent) than their government counterparts (50 percent). This suggests 
that government MPs are aware that most decisions are made higher up in 
the party: 
 
The thing I’m finding is instead of necessarily directly influencing 
my colleagues I’ll talk to the minister or send a letter and do those 
sorts of things. 
 
I think those caucus committees play a role in bringing ideas to the 
attention of the minister. 
 
Opposition members, on the other hand, believed caucus committees offered 
an opportunity for new approaches to policy to be tested: 
 
Caucus committees are not places where the party’s position gets 
challenged; they are places where they get better understood or it 
gets adopted. So a lot of thinking goes on about how to adapt and 
then it goes back to caucus. It’s also a place where somebody 
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might come up with an idea. We’ll thrash it around and it might go 
nowhere or it might really become better. 
 
We’re in the process of beginning our policy development and 
there’s a big role for caucus members in that – huge. In fact, if we 
don’t drive it along, a lot of it wouldn’t happen. The Strategy and 
Communication Committee’s a really good one to be on; I do feel 
like I have a role in influencing that. 
 
Government committees operated sporadically, perhaps as an indication of 
their limited importance: 
 
Some start off with a hiss and a roar and meet every week the 
House is sitting. A lot of them have moved into once a sitting 
session, which is a bit more manageable. But then often what 
happens is other functions come up or you’ve gotta do this or 
you’ve got to go and give a speech in the House. So getting 
continuity with some of those is – I find – frustrating. 
 
They go in fits and spurts. It depends heavily on the relationship 
between the minister and the committee chair. 
 
A number of new MPs noted caucus committees were a low priority, which 
once again confirms their limited importance: 
 
I don’t think they’re working as effectively [as caucus], necessarily. 
I struggle with the resourcing of that side of things a bit, it’s a 
question of time and priorities and frankly I haven’t made caucus 
committees a high priority. 
 
If I can I normally attend all those caucus committees, but 
normally it’s a bit of a tough clash. For instance, this evening we 
have two or three caucus committees or other meetings, but if 
you’re scheduled to take a call in the Debating Chamber you 
simply cannot attend all of the meetings and again you need to 
prioritise your focus. 
 
It is notable that only one large party MP decided not to participate in caucus 
committees. This was not a critique of caucus committees; rather it was a 
reflection of the enormity of MPs’ jobs: 
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I wanted to get to grips with being an MP. And I do struggle to 
read everything, and then once I’ve read everything, trying to file 
everything. I just wanna make sure I speak well in the House, I 
know my stuff in select committees, I do my spokesperson role well, 
and obviously there’s the party organisation you have to do as well 
as the electorate stuff. 
 
New MPs are realistic about the limited role of caucus committees in 
influencing their party policies. Even MPs who were positive about 
committees believed they were most useful as discussion fora. Thus while 
they may be removed from major policy formulation, caucus committees 
provide a useful ‘testing ground’ for new MPs to debate policies in detail – a 
skill that is eminently useful throughout their parliamentary career. 
 
Policy 
 
The final area of parliamentary responsibility adopted by new MPs is the role 
of advocating for particular policies. This role is somewhat of a ‘middle 
ground’ between parliamentary and representational roles. MPs advocate for 
policies in their parties, select committees, and the House. However, they 
also seek policy feedback from constituents and, in turn, attempt to ‘sell’ 
policies to voters. Thus policy-related tasks vary. 
 
Despite this, the immediate benefits of new MPs engaging in policy roles are 
questionable. Few members of the public have clearly defined policy 
interests; therefore it may be beneficial for MPs to instead focus their 
attention on more ‘popular’ aspects of their role to increase their profile and 
legitimacy.18 On the other hand, the hierarchical nature of parliament 
ensures that MPs must demonstrate policy competence to be promoted and 
thus to have real influence. Therefore, MPs who aspire to high positions may 
emphasise policy roles.19 
 
                                                 
18 John Wahlke, ‘Policy Demands and System Support: The Role of the Represented’, British 
Journal of Political Science, Vol. 1, No. 3, July 1971, pp. 271-273. 
19 Kenneth Prewitt and William Nowlin, ‘Political Ambitions and the Behavior of Incumbent 
Politicians’, The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 2, June 1969, p. 301. 
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Policy roles were moderately important for new MPs. Overall, 32 percent of 
new MPs identified policy-related tasks as a key role in the first interviews, 
rising to 41 percent in the second interviews. MPs viewed policy advocacy as 
a process that started at community level and was an indicator of the issues 
they should highlight in all aspects of their roles: 
 
I think that things like [specific policy] are really positive because 
it shows that we’re really positive and have new ideas and I think 
that’s important. But the level at which those ideas will be enacted 
is only going to be as good as our relationship with the community 
that’s already trying new things all the time anyway. 
 
This policy focus is most pronounced amongst MPs from small parties – the 
vast majority of whom are list MPs. Fifty percent of small party MPs reported 
policy advocacy as a key role in the first interview, rising to 67 percent in the 
second. By contrast, only 27 and 33 percent respectively of large party MPs 
claimed to be policy advocates. This confirms small parties’ greater policy 
focus and is not surprising given the extensive portfolio workloads of small 
party MPs. 
 
Interestingly, 29 percent of MPs stated in the first interviews that they 
wanted to be ‘opinion leaders’. While leading public opinion is not 
necessarily connected with policy roles it does imply a desire to participate 
in setting the strategic direction for the nation – a task which is strongly 
related to policy direction. It is therefore significant that by the second 
interviews only seven percent of MPs took this position. 
 
There are two possible reasons for this decline. Firstly, MPs may become 
more aware of the need for them to be engaged in policy to become ‘opinion 
leaders’ and therefore articulate their roles along policy lines rather than in 
more abstract terms. On the other hand, the decline may be due to new MPs 
realising that their junior position does not allow them to be ‘opinion 
leaders’ to the extent they desire (if at all) due to party and parliamentary 
hierarchies. Therefore this ambition may be abandoned until a more 
favourable strategic location is acquired. 
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One avenue for backbench MPs to gain experience in developing policy – and 
legislation – is through members’ bills. The House sets aside an evening 
every second Wednesday to debate bills prepared by individual members, as 
well as local and private bills.20 Any MP (except ministers) may draft a bill 
and enter it into the ballot for one of the coveted spaces that occasionally 
becomes available on the Order Paper.21 In preparing members’ bills, MPs 
create for themselves the opportunity to make legislative achievements 
regardless of whether they are in government or opposition. 
 
The 2008 intake has thus far made good use of the members’ bill system. 
Figure 5.2 shows the occurrence of new MPs’ bills in each of the ballots held 
during the 49th Parliament, up until the ballot of 10 February 2010. 
 
Figure 5.2 – Proportion of New MPs’ Bills in Members’ Bill Ballots22 
 
                                                 
20 New Zealand Parliament, Members’ Bills Ballot, http://www.parliament.nz/en-
NZ/Features/d/4/a/49NZPHomeNews180620091-Members-bill-ballot.htm, accessed 23 
November 2009. 
21 For a comprehensive account of the members’ bill process, see Raukura Spindler, 
‘Members’ Bills in the New Zealand Parliament’, Political Science, Vol. 61, No. 1, June 2009, 
pp. 51-79. 
22 Ballots are held only when there are fewer than four members’ bills on the Order Paper 
awaiting their first reading. No spaces were available in the current parliament before 18 
June 2009. 
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Given that new MPs comprise 28 percent of the parliament as a whole, it is 
clear that these MPs make greater use of the members’ bill system than more 
experienced legislators.23 Indeed, 43 percent of the members’ bills picked 
from the ballot belonged to new MPs. 
 
MPs who had used the members’ bill process spoke of formulating strategies 
to ensure their bills were passed: 
 
I’ve suddenly realised what members’ bills are about… I need to 
build a campaign rather than get it to the House and get it lost, 
because it will be lost straight away if I do that. 
 
Some MPs entered bills into the ballot with the knowledge they were 
unlikely to pass even their first reading. This was a strategy to promote 
debate: 
 
The purpose of the bill will be to have a debate about an issue, 
okay, and you’re guaranteed a first reading if it gets drawn out of 
the ballot, so you get a debate, and then it will be voted down. 
 
It’s part of a campaign for us to frame the governance handling of 
the [policy area] as a corporatisation/privatisation exercise, and 
build up a constituency… who are mobilised to defend our public 
assets. 
 
One MP delighted in the absurdity of the members’ bill process: 
 
The ballot’s in a biscuit tin! I mean, who would have thought that?! 
 
Members’ bills are an important avenue for new MPs to gain experience in 
the development of bills and to understand the dynamics of lobbying 
parliamentary colleagues. The 2008 intake actively pursued members’ bills – 
with either the desire to have them passed or to stir debate – at a higher rate 
                                                 
23 It should be noted that as ministers are not entitled to enter members’ bills the pool of 
members who may do so is reduced to 94. Using this figure, new MPs comprise 36 percent of 
all members entitled to prepare members’ bills. 
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than their overall proportion in parliament would suggest. Therefore, it is 
possible that of all MPs, new MPs make the best use of this valuable system. 
 
Parliamentary Roles and Community Leadership 
 
It is interesting to consider how community leadership is exercised within 
parliament as MPs’ self-identified constituencies usually exist outside of 
parliament. Therefore the nature of engagement is significantly different to 
the forms of community leadership identified in the previous chapter. 
 
Up until this point, the inclusive nature of community leadership has been 
stressed – any community member may be a leader, regardless of whether or 
not they are elected. However, only MPs can provide community leadership 
in parliament, meaning that this is an exclusive form of leadership. Of course, 
this is not to say that community members cannot provide political 
leadership, but the nature of parliament means that only MPs can provide 
leadership within this particular institution. 
 
Given the dislocation between parliamentary activity and the general public, 
the extent to which MPs provide community leadership in the legislature is 
debatable. Certainly, MPs may speak in the House, select committees or 
caucus of the interests and concerns of their constituents, but this is an act of 
advocacy and does not necessarily equate to leadership. Moreover, the 
strength of political parties in New Zealand means that MPs’ primary 
parliamentary allegiances may be to their parties rather than to their 
constituents.  
 
The question of leadership in parliament is difficult to address as parliament 
is where major decisions are made and where political leadership is 
exercised. However, to say that all MPs demonstrate political leadership is 
not correct. The situational constraints placed upon backbenchers means 
that while they are part of the mechanism of power, they hold little real 
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influence. Therefore while backbenchers are close to power, they are largely 
excluded from its exercise. 
 
Despite this, the centrality of parliament in public perceptions of MPs’ roles 
means that legislators do engage in community leadership in parliament. 
While MPs’ power is constrained, the fact that constituents feel that they 
have a voice in parliament through ‘their’ MP means that the community 
leadership interaction occurs. The fact that the public can access legislators 
with relative ease and feel assured that their case, if worthy, will be taken to 
parliament means that MPs are in a unique position to offer a particular form 
of community leadership. This leadership is political, but is not political 
leadership. 
 
Parliament is, however, the premier location for MPs to demonstrate their 
skills as ‘proto-leaders’. Parliamentary activities are the most visible to party 
leaders of all of MPs’ tasks, meaning that MPs who excel in parliament may 
demonstrate their potential to fill more senior positions. Therefore, MPs may 
emphasise their parliamentary skills and dedication to their party as a 
means of self-promotion. 
 
This suggests that MPs exercise two types of leadership – community and 
‘proto-leadership’ – in different circumstances in order to appeal to different 
constituencies. This is a demonstration of legislators responding to the gate-
keepers of the offices to which they aspire. In candidate selection and 
carrying out their representational tasks, MPs emphasise their community 
leadership skills. In their parliamentary tasks, however, MPs highlight their 
individual potential as ‘proto-leaders’ to appeal to party leaders. This is a 
rational strategy for self-preservation and self-promotion, and is well 
documented in the existing literature.24 Thus MPs show some sophistication 
                                                 
24 See, for example, Kenneth Prewitt and William Nowlin, ‘Political Ambitions and the 
Behavior of Incumbent Politicians’, p. 300; James Walter, The Acculturation to Political Work: 
New Members of the Federal Backbench (Canberra: Australasian Political Studies Association, 
1979); and Harold D. Clarke and Richard G. Price, ‘Freshman MPs’ Job Images: The Effects of 
Incumbency, Ambition and Position’, Canadian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 13, No. 3, 
September 1980, p. 592. 
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in tailoring their behaviour to appeal to a range of groups depending on the 
particular circumstances. 
 
Conclusions 
 
For new MPs, arriving at parliament for the first time was a source of some 
excitement and nervousness. The traditions and symbolism of parliament 
may feel comfortable to some and archaic to others. Thus each member’s 
initial experiences in parliament are unique. 
 
Overall, new MPs adapted very quickly to their alien surroundings. Although 
initially overwhelming, MPs quickly learnt parliamentary norms. This is 
exemplified by the seriousness with which maiden speeches were delivered: 
all MPs delivered speeches within the norms of parliament – respectful and 
largely non-controversial. 
 
Perhaps the most significant confirmation of the extent of socialisation to 
parliamentary norms is the speed with which new MPs altered their 
perceptions of the level of behaviour they aspired to. When interviewed 
shortly after their election new MPs believed the childish behaviour typical 
of the House was unnecessary. However, within a few months MPs had not 
only adapted their behaviour to fit within parliamentary norms, but also 
rationalised the change as just ‘fitting into’ the atmosphere of the House. 
Moreover, while MPs initially praised select committees for their civility and 
constructive atmosphere, by the second interviews party tribalism had 
begun. Thus the behaviour typical of parliament – often criticised by the 
public and sometimes by MPs themselves – is deep-rooted and in some ways 
intoxicating for MPs. 
 
New MPs enjoy their parliamentary roles immensely. Enjoyment of the 
House grew with time and MPs became increasingly comfortable to speak on 
a range of subjects – including those about which they knew very little. 
Particularly enthusiastic MPs even took to sitting in the House when they 
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were not scheduled to speak. Additionally, new MPs were largely positive 
about their select committee and party roles.  
 
New MPs feel significant camaraderie with their party and – to an extent – 
parliamentary colleagues. Given the unusual nature of their jobs, MPs view 
parliament as a place where other members understand the demands they 
face. Thus even though parliament itself can be tense and uncomfortable for 
MPs, the opportunity to spend time with their colleagues is a release. It is 
therefore not surprising that new MPs quickly adapt to parliamentary norms 
– for better or worse – as a means of self-preservation. 
 
This thesis now moves to a final chapter, which brings together arguments 
about the individuals who become MPs and the disparate roles they 
undertake to offer a comprehensive account of candidate selection and role 
adaptation amongst New Zealand MPs. 
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Chapter 6  
 
Conclusions 
 
 
The belief that new MPs are relatively unimportant within parliament is best 
summed up in Keith Holyoake’s adage that they ought to ‘breathe through 
their noses’. Indeed, the old-fashioned belief that children should not speak 
unless they are spoken to may be equally applicable to first-term MPs. 
 
This final chapter brings together findings regarding candidate selection and 
new MPs’ roles. The value of the candidate selection process, changing role 
conceptions, the balancing of roles, and differences between members are 
discussed. The chapter concludes by arguing that new MPs’ roles as 
community and ‘proto-leaders’ are unique and extremely important within 
the New Zealand democracy. 
 
Candidate Selection 
 
Candidate selection processes are characterised by a myriad of supply and 
demand factors. Selectors seek a range of individuals with the skills required 
to fill all aspects of legislators’ roles. Thus individuals with a variety of 
backgrounds or characteristics, including temperament, occupation, gender, 
ethnicity, and party experience, are sought. On the supply side, individuals 
who have qualities typical of MPs – including high levels of ambition – are 
most likely to stand. 
 
Overall, there are two goals of candidate selection over and above the need 
to determine who stands for each party. Firstly, parties use the candidate 
selection process as a means of socialising and grooming potential 
legislators. In jurisdictions with strong and hierarchical political parties, like 
New Zealand, it is imperative for parties to ensure that their MPs adhere to 
the norms of the party hierarchy. Therefore, parties test potential 
candidates’ loyalties through the candidate selection process. 
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Socialisation and grooming requires a demonstrated commitment to the 
party. This is usually achieved through long-term party membership and 
office-holding in the larger parties, or significant contributions to 
complementary causes in smaller parties (for example, participation in 
environmental or social justice organisations for the Green Party). 
Participation in the party or associated groups makes potential MPs familiar 
with the norms of their party, including the need to work their way up the 
ranks – an essential skill for backbench MPs. 
 
The second aim of the candidate selection process is for parties to test 
potential MPs. Chapter three outlined the difficulties many MPs faced in 
campaigning to become candidates. This is beneficial from the parties’ 
perspective as campaigning for a nomination provides an ideal test for how 
nominees handle campaigning generally. The skills required of nominees 
who are able to convince party delegates to select them are not substantially 
different to those required of candidates soliciting citizens’ votes. Therefore, 
the skills acquired during candidate selection are transferable to the election 
campaign-proper. 
 
The two aims of candidate selection meet where parties use the candidate 
selection process to identify individuals who operate within group norms 
and therefore do not pose political risks. If candidates who are ill-suited to 
the expectations of hierarchical parliamentary parties are selected, parties 
are at risk of becoming fragmented and disunited. Thus the criteria for 
selection – formal and informal – reinforce the need for candidates to act 
within party norms. Individuals who have been socialised into the party and 
have been tested through the selection process are arguably less risky as 
candidates than ‘outsiders’. 
 
The rigorous testing in candidate selection is often stressful for nominees. 
Paradoxically, however, selection is designed for potential candidates to test 
themselves. Even though only a small fraction of citizens ever put themselves 
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forward for election to parliament, assuredly many from this small pool are 
unsuited to the job. Thus candidate selection allows nominees to test 
themselves, with unsuitable nominees falling along the wayside. This is 
beneficial for better-suited nominees as they must devise strategies to win 
against all competitors, regardless of their perceived chances of success. 
Thus unsuccessful nominees help strengthen the campaigning skills of 
successful candidates. 
 
It is interesting to note that perceptions of list MPs lacking legitimacy are 
evident at even the candidate selection stage. There was an attitude amongst 
large party MPs that gaining a nomination for a winnable electorate seat was 
a sign that they were valued by their parties. List MPs who stood in an 
electorate and lost thus entered parliament with less mana than their 
electorate seat counterparts. This attitude was less apparent in list MPs who 
had stood only on the list; the list was bound to be their means of entry to 
parliament. 
 
The existence of negative attitudes towards list MPs so early on the road to 
parliament gives insights into how these types of MPs are viewed by the 
general public and their peers. It is reasonable to assume that political 
candidates have a greater knowledge of MPs’ roles than the general public, 
even if that knowledge is not comprehensive. Thus candidates should have 
some understanding of list MP roles. If even candidates view winning an 
electorate seat as a more legitimate means of entry to parliament, it is likely 
that scepticism about list MPs is widespread. The party list is treated with 
distrust by candidates and the public alike. 
 
Variations in Roles amongst ‘Types’ of MPs 
 
Throughout this thesis it has been apparent that there are particular ‘types’ 
of MPs. The most notable distinction is between electorate and list MPs, 
although there are also significant variations between large and small 
parties, government and opposition, and, in some cases, men and women. 
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This section addresses the way new MPs perceive these variations and 
examines whether preferred ‘types’ of MPs exist amongst legislators. 
 
Electorate versus List MPs 
 
The distinctions between electorate and list MPs are most apparent in 
considering the representative functions of legislators. Chapter four 
described how list MPs often mimic the role of electorate MPs, implying that 
representative functions of electorate MPs were more legitimate than those 
of list MPs. This is especially significant in considering representation of 
minority groups, who are often cited as constituents of list MPs. If list MPs 
are not considered legitimate representatives then minority groups may 
remain under-represented. 
 
In order to understand how the roles of electorate and list MPs were 
perceived, MPs were asked whether there were any differences between the 
two ‘types’ of MPs and, if so, what those differences were. Overall, 81 percent 
of MPs believed that differences existed in the roles of electorate and list 
MPs. Perceptions of difference were greatest between electorate and list MPs 
themselves, with all electorate MPs saying that roles differed versus only 71 
percent of list MPs. 
 
Interestingly, only 69 percent of list MPs claimed to replicate electorate MPs’ 
roles, most commonly by servicing a geographic constituency. Given the 
emphasis most MPs – electorate and list alike – placed on geographic 
representation this figure is lower than expected. However, this may be due 
to differences between large and small parties: 91 percent of large party list 
MPs claimed to act as though they were electorate MPs versus only 20 
percent of small party MPs. 
 
In understanding how list MPs’ roles are constructed it is important to 
consider whether there is an imperative – formal or informal – for list MPs to 
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act like electorate MPs. Electorate MPs were unanimous in their belief that 
list MPs may mimic the electorate role, but that doing so was not mandatory: 
 
I guess there are some small aspects that have to be done by the 
electorate MP, or the electorate MP will be [approached] first. But 
in terms of helping whoever comes through the door, there are 
some list MPs who run it in a very similar way. There are other list 
MPs who are deliberately not set up that way – it might be that 
their constituency is ethnically-based or sector-based or religion-
based, it could be a number of different things, and they work on a 
different basis. 
 
List MPs can play a different role depending on who they are. See, 
some list MPs are playing a role within a particular demographic 
community rather than a geographic community… Then other list 
MPs have a geographic electorate. 
 
List MPs were more divided over the imperatives of their role. Forty percent 
believed that it was important for list MPs to act like electorate MPs: 
 
[My party has] said to me, ‘you’ve gotta be based in [electorate], 
we want you to work the [region]’… They haven’t said it overtly, 
but what they’re basically saying is we want a good presence in 
the provinces and you’re our man here. 
 
On the other hand, 40 percent of list MPs believed that there was no 
compulsion for them to mimic electorate MPs: 
 
We don’t have the responsibility of dealing with individual issues, 
although they do come to us because the public doesn’t necessarily 
differentiate. But we have to be pretty clear about what we are 
and what we’re not. 
 
Finally, 20 percent of list MPs believed that they may act as electorate MPs, if 
they so choose: 
 
I will go to some events in parts of the city. But when I am in a 
particular constituency MP’s electorate then I will be with them. 
 
 161 
Thus electorate MPs are unanimous in their understanding of the general 
role orientations of list MPs, while list MPs themselves are split. This 
suggests that electorate MPs may have vague understandings of list MP roles 
and that list MPs may undertake a diverse range of roles depending on 
individual and/or party preferences. 
 
This second point is interesting because findings up until this point have 
suggested that list MPs emphasise the importance of acting as a 
representative for a geographic electorate or region. Chapter four found that 
list MPs were more likely to define their constituency as an electorate or 
region in the second interviews than they were in the first. Thus there 
appears to be a contradiction amongst some list MPs. While some claim that 
there is no imperative to provide geographic representation, the high level of 
electorate and regional representation amongst list MPs suggests that many 
do so anyway. Thus it is possible that list MPs are no clearer about the 
requirements of their role than electorate MPs, parties, and even members of 
the public are. 
 
Given that list MPs may be perceived as less legitimate than their electorate 
counterparts, it is salient to consider MPs’ preferences in terms of which 
‘type’ of MP they would prefer to be. One may reasonably hypothesise that 
MPs wish to be perceived as legitimate and thus aspire to become electorate 
MPs. MPs were asked in each of the interview rounds whether they would 
rather be a list or electorate MP. The results are shown in Table 6.1. 
 
Table 6.1 – Electorate versus List Preferences 
 Wishes to be 
 Round 1 (%) Round 2 (%) 
 Electorate List Undecided Electorate List Undecided 
All MPs 81 7 11 77 19 4 
Electorate 100 0 0 100 0 0 
List 69 13 19 60 33 7 
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It is unsurprising that electorate MPs were unchanged in their desire to 
remain electorate MPs. It is interesting, however, that amongst list MPs the 
list role became more desirable between the interview rounds. This suggests 
that list MPs adopt clearer conceptions of what their role entails in their first 
year in office. This does not necessarily mean that list MPs cease performing 
electorate-type roles; rather, list MPs may seek a balance between 
‘traditional’ electorate-related roles and broader roles: 
 
There are probably two levels at which you can make a difference 
in this job. One’s very much at a governance and policy level… You 
can do that as a list MP – what you do on a far less regular basis in 
interact and assist directly individual constituents. So I place a lot 
of value on that role as well and I’d like the opportunity to do both 
more frequently. 
 
Despite feeling greater comfort about their MP ‘type’, many list MPs believed 
that electorate MPs were widely considered to be more legitimate, 
commanded greater mana, and wielded more influence than list MPs. 
Moreover, the perceived disparity in resources available to the two ‘types’ of 
MPs for electorate-related work became more important over time: 
 
I think that we get nowhere near the respect that we deserve, 
because the thing is that you’re doing all the electorate work 
without any of the respect and resources. 
 
I only have one office; I have someone for 35 hours… [The 
electorate MP] has four offices… and I think that there’s an 
inequity there. He’s got four times what I’ve got – I don’t think 
people get four times the benefit. 
 
Perhaps the most important factor in the continued assumption of list 
members being lesser MPs is their own desire to become electorate MPs. 
Many large party candidates have the primary goal of winning an electorate 
and therefore see the list only as a back-up if they are unsuccessful.1 Thus 
                                                 
1 See, for instance, Hekia Parata, ‘“Out of my Comfort Zone”: Campaigning in Wellington 
Central’, in Jonathan Boston, Stephen Church, Stephen Levine, Elizabeth McLeay, and Nigel S. 
Roberts (eds.), New Zealand Votes: The General Election of 2002 (Wellington: Victoria 
University Press, 2003), p. 155. 
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many list MPs enter parliament having lost in an electorate contest. 
Candidates’ ability to stand in electorates and on the party list contributes to 
their perceived lack of legitimacy as it is difficult for voters to hold MPs 
accountable if they are able to enter parliament despite losing in an 
electorate. Moreover, the failure of parties to articulate clear role 
expectations for list members has added to perceptions of illegitimacy.2 Thus 
even within parliament there is a perception that list MPs are ‘second-class’ 
MPs. 
 
While list MPs may develop a greater appreciation for their role over time, 
this does not necessarily mean that they wish to remain list MPs in future 
parliaments. It does suggest, however, that list MPs grasp the opportunities 
available to them to achieve their goals, even if their goals are simply to 
replicate the roles of electorate MPs. 
 
Large versus Small Party MPs 
 
A second key determinant of the roles MPs adopt is the size of their parties. 
MPs from large parties are likely to develop roles related to constituency 
service. This is due to the large parties’ dominance in electorate seats and the 
relative lack of influence each large party MP holds within their caucus. Small 
party MPs, on the other hand, tend to have a primary focus on parliamentary 
and policy tasks – a reflection of the more limited resources available to 
small parties on account of their size and the need to promote their party to 
ensure their own political survival. 
 
In the second round of interviews, MPs were asked whether there were 
differences between MPs’ roles based on party size and, if so, which roles 
they would prefer – those of small or large parties. Overall, 93 percent of 
MPs believed that differences existed in the roles of small and large party 
                                                 
2 Jeffrey A Karp., ‘Members of Parliament and Representation’, in Jack Vowles, Peter Aimer, 
Jeffrey Karp, Susan Banducci, Raymond Miller, and Ann Sullivan (eds.), Proportional 
Representation on Trial: The 1999 New Zealand General Election and the Fate of MMP 
(Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2002), p. 139. 
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MPs. Some of the differences identified were relatively straightforward: large 
party MPs have a greater constituency workload, while small party MPs must 
place greater emphasis on parliamentary tasks, such as select committee and 
speaking in the House. Moreover, 90 percent of MPs agreed that small party 
members have greater workloads than their large party counterparts. 
 
However, some interesting variations in role perceptions also appeared. For 
instance, large party MPs believed that small party MPs were able to be 
specialists in their roles, while small party MPs believed the same to be true 
of large party MPs. This finding may be due to differences in emphasis 
between small and large party MPs. Large party MPs stressed that they had 
to cover each and every issue that arose, whereas small party MPs could be 
selective with their issues: 
 
There is perhaps more room for [small party MPs] to pick and 
choose issues, whereas I think there is a higher expectation that we 
cover everything that a government covers. 
 
[Small party MPs] have one or two things that they really heavily 
focus on and then other stuff ticks over. 
 
Small party MPs, on the other hand, believed that the greater number of 
members in large parties meant that those MPs were able to become experts 
in particular areas, while small party MPs were required to cover a broad 
range of issues, thereby preventing them from becoming specialists: 
 
I’m on four select committees and because I have such a large 
portfolio of things I’m supposed to do – and very different, some of 
them, to what I’m used to – I’m having to learn a lot, so what I’m 
finding is that I’m learning a little bit about a lot and not much in-
depth knowledge, which can be a real disadvantage, especially on 
select committees. 
 
In a small party one is inevitably a spokesman in a number of 
areas. I think I’ve probably got a dozen spokesman areas. A Nat 
backbencher would have none. 
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One of the key differences between large and small party MPs are their 
portfolio responsibilities. Generally, small party MPs are responsible for a 
range of portfolio areas. On the other hand, large party backbenchers tend to 
have few, if any, portfolio allocations – MPs from large opposition parties 
generally have one or two minor portfolios, while government backbenchers 
have none.  
 
One would expect that, given their significant portfolio responsibilities, small 
party MPs would be perceived as having more influence than large party 
members. It is interesting, then, that 67 percent of MPs claimed that large 
party MPs were more influential than small party members. Seventy-one 
percent of large party MPs took this position, along with 50 percent of small 
party MPs. 
 
In analysing this finding the centrality of parties in New Zealand becomes 
apparent. Despite being asked about the differences between large and small 
party MPs, most responses highlighted the differences between large and 
small parties. Thus many MPs commented on the relative influence of parties 
based on their size: 
 
Overall their [small] party portfolios are less likely to be 
significant in the sense that who really cares what they think at 
this point in the electoral cycle, because the two big parties are the 
ones that will largely determine the policy direction. 
 
I don’t know much about what the smaller parties do – I’ve not 
paid much attention to them. The people of [my electorate] didn’t 
think they were important or significant last year, so why would I 
waste my time thinking about them? 
 
MPs were also asked whether they would rather be a member of a large or 
small party. Unsurprisingly, all but one MP claimed to prefer to be in a party 
of the same size to which they actually belonged. The sole outlier – a large 
party MP – stated that they had no preference one way or the other. 
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This suggests that MPs enter parliament with some prior knowledge about 
their role based on the size of their party, or that they are quickly socialised 
into party-specific roles. It is likely that both of these prepositions are true – 
while MPs’ knowledge of specific legislator roles may be limited, their 
experience within political parties mean that they understand the general 
framework under which each party’s MPs operate. Once they enter 
parliament, strong socialisation forces ensure that their own party’s role 
expectations quickly become normalised. 
 
Representative Roles 
 
New MPs place great emphasis on their representative tasks. Acting as a 
‘representative’ is the best-known and most legitimate role MPs hold, even if 
the concept of representation is vague. It is therefore unsurprising that new 
MPs, who often have minimal ideas of exactly what being a legislator entails, 
turn to representational roles as their primary role. ‘Representation’ may 
become less significant over time as MPs develop more varied and 
sophisticated understandings of their roles, or are promoted. 
 
In considering representational tasks, MPs primarily responded to 
geographic constituencies, usually electorates or particular regions. This 
demonstrates the primacy of the local member in New Zealand politics. 
Despite the fact that few citizens have significant contact with their local MP, 
there is an expectation that MPs are accountable and accessible to a 
geographically-defined population. 
 
This attitude may be a hangover from the first-past-the-post (FPP) electoral 
system, where each member represented an electorate. While there is no 
fundamental problem with members being accountable to geographic 
communities, this attitude shows reluctance amongst the public, political 
parties, and MPs to adapt to the MMP system. Arguably, non-geographically 
defined communities remain substantively under-represented due to 
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perceptions that list MPs, who are presumed to represent minorities, are less 
legitimate than electorate MPs. 
 
As an alternative explanation, the imperative of representing geographic 
constituencies even under MMP may suggest that geographic representation 
is a strong component of New Zealand’s political culture and that MMP itself 
has adapted to fit this culture. For any electoral system to be considered 
legitimate, it must fit within normative assumptions about the accountability 
of legislators. Within the New Zealand political culture there is a tradition of 
electorate-based MPs being accountable, and MMP has adapted accordingly. 
Thus the primacy of geographic representation may be evidence of the MMP 
system maturing. 
 
The fact that many list MPs placed great emphasis on representing 
geographic communities confirms the narrow scope with which 
constituencies are measured. New Zealand has held five elections using the 
MMP system. Given the significant variances between MMP and FPP, it was 
always likely that some trepidation about the roles of list MPs would occur. 
However, the continuing confusion over list MPs’ roles amongst the public 
and MPs themselves suggests that this may become a permanent feature of 
MMP.  
 
Arguably, small parties have been more successful than large parties in 
legitimising list MPs’ roles. This has largely been out of necessity – the 
majority of small party MPs are list members. However, there also appears to 
be a fundamental difference in perceptions of list MPs between small and 
large parties. Whereas in large parties the list may be a stepping stone to 
becoming an electorate MP, small parties appear to attach no stigma to being 
a list MP. 
 
This is likely due to the niche communities that small parties tend to serve. 
As defenders of minority interests, small party MPs are more likely to believe 
that constituencies can be constructed out of any community – not just 
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geographic communities. Thus what matters most for small parties is 
ensuring that their MPs effectively represent their minority constituencies. 
On the other hand, large parties must appeal to broader and more 
heterogeneous groupings of citizens. Therefore, having widespread appeal in 
geographic communities – which also tend to be reasonably heterogeneous – 
is an indication of their broad-based support. 
 
Representation of ethnic minorities is one possible exception to the 
observation that non-geographic constituencies are considered less 
legitimate than geographic constituencies. MPs from ethnic minorities 
generally identified their own and other ethnic minorities as constituencies. 
More important, however, was that non-ethnic MPs considered 
representation of ethnic groups to be a legitimate role for MPs, with half of 
electorate MPs identifying ethnic representation as key list MP duty. 
 
This is positive as it gives ethnic minorities an opportunity to achieve 
substantive representation in parliament. While evidence of the presence of 
minorities in parliament leading to greater minority participation is mixed, 
accepting MPs who aim to represent minorities reflects the growing 
pluralism of New Zealand’s society.3 However, it is important for the 
legitimacy of minority representation that all parties and MPs seek to 
broaden their representative focus. Parties generally include members of 
particular minority communities on their party lists. This is of limited use, 
however, as the presence of a minority community member does not 
guarantee representation of that community. It is the responsibility of all 
MPs to better understand minority concerns and parties must ensure they 
recruit candidates who substantively represent minorities. 
                                                 
3 For discussion on the relationship between descriptive and substantive representation for 
minorities in parliament, see: Elizabeth McLeay and Jack Vowles, ‘Redefining Constituency 
Representation: The Roles of New Zealand MPs Under MMP’, Regional and Federal Studies, 
Vol. 17, No. 1, March 2007, pp. 87-88; Susan Banducci, Todd Donovan, and Jeffrey A. Karp, 
‘Minority Representation, Empowerment, and Participation’, The Journal of Politics, Vol. 66, 
No. 2, May 2004, p. 539; and Jeffrey A. Karp, ‘Members of Parliament and Representation’, in 
Jack Vowles, Peter Aimer, Jeffrey Karp, Susan Banducci, Raymond Miller, and Ann Sullivan 
(eds.), Proportional Representation on Trial: The 1999 New Zealand General Election and the 
Fate of MMP (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2002), p. 132. 
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Parliamentary Roles 
 
The parliamentary environment is unique. Chapter five outlined some of the 
responses MPs had to parliament upon their arrival and confirmed that the 
unusual working environment in which they find themselves is quickly 
normalised. Overall, new MPs treated parliament with reverence and 
respect. 
 
The speed at which new MPs adapted to parliamentary norms was 
impressive. The attitudes MPs held about their new parliamentary 
responsibilities were demonstrated in their maiden speeches. The maiden 
speeches of the 2008 intake exemplified the sense of achievement and pride 
new members feel upon entering the legislature. More importantly, however, 
the tone of the maiden speeches shows that MPs enter parliament with a 
sense of reverence for the institution and an understanding of the gravity of 
their new roles. MPs articulated clear personal and professional goals as a 
means of constructing a framework by which they wish their parliamentary 
career to be measured. 
 
MPs’ attitudes toward the House changed notably between the two interview 
rounds. When first interviewed, most new MPs had spoken in the House only 
a handful of times. Indeed, in the first round of interviews many MPs 
individually listed the bills on which they had spoken. At this point in their 
parliamentary socialisation, many MPs were nervous about speaking in the 
House but enjoyed the atmosphere nonetheless. Some MPs were especially 
enthusiastic about engaging in the serious business of the House. 
 
By the second interviews, new MPs were far more confident in their House 
abilities. Most new MPs were speaking in the House at least once a week. 
Moreover, they were developing their own speaking style and learning about 
standing orders and House norms. A number of new MPs had visited the 
Palace of Westminster, the United Kingdom’s parliament, as a parliamentary 
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delegation between the first and second rounds of interviews. These MPs 
noted how fortunate they were to speak so frequently in the House in 
comparison to British legislators: 
 
I was part of a delegation that went to the UK to do a study tour of 
the Westminster system with the MPs over there. And meeting with 
them, the size of their parliament is 400-odd people, and they were 
saying that they get to speak about four or five times a year if 
they’re lucky. And I looked at them and I said, ‘I spoke four times 
last Wednesday’. 
 
At Westminster the backbenchers over there speak three or four 
times a year – I’m speaking three times in one day. And I think you 
need to speak often to get comfortable with it. If you’re only 
speaking occasionally it would become such a tense thing. 
 
This is interesting as it suggests that the roles of New Zealand backbenchers 
are significantly different to British backbenchers. The small size of the New 
Zealand parliament means that even new MPs speak frequently in the House. 
In larger parliaments this opportunity is denied. Thus while backbenchers in 
parliamentary systems may lack power, some lack more power than others. 
 
Perhaps as a result of their extensive participation in the House, new MPs 
quickly learn the norms of parliamentary behaviour. Many new MPs entered 
parliament intending to avoid childish behaviour in the House, but quickly 
adopted the behaviour they wished to avoid. New MPs became more 
partisan even in select committees, which are less adversarial than the 
House. When New Zealand elected its first MMP parliament, some hoped that 
the especially large intake of new MPs and the new mode of politics would 
result in more civilised parliamentary behaviour. This did not eventuate.4 
Coupled with this study’s findings, this suggests that the norms of parliament 
are strong and particular types of behaviour are institutionalised. 
 
                                                 
4 Fiona Barker and Stephen Levine, ‘The Individual Parliamentary Member and Institutional 
Change: The Changing Role of the New Zealand Member of Parliament’, in Lawrence D. 
Longley and Reuven Y. Hazan (eds.), The Uneasy Relationships Between Parliamentary 
Members and Leaders (London: Frank Cass & Co., 2000), p. 116. 
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It is interesting that new MPs’ behaviour should change quickly, as it 
indicates not only that conflict is inherent in legislatures but also that MPs 
may adapt to behavioural norms as a form of anticipatory socialisation. 
Kenneth Prewitt and William Nowlin argue that anticipatory socialisation 
‘suggests that men select as a reference group a group in which they do not 
currently hold membership, but to which they aspire.’5 Thus individuals 
model their behaviour on the behaviour of those who hold the positions they 
aspire to. 
 
Within the parliamentary environment, therefore, new MPs model their own 
behaviour on the behaviour of frontbench members. Within the House the 
closeness of the opposing frontbenches, and the importance of the members 
who occupy them, mean that they are often the source of the most intense 
conflict. Thus aspiring backbenchers mimic the adversarial behaviour of 
their party seniors – intentionally or unintentionally – as a means of 
preparing themselves for more senior roles. Those who wish to change 
parliamentary behaviour, therefore, may be best served to adapt the 
behaviour of frontbenchers rather than rely on the good intentions of new 
members. 
 
Changes in Role Conceptions 
 
It is inevitable that MPs’ role perceptions change over time. While new MPs 
may have better role conceptions than the general public by virtue of their 
political interest and party activity, few could accurately predict what being 
a legislator truly entails. This section addresses changes in role conceptions 
in the first few months of office. 
 
                                                 
5 Kenneth Prewitt and William Nowlin, ‘Political Ambitions and the Behavior of Incumbent 
Politicians’, The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 2, June 1969, p. 299. 
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Ministerial Ambitions 
 
Perhaps the clearest way to measure how MPs view their roles as legislators 
is to track their political ambitions. Chapter three introduced the drive for 
ministerial office as a measurement of political ambition. This section further 
explores this question to understand how ambition for high office changes 
over time. 
 
In the first round of interviews, 75 percent of MPs stated that they aspired to 
a ministerial role, dropping only fractionally to 74 percent in the second 
interviews. This is a significant majority and suggests that MPs enter 
parliament highly ambitious and their ambition does not waiver in their first 
year in office. In the first interviews, 14 percent of MPs were undecided 
about whether they wanted to be a minister and 11 percent refused to 
speculate. Significantly, no MPs said that they did not want to be a minister. 
By the second round of interviews, only 4 percent of MPs were undecided, 
while 11 percent refused to speculate and a further 11 percent did not want 
to be a minister. 
 
Between the two interview rounds variations appeared between particular 
types of MPs that suggest that role conceptions change over time. In the first 
interviews, 93 percent of government MPs stated they aspired to become a 
minister versus only 57 percent of opposition MPs. By the second interviews, 
however, government members were less ambitious – or more realistic – 
with 77 percent wanting to become ministers. By contrast, 71 percent of 
opposition MPs wanted to become ministers. Thus by the second interviews 
the ambitions of government and opposition members had more-or-less 
aligned. 
 
This finding is significant as it highlights the difference in work undertaken 
by government and opposition MPs. New government MPs quickly find that 
their influence is extremely limited on account of ministers monopolising 
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decision-making at the expense of the broader caucus. Thus government MPs 
are severely limited in their ability to pursue policy issues. 
 
By contrast, opposition MPs are able to criticise the government – arguably a 
simpler task. Most opposition MPs hold portfolio responsibilities (although 
the significance of the portfolios varies), meaning that they can lead attacks 
on the government. It is likely that this role gives opposition MPs confidence 
which transfers into greater political ambition – opposition MPs, unlike 
government members, feel effectual. Thus it is unsurprising that ambition 
increases in opposition MPs while it decreases in government members. 
 
Variations in ambition also become apparent between large and small party 
MPs. In the first interviews 77 percent of large party MPs wanted to become 
ministers, versus 67 percent of small party members. By the second 
interviews 81 percent of large party MPs wanted to become ministers 
against only 50 percent of small party MPs. 
 
This finding suggests that small party MPs quickly become aware of the 
difficulties they face in becoming ministers. Even when small parties enter 
governing arrangements with large parties, ministerial roles are usually 
granted only to party leaders – a reflection of the relative influence of each 
party. Moreover, recent governments have seen ministers from small parties 
excluded from cabinet. This is a political decision to avoid cabinet collective 
responsibility and to facilitate political management, but this may have the 
effect of reducing the overall effectiveness of small party ministers. 
 
It is interesting to note that of the small party MPs who did not aspire to be a 
minister, there was an attitude that achieving high office was not the reason 
they went into politics: 
 
That’s not what I went in for. It’s to make a contribution to 
meeting the global challenges that are going to confront this 
nation as well as every other nation, and turning the human 
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mindset around sometime so that we can pass on to our children 
half an opportunity to lead a decent life. 
 
If I was a minister, what would I be minister of? ... I don’t know if 
I’m going to be around long enough to be a minister because I 
don’t intend to be here at 85… I don’t think I’d be around to be a 
minister. And I don’t care. 
 
Thus small party MPs may channel their ambition differently to large party 
MPs in order to achieve more global goals. Rather than ambition being tied to 
particular offices, small party MPs are more likely to define their roles in 
relation to achieving party objectives. This confirms the finding in chapter 
four that small party MPs place greater emphasis on party representation 
than large party MPs. For small party MPs the party is paramount. 
 
Intended Number of Terms 
 
Power, once acquired, is difficult to relinquish. Experienced MPs know how 
parliament operates better than any others, but the legislature sometimes 
becomes their raison d’être – life outside of politics is unfathomable. It is 
therefore interesting to consider how long new MPs intend to remain in the 
legislature. 
 
In each of the interview rounds, MPs were asked how many terms they 
intended to serve, all going well. The results are shown in Figure 6.1. 
 
The shift towards a longer parliamentary career is evident, suggesting that 
the allure of becoming a professional politician increases once MPs enter 
parliament. While a significant number of new MPs remain undecided about 
how many terms they wish to serve, over time three or more terms become 
desirable for many MPs.  
 
Electorate MPs expected to serve more terms than list MPs. Indeed, in the 
second interviews 36 percent of electorate MPs expected to serve five terms 
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or more, versus only 13 percent of list MPs. Electorate MPs may have greater 
job security than list MPs and can therefore plan for a longer political career: 
 
For me this is my career. I’ve done everything I can to get to this 
point so this is a 20 year career for me, as long as people want me. 
And so that’s what I’m focused on and that’s why building my 
support base in the electorate is my priority. 
 
Hard to say definitely. But I’d like to think that I’m here for a good 
five or six terms. Yeah, I would like to be here 15 years or so. 
Maybe more. 
 
Figure 6.1 – Intended Number of Terms 
 
 
List MPs also intended to have reasonably long careers, with 31 percent 
intending to serve three terms. However, list MPs highlighted the uncertainty 
of their tenure as they were more dependent on the will of their parties than 
their electorate colleagues: 
 
You can get defeated because the [party] can rank you a lot lower 
down the list. 
 
Maybe the party doesn’t want me. We’re entering a difficult phase 
and they may decide that I don’t have the skills they require. 
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The trend towards longer parliamentary careers was evident in both large 
and small party MPs, although large party MPs expected to serve more terms 
overall. This is likely due to the greater expectation amongst large party MPs 
that they may eventually become ministers. Parliamentary systems generally 
require long apprenticeships before MPs become ministers, meaning that a 
significant political career is necessary for ambitious members. Not only are 
small party MPs less likely to become ministers, but amongst this study’s 
sample they were also older than the average age across the 2008 intake. 
Indeed, new small party MPs had an average age of 54, versus 40 for Labour 
and 39 for National MPs. The considerations that older MPs must make were 
noted by two small party MPs: 
 
How old are you? What’s your health? What’s your level of energy 
and commitment to the cause? Are you and your wife adapting to 
that life decently? Where are your children and grandchildren? 
 
I have a passion for a little person, [my grandchild]. Life’s so full 
and rich. You don’t need to be living in this mad place to have a 
great life. 
 
Thus small party MPs may view parliament as their final career goal before 
retiring. 
 
Post-Political Possibilities 
 
Being a legislator is an all-encompassing job. The hours are long and the 
expectations high. Indeed, the totalising nature of the role may prevent MPs 
from properly considering life after parliament. A study of British legislators 
who had left parliament, willingly or unwillingly, found a lack of 
preparedness for post-political life which led to a ‘grieving’ process and a 
sense of shock.6 Thus new MPs were asked in the second round of interviews 
what they intended to do once they left parliament. The results are shown in 
Table 6.2. 
                                                 
6 Kevin Teakston, Ed Gouge, and Victoria Honeyman, Life After Losing or Leaving: The 
Experience of Former Members of Parliament, Report for the Association of Former Members 
of Parliament, University of Leeds, October 2007, pp. 6-7. 
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Table 6.2 – Post-Political Possibilities7 
 
 
The fact that many new MPs were undecided about what they wished to do 
after leaving parliament is unsurprising. These MPs were less than a year 
into their political career; post-political considerations were not particularly 
salient. Some of the MPs who were undecided simply had not considered 
their options after parliament: 
 
Oh, I haven’t thought about that… because I don’t know when that 
is. I’m focusing on what I’m doing now. 
 
It could be next month, it could be next year, it could be 30 years 
from now. I’ve not put any thought into that. But there’s life after 
politics. 
 
Other undecided MPs chose not to think about their post-parliamentary life: 
 
I don’t really want to think about it, actually. I’d cross that bridge 
when I get to it. I’ve never had a plan this far. I’ve just taken 
                                                 
7 Some MPs identified more than one post-political possibility, meaning that responses total 
more than 100 percent. 
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opportunities as they have come and I’m sure there’ll be 
opportunities out there.  
 
No idea. None whatsoever… That probably reflects me. I’ve done 
some really cool things in my career but I haven’t had a great deal 
of planning around my career. Opportunities have presented 
themselves and I’ve taken them, and I’m confident that 
opportunities at the end of that time will present themselves, 
whatever they are. 
 
Of MPs who were undecided about their goals after parliament, the group 
who choose not to consider their options may be more likely to face 
problems on their exit. This group took a relaxed attitude and assumed that 
opportunities would present themselves. Indeed, for some former MPs their 
high status and particular skills mean that impressive opportunities arise. 
For others, however, the assumption that they will be in demand outside of 
parliament proves to be wrong.8 Although a firm post-political plan is not 
essential, a willingness to consider the future and to position oneself to 
create opportunities is important for MPs. 
 
It is interesting that many new MPs consider beginning a new career after 
they leave parliament. This indicates the extent to which being an MP is 
considered a fundamental life change. The skills learned by MPs are unique 
within the labour market and thus legislators may emerge from parliament 
to opportunities that would be impossible without legislative experience. 
Some MPs mentioned entering diplomacy or international development, 
which are ordinarily difficult fields to enter: 
 
If I had a reasonably successful career over 9 or 10 years and my 
party was in a position to do it, I’d certainly be keen to take on 
perhaps even a diplomatic post. 
 
                                                 
8 A recent example of this is the former Labour MP Georgina Beyer. Beyer left parliament 
mid-term in 2007 and struggled to find employment. Beyer was vocal in her disappointment 
that her party had not assisted her to transition to life outside of parliament. Eventually 
Beyer publicly pondered moving abroad to increase her employability. See Colin Espiner, 
‘Jobless Beyer Eyes Aussie’, The Dominion Post, 15 August 2008, p. 2. 
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If I feel like I’ve contributed a lot to New Zealand, [then I would 
consider] doing something in the international development area. 
 
Amongst the other possibilities cited, there was a focus on MPs doing 
something for themselves or their families. This is perhaps indicative of the 
intense workload MPs carry and the strains this puts on their personal life. 
Some MPs raised this subject, albeit humorously: 
 
 Drink. Sink into a deckchair. No, that’s the wrong answer. Sorry. 
 
 Sleep! Sleep permanently. Just sleep 18 hours a day. 
 
While light-hearted, these responses highlight the intensity of being an MP. It 
is understandable that the pace of the job means that MPs are limited in their 
ability to plan ahead. However, doing so is important to ensuring a smooth 
transition out of parliament. 
 
Leadership  
 
The leadership offered by new MPs has been a theme of this thesis. It is 
apparent that the majority of new MPs are not in a position to provide 
political leadership. This is not necessarily a reflection of the skills of new 
MPs; rather their situational constraints in a hierarchical parliamentary 
system are so great that the exercise of political leadership is largely beyond 
their reach. 
 
There is no doubt, however, that new MPs form part of the pool of ‘proto-
leaders’ – individuals who may become political leaders in the future. It is 
notable that new MPs were content to wait for their opportunity to become 
political leaders. While some experienced minor frustrations at their 
impotence caused by a lack of real power, overall, MPs were satisfied to 
follow traditional routes through party and parliamentary hierarchies before 
assuming leadership positions. This indicates that MPs have a good 
understanding about the limited capacities of backbenchers, or that this is 
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learnt quickly upon induction. It is likely, in fact, that both prepositions are 
true. 
 
Interestingly, some MPs do gain significant formal power more-or-less 
immediately upon their election. In chapter two, the unusual cases of Steven 
Joyce and Margaret Wilson were raised as an example of this – Joyce was 
first elected in 2008 and was immediately appointed to cabinet; Wilson 
entered cabinet immediately upon her election in 1999. This raises an issue 
that is related to this thesis, but which is outside of its immediate scope: the 
concept of ‘parachute’ MPs. 
 
Sometimes, parties identify ‘outside’ candidates who they believe could fill 
important roles within their party. These individuals often have high-profiles 
and are recruited with the promise of speedy promotions. On the National 
Party side, in addition to Joyce former party leader Don Brash fits into this 
category. Arguably, the current Prime Minister, John Key, also followed this 
path. On the Labour side there is the case of Wilson and the speculation 
surrounding the leadership intentions of Andrew Little, the current party 
president, suggest that this phenomenon is not restricted only to the 
National Party. 
 
Whether or not parachute MPs are becoming more common is unclear. It 
could be that the ability of parties to recruit talented individuals and rank 
them highly on party lists means that MMP offers greater possibilities for 
this type of MP to enter parliament.9 Regardless, this method of entry into 
parliament should be noted as an alternative to the orthodox hierarchical 
and long-term grooming and socialisation processes identified in this thesis. 
 
New MPs fulfil important roles as community leaders. These roles largely 
centre on representation – specifically geographic representation. Many of 
the community leadership roles that MPs adopted were based on the 
                                                 
9 Under the first-past-the-post electoral system, the equivalent option was to recruit 
potential leaders to stand in by-elections. The elections of David Lange and Geoffrey Palmer 
are examples of this. 
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legitimacy of their office – if they were not MPs they would not be 
community leaders in the same capacity. 
 
In chapter four, community leadership above and beyond ex-officio roles was 
explored. MPs are in a unique position within their communities. Their 
connections with a disparate range of community groups mean that they can 
build communities in ways that other community leaders generally cannot. 
When MPs take these opportunities, they demonstrate skills that are 
essential for political leadership: the ability to articulate shared goals that 
can bring people together. This act shows the combination of community 
leadership and ‘proto-leadership’. MPs who fulfil this type of leadership may 
be the most likely of all MPs to become political leaders. 
 
In chapter two, it was hypothesised that not all MPs would want to become 
ministers or prime ministers. Instead, some MPs would be content providing 
community leadership. This hypothesis ran counter to the bulk of the 
existing literature, which suggests that most legislators aspire to the top 
offices of their legislative body. This hypothesis has been partially confirmed, 
with government and small party MPs becoming less ambitious to hold 
executive office over time. By contrast, opposition MPs become more 
ambitious. This suggests that significant variations occur in the leadership 
aspirations of different types of MPs depending on their location in relation 
to power and their proximity to government. 
 
Arguably, the MPs who are most isolated from exercising political leadership 
are government backbenchers. These MPs are connected with power, but are 
largely excluded from it. This may be disillusioning for new MPs and cause 
government backbenchers to focus on community leadership rather than 
aspiring to political leadership. Moreover, the close proximity of government 
backbenchers to ministers means that they see first-hand the toll of 
ministerial roles, and may reassess their willingness to pursue such a career. 
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With regard to small party MPs, it is unsurprising that they have less 
ministerial ambition than their large party counterparts. The chances of 
small party MPs become political leaders are relatively slim – their 
situational constraints are enormous. Even if small parties enter 
arrangements with larger governing parties there is no guarantee of 
ministerial roles or, indeed, real influence. Therefore the opportunity to 
exercise real political leadership may never eventuate. 
 
The ambitions of new opposition MPs suggest that there are major benefits 
to entering parliament in opposition. Undoubtedly, new MPs from large 
opposition parties have greater responsibilities than their governing 
counterparts – it has become standard in recent years for all large party 
opposition MPs to hold at least one portfolio. This provides opposition MPs 
with opportunities to practice the skills of political leadership. These MPs are 
not restricted to traditional notions of constituency service (and therefore 
expectations of geographic community leadership), although they do often 
carry out these roles. Instead, opposition MPs may develop relationships 
with a broad range of groups connected with their portfolio and learn skills 
related to policy and legislative development, negotiation, and compromise – 
skills that are essential for political leadership. Thus large party opposition 
MPs may be the best-placed ‘proto-leaders’ in parliament. 
 
It is unmistakable that MPs hold privileged institutional positions that allow 
them to practice leadership in ways that no other individuals or groups can 
replicate. Therefore, it is essential that parties recruit individuals who hold 
the skills necessary for community leadership and who may develop the 
skills of political leadership in the future. Overall, the 2008 intake of new 
MPs were determined, dedicated, and well-suited to their new roles.  
 
Less than a handful of the 2008 intake will become political leaders; the 
overwhelming majority will not. This may appear a shame, but it should not 
be considered so. The enthusiasm with which many MPs described their 
community leadership suggests that perceptions that the only successes in 
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parliament come from being a political leader are wrong. One simply hopes 
that the MPs who are best suited to community leadership realise where 
their talent lies so that they might feel a sense of achievement within their 
political careers.  
 
Former Prime Minister Sir Keith Holyoake famously counselled his first-term 
MPs to breathe through their noses. This wisdom was repeated in numerous 
interviews with the 2008 intake, demonstrating that it may be as true now as 
it was half a century ago. However, this does not do justice to new MPs’ roles. 
New MPs are representatives, advocates, community members, and 
community leaders. Moreover, they form the pool of future political leaders. 
Perhaps it is wiser to advise new MPs to enter their jobs with reverence, 
respect, and an expectation that not everyone will climb the greasy pole to 
the top of the hierarchy. New MPs should know their position within the 
hierarchy, but should equally enjoy the roles afforded to them. They are, 
after all, roles that very few individuals ever have the pleasure of filling. 
 184 
Appendix I 
 
Participant Information Sheet 
 
Participant Information Sheet for a Study of Candidate 
Recruitment and Role Adaptation in the  
New Zealand Parliament 
 
Researcher: Steven Barnes: School of History, Philosophy, Political Science 
and International Relations, Victoria University of Wellington 
 
I am a Master’s student in Political Science at Victoria University of 
Wellington. As part of this degree I am undertaking a research project 
leading to a thesis. The project I am undertaking is examining candidate 
recruitment and role adaptation in the New Zealand Parliament. The 
University requires that ethics approval be obtained for research involving 
human participants. 
 
I am inviting Members of Parliament who were first elected in the November 
2008 General Election to participate in this study. Participants will be asked 
to meet with me between January-April 2009 to discuss aspects of their 
experiences as a political candidate and their roles within Parliament. Each 
interview is expected to take 30-60 minutes and will be digitally recorded 
and transcribed. 
 
Following the initial interview, participants will be invited to meet with me 
again approximately six months later for a second interview. There is no 
obligation to participate in this subsequent interview. 
 
Should any participants feel the need to withdraw from the project, they may 
do so without question at any time before the data is analysed. Just let me 
know at the time. 
 
Responses collected will form the basis of my research project and will be 
put into a written report on an anonymous basis. It will not be possible for 
you to be identified personally. Only grouped responses will be presented in 
this report. All material collected will be kept confidential. No other person 
besides me and my supervisors, Dr Jon Johansson and Professor Stephen 
Levine, will have access to the recorded interviews or transcripts. The thesis 
will be submitted for marking to the School of History, Philosophy, Political 
Science and International Relations and deposited in the University Library. 
Digital recordings and transcripts will be destroyed two years after the end 
of the project. 
 
If you have any questions or would like to receive further information about 
the project, please contact me at steven.barnes@vuw.ac.nz or 027 426 3710, 
or my supervisors, Dr Jon Johansson (phone: 04 463-6424) or Professor 
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Stephen Levine (phone: 04 463-5233), at the School of History, Philosophy, 
Political Science and International Relations at Victoria University, P O Box 
600, Wellington. 
 
Steven Barnes 
 186 
Appendix II 
 
Consent to Participation in Research 
 
 
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATION IN RESEARCH 
 
Title of project: Candidate Recruitment and Role Adaptation 
in the New Zealand Parliament 
 
 I have been given and have understood an explanation of this research 
project.  
 
 I have had an opportunity to ask questions and have them answered to my 
satisfaction.  
 
 I understand that I may withdraw myself (or any information I have 
provided) from this project (before data collection and analysis is complete) 
without having to give reasons. 
 
 I understand that any information I provide will be kept confidential to 
the researcher and the supervisors. 
 
 I understand that the published results will not use my name, and that no 
opinions will be attributed to me in any way that will identify me.  
 
 I understand that the digital recordings of interviews will be securely 
stored and electronically wiped two years after the completion of the project 
unless I indicate that I would like them returned to me. 
 
 I would like to receive a summary of the results of this research when it is 
completed. 
 
 I agree to take part in this research. 
 
Signed: 
 
 
Name of participant: 
 
 
Date: 
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Appendix III 
 
First Interview Schedule 
 
 
Section I: General Reactions 
1. What kind of experience has this been for you so far, from a personal 
viewpoint? 
(How have you found being an MP so far?) 
(Would you say that you have enjoyed being an MP so far?) 
 
Section II: Personal Situation before Seeking Election 
1. When did you first become interested in politics? 
(Was your family political when you were growing up?) 
(What are some of the things that interested you about politics?) 
 
2. How would you describe your temperament? 
 
Section III: Decision to Run 
1. What was it that made you want to be an MP?  
(What would you say was the single most important factor that led to your 
decision to run for Parliament?) 
 
2. How did your family feel about your decision to stand for Parliament? 
(Did your family support your decision to become an MP?) 
(How did discussions within your family about you becoming an MP go?) 
 
Section IV: Candidacy 
1. How did you find the candidate selection process? 
(Did you find it straightforward or difficult to be selected as a candidate? 
 
2. Electorate MPs: (Tell me about the completion you faced from others within 
your party for the ______ (seat) candidacy)  
 (Did you face any competition for the ______ (seat) candidacy?) 
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 OR 
 List MPs: Tell me about the competition you faced to gain a winnable place on 
your party’s list. 
 
3. What qualities do you think the selectors were looking for in a candidate? 
(Why do you think you succeeded in (winning the ______ nomination/gaining 
a winnable list placing)?) 
(What made you stand out over the other competitors?) 
 
Section V: Campaign and Election 
1. Overall, what kind of experience was the election campaign? 
 (Did you enjoy campaigning?) 
 
2. How long before the election did you begin campaigning? 
 
Section VI: Role Definition 
1. How would you describe the job of being an MP? 
 (What is the main duty or function of an MP?)  
 (What approach should MPs take to their work?) 
 
2. Are there any particular groups that you see yourself as representing in 
Parliament? 
 
Section VII: Initial Parliamentary Experiences 
1. How did you feel the first time you attended the House? 
(What stands out in your mind about first taking your seat in the House?) 
 
2. How did you find giving your maiden speech in the House? 
(How did you feel speaking in the House for the first time?) 
 
3. How have you found Select Committee work? 
(How have things been going on the _________ (committee) so far?) 
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Section VII: Relationships 
1. How would you describe your relationships with your party’s leaders and 
senior MPs? 
(How do you feel your party’s leadership and senior MPs are performing?) 
 
2. How would you describe your relationship with your own party’s MPs? 
(Do you get along with your caucus colleagues?) 
 
3. How would you describe your relationship with MPs from other parties? 
(Do you get along with MPs from other parties?) 
 
Section VIII: Future Perspectives 
1. What is your general feeling about politics in your own future? 
(Do you see politics as a long-term career for yourself?) 
 
2. What are some of the likely political possibilities for you in the future? 
(What kind of goals do you think you will be able to achieve while in 
Parliament?) 
 
3. How many terms do you think you’ll remain in Parliament for? 
(Are you planning on standing for one or more terms after this one?) 
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Appendix IV 
 
Second Interview Schedule 
 
Section I: General Reactions 
1. How have things changed for you since we last met? 
2. Is there anything that you know now that you wish you knew when you first 
arrived at Parliament? 
 
Section II: Roles 
1. What do you think is the single most important role that you have as an MP? 
 
Section III: Constituents 
1. Who would you say are your constituents? 
2. Do you feel accountable to them? 
3. Approximately how many hours per week would you spend on constituent 
issues? 
4. Do you feel like your constituents have accepted you as ‘their’ 
representative? 
 
Section IV: Electorate vs. List 
1. Electorate MPs: Do you feel like there’s any difference between your role as 
an MP and the roles taken up by list MPs? 
a. Which role would you prefer? 
2. List MPs: Do you feel like there’s any difference between your role as an MP 
and the roles taken up by electorate MPs? 
a. Which role would you prefer? 
3. Do you think that the roles between MPs from larger parties differ greatly 
from the roles of MPs in smaller parties?  
a. Putting party preferences aside, which role would you prefer? 
 
Section V: Psychology 
1. What drives you as a person and motivates you as a politician? 
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2. Do you feel like public expectations of MPs’ behaviour in both a professional 
and personal capacity are reasonable? 
3. Do you feel effective as an MP? 
4. Do you feel like you belong here? 
 
Section VI: Party 
1. How have things been going within your party? 
2. Do you feel accountable to your party? 
3. Would you like more autonomy from your party? 
4. How do you find caucus meetings? 
5. How do you find caucus committees? 
 
Section VII: Parliament 
1. How have you been enjoying being in the House? 
2. Do you feel like you’ve had enough opportunities to speak in the House, 
particularly at Question Time? 
3. How have your Select Committees been going? 
 
Section VIII: Media 
1. Would you say that you’ve been in the media very often since becoming an 
MP? 
2. How do you find dealing with the media? 
 
Section IX: Relationships 
1. Last time we met you mentioned that you get along with a number of MPs 
from other parties. How has that progressed? 
2. Have there been any changes in your personal life since you became an MP? 
 
Section X: Future Perspectives 
1. When you look at the competition around your party and around Parliament, 
how do you feel about your ability to advance within Parliament? 
2. Last time we met you mentioned that you would like to get into Cabinet. 
Have you taken any steps towards achieving that goal? 
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3. All going well, how many terms do you think you’ll remain in Parliament for? 
4. What do you think you’ll do when you leave Parliament? 
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Appendix V 
 
Parliamentary Services Induction Seminar Agenda 
  
Tuesday 11 November 2008 
Legislative Council Chamber, Parliament House 
2:00 – 2:30 pm Welcome and introductions 
   Welcome and initial introductions to the day’s agenda 
 
2:30 – 2:45 pm Welcome and explanation of the content of the 
induction by Hon Margaret Wilson, Speaker of the 
House of Representatives for the 48th Parliament 
and Responsible Minister for Parliamentary Service 
and Office of the Clerk. 
 
2:45 – 3:00 pm Welcome and overview of the upcoming induction 
provided for new members by the Office of the Clerk. 
 
3:00 – 3:15 pm Overview of the Parliamentary Service’s role in 
supporting members by the General Manager. 
 
3:15 – 3:30 pm Role of the Press Gallery 
Brief account of the press gallery’s role at Parliament by 
Chair of the Press Gallery. 
 
3:30 – 3:45 pm At Parliament 
Overview of the buildings and services within the 
parliamentary precincts. 
 
3:45 – 5:00 pm Tour of the Parliamentary Precincts 
Familiarisation with the parliamentary precincts with a 
specially tailored tour highlighting members’ facilities. 
 
A short briefing of security considerations at 
Parliament will be provided en route. 
 
The Parliamentary Librarian will also provide a short 
introduction to the Library on the tour. 
 
5:00 – 5:30 pm Session wrap-up in the Grand Hall, Parliament House. 
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Wednesday 12 November 2008  
Select Committee Rooms, Number 1 The Terrace 
 
9:30 – 9:45 am Introduction 
Introduction of the day’s agenda by the General 
Manager. 
 
9:45 – 10:45 am Funding and entitlements 
Introduction to members’ funding and entitlements, 
including an outline of the legislative framework and a 
summary of how entitlements are funded, processed 
and reported. 
 
10:45 – 11:00 am  Morning tea 
 
11:00 – 11:15 am Members’ salaries 
Advice about members’ salaries, basic expense 
allowance and superannuation. 
   
11:15 – 11:45 am Technology 
Information on telecommunications, computing 
entitlements and technology options available to 
members. 
 
11:45 – 12:15 pm Out-of-Parliament offices 
Overview of the considerations relating to a member’s 
activities out-of-Parliament, including support 
allocation funding and the rules governing the 
establishment and operation of out-of-Parliament 
offices. 
 
12:15 – 12:30 pm Protocol 
Brief look at the types of protocol considerations that 
arise for members and general information about 
hosting a function at Parliament. 
 
12.30 – 1:30 pm Lunch   
 
1:30 – 2:00 pm Staff  
Overview of staff management, including recruitment of 
support staff and human resources. 
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2:00 – 2:30 pm Travel 
Advice about the travel entitlements available to 
members and their families including information 
about making travel bookings. 
 
2.30 – 2.40 pm Brief afternoon tea break 
 
2.40 – 3:30 pm Issues handling and internet pages 
An overview of key points to consider in handling 
issues referred by constituents (e.g. Privacy Act) and 
members pages on the Parliament Internet site. 
 
3.30 – 4:00 pm Wrap-up 
Panel question and answer session and completion of 
paperwork. 
 
4.00 – 4.05 pm Closing by the Kaiwhakarite. 
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Appendix VI 
 
Office of the Clerk Induction Workshop Programme 
 
 
Day One – Wednesday, 3 December 
 
1.30pm – House Procedures (Debating Chamber)  
 
• An introduction to basic House rules and procedures 
• Practice speaking and use of microphones 
• Oral questions (includes role-play). 
 
3.15pm – Afternoon Tea 
 
3.30pm – Making the law  
 
• Types and progress of legislation. 
 
Day Two – Thursday, 4 December 
 
9.30am – Introduction to Select Committees  
 
11.15am – Morning Tea   
 
11.30am – Role-play of a select committee examination 
 
1.00pm – Lunch 
 
1.30pm – Parliamentary Library 
 
• How the Library supports Members of Parliament. 
 
3.00pm – Wrap-Up 
 
• Opening of Parliament 
• What’s next (maiden speeches and Address in Reply debate). 
 
3.30pm – Afternoon tea
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DINNERTIME SESSIONS TIMETABLE 2008/2009 
 
The following timetable for the dinnertime sessions has been proposed by 
Office of the Clerk and Parliamentary Service. 
 
 Session Content Date/timing 
(no longer 
than  
1 hour) 
Organiser 
1 Pecuniary 
Interests 
This session will 
explain the 
principles 
members need to 
apply when 
making a return 
of pecuniary 
interests, along 
with related 
timetable and 
procedural issues. 
It is also an 
opportunity for 
members to meet 
senior staff who 
can assist during 
the annual return 
process and 
throughout the 
year. 
 
All returns need 
to be submitted 
by the end of 
February 2009. 
 December 
2008 
 
6.15 – 7.00pm 
Office of the 
Clerk 
 
 
2 Advertising, 
office signage 
and 
sponsorship 
This session will 
cover the pre-
approval process, 
briefly cover the 
rules of publicity, 
and give 
examples of the 
types of publicity, 
signage and 
sponsorship that 
can be paid for 
from 
parliamentary 
funds. 
February 2009 
 
6.15-7.00pm 
Parliamentary 
Service 
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3 Parliamentary 
Press Gallery 
Presentation by 
the Parliamentary 
Press Gallery 
Hosted by the 
Parliamentary 
Service 
March 2009 
 
6.15-7.00pm 
Parliamentary 
Service 
 
 
4 Staff 
management 
Presentation by 
Parliamentary 
Service 
March 2009 
 
6.15-7.00pm 
Parliamentary 
Service 
 
 
5 Research 
services 
available to 
members 
Delivered by 
Parliamentary 
Service 
April 2009 
 
6.15-7.00pm 
Parliamentary 
Service 
 
 
6 Regulations 
review 
Hosted by the 
Office of the Clerk 
The session will 
focus on the work 
of the Regulations 
Review 
Committee 
May 2009 
 
6.15-7.00pm 
Office of the 
Clerk 
 
 
7 Estimates Delivered by the 
Office of the Clerk 
June 2009 
 
6.15-7.00pm 
Office of the 
Clerk 
 
 
8 Parliamentary 
Privilege 
Delivered by the 
Office of the Clerk 
To Be 
Confirmed 
Office of the 
Clerk 
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Appendix VII 
 
Code of Conduct for Members of Parliament 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
• The New Zealand electorate expects members of Parliament to act 
ethically and with integrity. 
 
• An MMP Parliament demands a standard of behaviour that allows all 
voices to be heard.  
 
• This Code of Conduct enables the public to be clear about the principles 
that define members’ activities and how these principles are interpreted 
and upheld.  
 
Purpose of the code  
 
• The purpose of the Code of Conduct is to assist members in the discharge 
of their obligations to the House, to their constituents and the public.  
 
• Nothing in the Code of Conduct derogates from Standing Orders as 
Speakers’ Rulings or any other official code of conduct or guidelines for 
members. This Code of Conduct supplements and supports other 
requirements.  
 
I “name” agree to uphold this Code of Conduct for Members of Parliament  
 
 
Signature: __________________________________________  
 
 
Date: __________________________________________  
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